Daily Report

Soviet Union

FBIS-SOV-90-203
Friday
19 October 1990

Daily Report
Soviet Union

FBIS-SOV-90-203 *19 October 1990*

CONTENTS

NOTICE TO READERS: An * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

Proposal Issued on Nuclear-Free Baltic Sea *[TASS]* 1
Joint U.S. Control Commission Opens Session *[TASS]* 1
Disarmament Process Seen 'Back on Schedule' *[PRAVDA 14 Oct]* 1

WORLDWIDE ISSUES

Afanasyevskiy Lauds 'New Stage' in NATO Ties *[PRAVDA 12 Oct]* 4
Greenpeace Representatives Explain Operation *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 17 Oct]* 5

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

United States & Canada

Cheney Concludes Four-Day Visit to Moscow 7
Meets With Soviet Legislators *[IZVESTIYA 19 Oct]* 7
Advocates Arms Cuts, Reform *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 19 Oct]* 8
Attends News Conference 19 Oct *[TASS]* 8
TASS Reports on Primakov's Trip to Washington 8
Primakov Arrives 18 Oct 8
Baker, Scowcroft Meet Primakov 9
CIA Director on Terrorist Information Exchange *[Moscow TV]* 9
Talks Held With U.S. on Latin American Issues *[TASS]* 9
Meeting on U.S.-Soviet Trade Ends in Baltimore *[SELSKAYA ZHIZN 14 Oct]* 9
Maslyukov Receives U.S. Businessmen at Kremlin *[IZVESTIYA 17 Oct]* 9
UPS Enters Venture To Provide Far East Service *[Moscow TV]* 10
Obukhov Confers With Canada's Clark in Ottawa *[Moscow Radio]* 10

China

Li Peng Makes Remarks on Developing Economy *[Moscow International]* 10
PLA Rear Services Delegation Concludes Visit *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 16 Oct]* 10
Panel Starts To 'Register' Sections of Border *[IZVESTIYA 17 Oct]* 10
Commentary Notes Singapore Leader's PRC Visit *[Mikhaylov on Moscow International]* 11

Northeast Asia

Gorbachev-No Tae-u Reportedly To Meet in 1991 *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 18 Oct]* 11
North-South Korean Premier Talks Evaluated *[Moscow International]* 11
Kaifu Highly Rates Soviet Reform Efforts *[Moscow International]* 12
Japan's Kaifu, Nakayama Cited on Kurils, Treaty *[TASS]* 12
Japan Reiterates Demand for Return of Kurils *[PRAVDA 18 Oct]* 12
Russian Republic Seeks Role in Talks on Kurils *[Tokyo KYODO]* 13
KGB Notes Japanese Fishing Violations Increase *[TASS]* 13
New Payment Plan Proposed for Japanese Steel *[Moscow International]* 13
Japanese Firm To Aid Khabarovsk Airport Project *[Moscow TV]* 13

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Shortfall in Oil Deliveries to Vietnam Denied *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 16 Oct]* 14

Commentary Assails Khmer Rouge 'Offensive' *[Moscow International]* 14

Near East & South Asia

Commentators Discuss Outlook in Gulf Crisis *[Shishlin on Moscow Radio]* 15
Nonaligned Movement's Gulf Crisis Role Viewed *[Radio Peace and Progress]* 16
Soviet Hills Seizure in Pakistan Denied *[Moscow International]* 17
Prospects for Comeback by Bhutto Assessed *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 12 Oct]* 17
Human Rights Expert's Visit to I n Assessed *[Radio Peace and Progress]* 18
'Rifts' Perceived Between Afghan Rebel Groups *[TASS]* 19
Doubts Cast on Hikmatyar's Softer Stance *[PRAVDA 16 Oct]* 20

Sub-Saharan Africa

Shevardnadze Greets Malian Relations Anniversary *[IZVESTIYA 18 Oct]* 20
New Ambassador to Zambia Appointed *[TASS]* 20

East Europe

Communique Issued After Skubiszewski's Visit *[IZVESTIYA 18 Oct]* 20
Yanayev Delegation Meets Jaruzelski in Warsaw *[TASS]* 22
Romanian Envoy to USSR Holds News Conference *[IZVESTIYA 13 Oct]* 22

West Europe

Shevardnadze Concludes European Tour in Austria 22
Arrives in Vienna, Meets Mock *[TASS]* 22
Discusses Meeting With Mock *[PRAVDA 19 Oct]* 22
Confers With Dumas on Treaty *[TASS]* 22
Discusses Talks With Dumas *[Moscow TV]* 23
Further on Shevardnadze's Visit *[cross-reference]* 23
Shevardnadze Thanks De Michelis for Credit *[Rome ANSA]* 23
Greek Legislative Delegation Visits Moscow 24
Received by Nishanov 16 Oct *[TASS]* 24
Perestroyka Policy Lauded *[TASS]* 24
Germany Approves Treaty on Soviet Troops *[TASS]* 24
Culture Minister Gubenko Hails Ties With FRG *[PRAVDA 16 Oct]* 24
Berlin Group Questions Soviet Monument Fate *[TASS]* 25
Soviet Jewish Emigration to Germany Increases *[PRAVDA 17 Oct]* 25
Belgian Foreign Minister's Visit Postponed *[TASS]* 25
British-Soviet Trade Commission Ends Talks *[TASS]* 26
Gosteleradio Signs Agreement With French TV *[Moscow TV]* 26

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Supreme Soviet

Supreme Soviet Approves Gorbachev's Market Plan *[TASS]* 27
Gorbachev Says Plan Not 'Rejection of Socialism' *[TASS]* 27
Ryzhkov Says Government Ready To Initiate Program *[TASS]* 27
Deputies Debate Market Plan at 18 Oct Session *[Moscow TV]* 28
Aganbegyan Report *[Moscow TV]* 29
Commission Supports Gorbachev Plan *[TASS]* 34
Aganbegyan Dismisses Yeltsin Speech as 'Political' *[Moscow TV]* 35
Gorbachev Criticizes Yeltsin's Economic Statement *[TASS]* 35
Interregional Deputies Deliberate on Economic Plan *[Moscow Radio]* 36
Committees, Commissions Debate Economic Plan *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 18 Oct]* 36
Bunich Predicts Deficit of Over R80 Billion *[Moscow Radio]* 37
TASS Observer Views Gorbachev Market Plan 38
Kucherenko Urges Implementation of Economic Plan *[PRAVDA 19 Oct]* 38
General Prosecutor Sukharev's Resignation Accepted *[IZVESTIYA 18 Oct]* 38

Political & Social

Gorbachev Briefs Editors on Economic Reform *[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA 19 Oct]* 39
Popov Calls on Gorbachev To Head Coalition *[Moscow International]* 39
Council of Ministers Discusses Budget 18 Oct *[TASS]* 39
Alekseyev Seeks Privatization of State Property *[Moscow International]* 40
PRAVDA Editorial on CPSU Plenum Results *[18 Oct]* 40
Council of Ministers Presidium Discusses Crime *[PRAVDA 6 Oct]* 43
Demidov Discusses Arms Confiscation Decree *[Moscow Radio]* 44
Commentary on Crime Resolution Prospects *[IZVESTIYA 11 Oct]* 45
KGB To Intensify Fight Against Organized Crime *[TASS]* 46
Plans for Phone Taps in Criminal Cases Outlined *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 10 Oct]* 46
Kryuchkov 'Inclined' To Pardon Gordiyevskiy *[Moscow International]* 46
Gordiyevskiy Defection Case Detailed *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 27 Sep]* 46
Former KGB Officer on Gordiyevskiy Case *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 12 Oct]* 48
Army Deputies' Criticism of Shevardnadze Viewed *[IZVESTIYA 18 Oct]* 50
Further on Shenin's 17 Oct News Conference *[PRAVDA 18 Oct]* 51
Urges 'Positive Work' in CPSU *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 18 Oct]* 52
Veterans Protest Against Desecration of Monuments *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 14 Oct]* 53
Third Komsomol Central Committee Plenum Meets 53
12 Oct Information Report *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 13 Oct]* 53
13 Oct Information Report *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 14 Oct]* 53
'Democratic Platform' Conference Forms Party *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 16 Oct]* 54
Further on CPSU Ideology Conference Proceedings *[PRAVDA 14 Oct]* 54
CPSU Secretary on Changes in Party Apparatus *[Prague RUDE PRAVO 17 Oct]* 56
CPSU Role in Multiparty System Examined *[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA 4 Oct]* 56
Center for Applied Political Research Opens *[Moscow Radio]* 58

Economic

State Bank Official Explains Devaluation *[Moscow TV]* 58
New Bank Notes Do Not Signal Currency Reform *[TRUD 12 Oct]* 59
Power Station Fuel Stocks Down From Last Winter *[IZVESTIYA 12 Oct]* 60
Merchant Marine Head Meets Press in Vladivostok *[TASS]* 60
Economic Reform Plans Seen as 'Fairy Tales' *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 17 Oct]* 60
Economist Calls for Immediate Privatization *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 6 Oct]* 63
Article Cites Experts on Conversion Issues *[IZVESTIYA 6 Oct]* 67

Agricultural

Goskomstat Releases 15 Oct Harvest Figures *[SELSKAYA ZHIZN 19 Oct]* 68
Sugar Shortages Blamed on Inefficient Processing *[IZVESTIYA 17 Oct]* 69

Military

Baltic Fleet Commander Notes Navy Pullback *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 14 Oct]* 70
Frolov Attends Military Air Academy Meeting *[PRAVDA 17 Oct]* 71
Paper on Conscripts' Mothers Opposed To Violence
[Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER 15 Oct] 71
Weimar Military Tribunal Sentences Deserter *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 13 Oct]* 72

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Baltic Republics

Nordic Council Desires Relations With Baltics *[TASS]* 73
Savisaar Holds News Conference on U.S. Visit *[Tallinn Radio]* 73
TASS Not Invited *[TASS]* 73
Estonian Legislature Discusses Presidency 74
Narva Rally Protests Estonian Economic Border *[IZVESTIYA 16 Oct]* 74
Military Official Says Latvia Parade To Be Held *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 19 Oct]* 74

Latvian Party Central Committee Plenum Reported *[PRAVDA 18 Oct]* 75
Prunskiene Views Meetings With Swedish Officials *[Vilnius Radio]* 75
Talks With Carlsson Assessed *[Vilnius Radio]* 75
Ozolas Outlines Procedure for Talks With USSR *[IZVESTIYA 17 Oct]* 75
Lithuania, USSR Lay Groundwork for Talks *[TASS]* 76
Lithuanian Crime Wave Due to Political Instability *[PRAVDA 15 Oct]* 76
VLIKAS Wants Baltic Issue on Paris CSCE Agenda *[Vilnius Radio]* 77

RSFSR

Yavlinskiy Announces Resignation 17 October *[Moscow TV]* 77
Yavlinskiy Interviewed *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 18 Oct]* 79
Silayev, Kozyrev Meet With Poland's Skubiszewski *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 13 Oct]* 80
Kozyrev Holds First News Conference *[TASS]* 80
RSFSR Agriculture Ministry Discusses 'Problems' *[Moscow Radio]* 81
Russian Legislator Examines Ownership Changes *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 11 Oct]* 81
Russian Communist Party Draft Guidelines Released *[TASS]* 82
RSFSR Signs Accords With Belorussia, Ukraine *[Moscow TV]* 83
Democratic Russia Congress Tasks Defined *[Moscow Radio]* 83
Founding Congress Planned *[TASS]* 83
Russian Legislators Found New Political Journal *[TASS]* 84
Leningrad City Soviet Session Work Assessed *[Moscow Radio]* 84
Leningrad Communists Criticized for Indecision *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 17 Oct]* 84
Potential Nuclear Hazard to Lake Ladoga Reported *[Moscow TV]* 85
Siberian Oil Workers Threaten To Strike 20 Oct *[Moscow International]* 85
Urals Lease-Holders Union Meets in Chelyabinsk *[TASS]* 85
Demonstrators Picket Kabardino-Balkar Paper *[IZVESTIYA 16 Oct]* 85
Yamalo-Nenetsk Okrug Proclaims Itself Republic *[IZVESTIYA 18 Oct]* 86
Kalmyk ASSR Adopts Sovereignty Declaration *[Moscow Radio]* 86
Yamal-Nenets Deputies Adopt Republic Resolution *[Moscow Radio]* 86
Legislature Postpones Gorkiy City Renaming *[Moscow TV]* 86

Western Republics

Ukrainian Students To Change Protest Methods *[AFP]* 86
Ukraine's Grinev Interviewed on Various Topics 86
On Moscow Talks *[KOSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 18 Oct]* 86
On Army Draft *[IZVESTIYA 16 Oct]* 87
Ukraine Nationalist Demonstrations Examined *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 17 Oct]* 88
Reactions to Rukh Call for Press Boycott Reported *[PRAVDA 16 Oct]* 89
Yalta Soviet Discusses Crimean Tatar Problems *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 18 Oct]* 90
Ukrainian Green Party Elects First Leader *[IZVESTIYA 16 Oct]* 90
Ukraine To Mark Babi Yar Massacre Anniversary *[TASS]* 91
Moldavian Leaders Meet With Snegur *[SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA 19 Sep]* 91
Moldavian Communist Party Plenum Reported *[PRAVDA 17 Oct]* 93
Belorussian Supreme Soviet Passes Leasing Law *[TASS]* 94
Belorussian Decree on Law and Order Published *[SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA 21 Sep]* 94

Caucasus

Ter-Petrosyan Interviewed About Civil Strife *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 19 Oct]* 95
Official Links Blockade to Armenia's Policy *[ARMENPRES]* 96
Oil Supplies to Armenia Resumed *[IZVESTIYA 18 Oct]* 97
NKAO Philanthropic Union Official Released *[Yerevan International]* 97
Mutalibov Defends Azerbaijan Position on NKAO *[SOYUZ No 38]* 97
Azerbaijan's Aliyev Describes Election Campaign *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 13 Oct]* 99
Baku Commandant Cancels 7 Nov Victory Parade *[TASS]* 100
Foreign Businessmen, Azerbaijanis Meet in Baku *[PRAVDA 17 Oct]* 100
Georgia Protests Holding 7 Nov Military Parade *[Moscow International]* 100

Central Asia

Coverage of Kazakhstan Supreme Soviet Proceedings 101
Sovereignty Declaration Debated *[IZVESTIYA 18 Oct]* 101
Republics Agreements Approved *[Alam-Ata Radio]* 101
Subscriptions to Kazakhstan Press Decline *[PRAVDA 16 Oct]* 102
'Unity' Movement Registered in Alma-Ata *[IZVESTIYA 11 Oct]* 102
Russian Migration From Uzbekistan Examined *[SOYUZ No 40]* 103

Proposal Issued on Nuclear-Free Baltic Sea

LD1810212190 Moscow TASS in English 2002 GMT 18 Oct 90

[Text] Moscow October 18 TASS—Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Yuliy Kvitsinskiy today met the ambassadors of Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Poland and Germany.

The attention of the ambassadors was drawn to President Gorbachev's statement of October 26, 1989 in the Finlandia Palace. The statement said the Soviet Union had made a decision concerning its nuclear forces in the Baltic Sea and had begun the unilateral elimination of some types of sea-based nuclear arms in the region.

The Soviet Union pledged to scrap all the nuclear ballistic missile-carrying submarines, dubbed "Golf" in the West, that were deployed in the region.

On October 15, 1990, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze told the Soviet parliament that the Soviet Union had kept its promise.

Now the Soviet Union is making a new major peace initiative aimed at further strengthening stability in Europe. The ambassadors invited to the conversation were handed a note by the USSR Foreign Ministry which said:

"The Soviet Union gives up the deployment in peace time of nuclear arms on Soviet ships and combat aircraft on the Baltic Sea and in the airspace above the Baltic on a permanent or a temporary basis.

"This step by the Soviet Union creates practical prerequisites of a military, material and political nature for granting nuclear-free status to the Baltic Sea.

"As a practical step in this direction, we propose that nuclear-weapon and Baltic countries pledge not to deploy nuclear weapons on the sea floor and inside the sea bedrock within the boundaries of territorial and inland waters and ban, without exception, all calls into the Baltic Sea of nuclear weapon-carrying ships and submarines and flights of nuclear arms-carrying aircraft above the Baltic Sea.

"For the purpose of considering questions related to the working out of effective guarantees of the Baltic Sea's nuclear-free status, the Soviet Union is prepared to start respective negotiations with nuclear powers and Baltic states.

"These negotiations should lead to an agreement on verification of the implementation of the accords concerning the Baltic Sea's non-nuclear status.

"We believe that the granting of the nuclear-free status to the Baltic Sea should be accompanied by carrying out other measures to strengthen strategic stability in the Baltic Sea, including greater openness and predictability of the naval activity.

"The Soviet Union proposes holding needed consultations by experts to prepare the negotiations."

During the conversation, it was stressed that the Soviet Union's new unilateral step was made possible as a result of deep changes taking place on our continent and in the entire range of East-West relations and the development process of actual disarmament. The Soviet Union hopes that its new initiative will meet with an adequate reaction on the part of our partners, the deputy foreign minister said.

Joint U.S. Control Commission Opens Session

LD1810202990 Moscow TASS in English 1945 GMT 18 Oct 90

[Text] Geneva October 18 TASS—A regular ninth session of the Special Control Commission opened here today. The Commission was set up in accordance with the Soviet-American treaty on medium and shorter-range missiles. The session will discuss issues dealing with the implementation of the treaty.

Disarmament Process Seen 'Back on Schedule'

PM1810141690 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Oct 90 Second Edition p 7

["Observer's Opinion" by Yevgeniy Shashkov: "'Disarmament Express' Back on Schedule"]

[Text] At the beginning of October, everyone who has been following attentively the complex developments of the Helsinki process breathed a sigh of relief: The next all-European summit conference will be held after all. It will take place in Paris 19-21 November. This was confirmed at the meeting of CSCE foreign ministers which ended in New York on 3 October. As already reported in the press, the leaders of the foreign policy departments of the 33 European countries, the United States, and Canada adopted two documents—the New York meeting communique and a statement on the Persian Gulf crisis—but most importantly, they approved the agenda of the forthcoming Paris conference.

I shall recall just a few of the main questions to be examined in the French capital. First and foremost, the signing of agreements on conventional arms reduction in Europe and on continuing talks in that area, as well as the opening of talks on tactical nuclear weapons; the approval of the declaration on the new principles of mutual relations between the Warsaw Pact and NATO and the creation of a center for the prevention or solution of conflicts; and the adoption of a decision to create an all-European assembly, possibly based on the existing European Parliament.

Among the items on the agenda, I think that the treaty on conventional arms reduction in Europe is of special significance. As U.S. Secretary of State Baker reported at a briefing in the White House, this agreement sets arms limits for NATO and the Warsaw Pact. For example, the

limit for tanks is set at 20,000, as is the figure for artillery, the limit for armored combat vehicles is 30,000, and for helicopters 2,000.

In accordance with these "ceilings," any country belonging to either bloc may have combat hardware within the following limits: up to 13,300 tanks, up to 13,700 artillery pieces, up to 20,000 armored vehicles, up to 1,500 helicopters, and up to 5,150 warplanes. Expressed as a percentage of the total quantity of armaments in Europe, these "ceilings" represent 33 percent of the tanks, 34.3 percent of artillery, 33.3 percent of armored personnel carriers, and 37.5 percent of helicopters. "The Soviet Union," Baker stated, "will be bound by considerably greater commitments to destroy equipment than NATO or any of its members, including the United States. We will have to destroy 4,000 tanks in NATO. The Soviets or the Warsaw Pact, and let us talk about the Warsaw Pact, will have to destroy 19,000 tanks. The figures are similar in other categories and in some indicators they are even more in our favor..."

Such was the compromise reached during the New York talks between E.A. Shevardnadze and J. Baker regarding the "ceilings" of the various conventional arms categories. And this was done, in the Soviet minister's words, so that the "disarmament train should make up the time lag that alarms us all and get back on schedule and will now arrive on time in Paris."

What was the West's reaction to events in New York? Enthusiastic, of course. As it indeed it should be, after all, thousands of Soviet tanks will be leaving Europe, tanks which were a "nightmare" for the West Europeans for many years. Commentaries are also dominated by the idea that the "USSR has made considerable concessions to the West." Outwardly, that is precisely how it seems. Although. in my view, all that has happened is primarily a concession to common sense. After all, the treaty on conventional arms reduction (the USSR spends around 80 percent of its military budget on them) is a blessing not only for the West but for the Soviet Union, too.

Although, it seems to me, this compromise will inspire the most conflicting feelings among Soviet people. Indeed, there is food for thought here. In my view, the point is this: Why have our political decisions in foreign policy activity been lagging behind the development of international events recently, unlike in the first years of perestroyka? Why do analyses of foreign policy processes hardly ever include such an important element as long-term forecasting, with the result that many international events catch us completely unawares? And why do we find it so difficult to make commonsense concessions on foreign policy?

Take the unification of Germany, for example. At the end of last year, many Germanists, including those in the Soviet Union, predicted the extraordinarily rapid process of unification. They believed that by fall 1990 or, more precisely, by the December elections in the FRG, the GDR would cease to exist. But our representatives, on whom the adoption of political decisions is very much dependent, continued to assert almost until spring that "unification will not happens all that quickly... It will most probably take several years."

In the organizational sphere, things sometimes happen which are hard to explain. It seemed an obvious fact that since the existence of the GDR is coming to an end, it will be necessary to view its international commitments and agreements as inoperative. In particular, the Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation with the USSR, which has been in operation since 1975. At the beginning of September, the GDR Foreign Ministry took up this matter with the relevant USSR authorities. However, literally the day before German unification, our parliamentarians are confronted with the necessity to adopt the corresponding USSR Supreme Soviet resolution.

International life today demands different ideas on the time factor in politics. The time when diplomats could spend almost two decades at the negotiating table, as happened in Vienna, and then hand over to their sons who had since grown up in that period has disappeared into the past forever. The loss of momentum in the foreign policy process could have unpredictable results.

In my view, the political hypodynamics [gipodinamika] at the Vienna talks were the cause of the serious problems in organizing the Paris meeting. Let us recall: At the end of September the "disarmament express" was stuck in the Vienna siding. The U.S. representatives could not take the strain and began applying pressure, stating that if a multilateral agreement on conventional arms was not ready for signing at the Paris conference, G. Bush would not go to France.

Of course, the pressure to which our partners in the talks resorted is not one of the best methods. But let us leave that to their conscience. We are primarily interested in how justified the USSR delegation's uncompromising stance was. Without going into details, that stance consisted in general terms of the following: The Soviet delegation insisted rigidly until very recently on a maximum "ceiling" of 40 percent of the total quantity of arms in Europe for the USSR while the NATO representatives insisted on 30 percent.

If the reports published in the Soviet and foreign press are to be believed, why did we continue defending in Vienna the usual ideas on the means of ensuring our security with a "reserve" of military strength instead of reaching a rational compromise? This contradicted our own strategic guideline on creating an all-European home in which all security problems will be resolved primarily by political rather than military methods. I do not think that the West will now be as vigorous in its efforts to undermine our security as it once was. The united Germany has consciously chosen to sharply limit its military potential. It seems to me that Western politicians are not so short-sighted as to artificially encourage a "Versailles syndrome" among the superpowers in the East.

From the military political viewpoint, the creation in Eastern Europe of a massive Soviet tank force and a powerful superiority in conventional arms and forces aimed against Western Europe was our asymmetric answer to the U.S. nuclear threat. But that confrontational logic was acceptable in the fifties and early sixties. Since then we have long had a counterthreat to U.S. territory and achieved parity in nuclear missiles. The question is: Today do we need even the semblance of a Soviet military threat to the states of the Old World? In my view the answer can only be no.

As for our own security, whether we like it or not, until military force as a means of maintaining peace is completely replaced by reliable guarantees in the political, economic, humanitarian, and environmental spheres, the USSR's nuclear potential will remain one of the main guarantees of its security. In my view, the tough approach is justified when discussing these problems and, of course, you must not go too fast. But that is for the future.

Today, though, one may state with satisfaction that thanks to the New York meeting, the "disarmament express" has gained the necessary speed. The treaty on the reduction of conventional arms in Europe is the first postwar agreement on conventional arms involving both the United States and the USSR. Thereby a complex stage which lasted 17 years on the difficult path toward the all-European home will be accomplished.

Afanasyevskiy Lauds 'New Stage' in NATO Ties

PM1710113790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
12 Oct 90 Second Edition p 5

["Interview for PRAVDA" in Brussels with N.N. Afanasyevskiy, Soviet ambassador to Belgium, by correspondent V. Peresada; date not given: "'Our Man at NATO.' Soviet Diplomat's Unusual Mission"—first two paragraphs are PRAVDA introduction]

[Text] The signs of changes in East-West relations include the start of permanent official contacts between the North Atlantic alliance and the member states of the Warsaw Pact Organization. The proposal to establish them was made at the July session of the NATO Council in London. It immediately met with a positive response in Moscow and the capitals of other allied states. In accordance with that proposal, the Warsaw Pact countries' ambassadors to Brussels (the headquarters of the alliance is located there) received instructions from their governments to represent them in the maintenance of ties with NATO.

For the Soviet Union this mission is fulfilled by N.N. Afanasyevskiy. He is 50 years old and a career diplomat who has dealt with European problems for many years. Before being appointed ambassador to Belgium, he headed the USSR Foreign Ministry's First European Department. Today V. Peresada, our correspondent in Brussels, talks with him.

[Peresada] Nikolay Nikolayevich, you are the first Soviet ambassador who can also be called "our man at NATO." How do you view the very fact of such an unusual mission?

[Afanasyevskiy] I would like to caution against exaggerations. This is not the only channel of contacts with NATO. There are others. For example, the talks on conventional arms and armed forces in Europe, which are being held in Vienna. In addition, questions of a military-political nature are just a part of our dialogue with the West on a wide range of European problems. Relations were established with the EC 18 months ago, and ties are functioning between the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. But, of course, permanent links with NATO are of special significance because this organization is responsible for defense aspects, which are still the key aspects of security in Europe. So a major step has been taken toward mutual trust.

[Peresada] For many years we held a guarded or even a hostile attitude toward NATO. That was perfectly understandable. However, even today, as far as I know, many people believe that practically everything there remains as before, to the accompaniment of talk about changes. What impression do you get? For you frequently visit the headquarters of the alliance now.

[Afanasyevskiy] Yes, NATO was always the opposite grouping, from which we expected little and in which, in general, we saw little that was good. And yet our policy was confrontational too. The past is over, and today we must pay tribute to that organization: It managed to sense the changes in time, including the new approaches on the part of the Warsaw Pact, and it is trying to adapt its activity to the present climate in East-West relations. An entire action program in this are was proclaimed at the NATO Council's London session. Its essence is to strengthen political principles in the alliance's strategy, to review military doctrines, and to define NATO's place and role in the future Europe.

[Peresada] What, specifically, is your task?

[Afanasyevskiy] Broadly, I understand it like this: to be, figuratively speaking, together with the embassy staffers who help to realize links with NATO, "direct witnesses" to the conformity of statements with deeds. The declarations really sound good, and there is now a great degree of mutual understanding at the level of intentions. But progress toward practical results is far more important. The Warsaw Pact states are already tackling this, and we will see how the North Atlantic alliance acts.

[Peresada] Evidently, your mission is also to be a channel of information?

[Afanasyevskiy] Of course. Since the new policy is no longer confrontation but a policy of interaction and even cooperation, an exchange of information is simply essential. And it is being carried out, taking into consideration both common problems and specific situations.

[Peresada] If it is not a secret, what has the NATO headquarters informed you about recently?

[Afanasyevskiy] About its approaches to a "hot" problem—the conflict in the Persian Gulf region. Special NATO Council sessions have twice been convened at ministerial level to discuss the situation. Both times the NATO Secretariat held briefings to report on the main substance of these sessions for the Warsaw Pact countries' governments.

[Peresada] Are they collective or individual meetings?

[Afanasyevskiy] All are invited together for such briefings of ambassadors. But, of course, like our colleagues from the other Warsaw Pact countries, we also conduct bilateral work. For example, within the framework of contacts with the 16 representatives of the NATO countries at this organization. This is particularly important because they form a permanent council which exercises current political leadership of NATO activity in the intervals between sessions.

[Peresada] I have encountered the following wording in the press here: "The Warsaw Pact countries' ambassadors accredited to NATO." Is it correct or not?

[Afanasyevskiy] It is incorrect. The North Atlantic alliance is not a supranational organization but an alliance of sovereign states. Therefore only permanent representatives of the member countries of the alliance are accredited to NATO. So it is a question not of the

Warsaw Pact countries' ambassadors to NATO but of the powers of the ambassadors to Belgium to maintain ties with NATO in combination with their main job, as we are inclined to say. But what really is true is that the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact states are the first to which NATO has offered such a form of relations.

[Peresada] I know that, as previously, a very small group of diplomats at the Soviet Embassy is employed on the "NATO direction." Are you coping?

[Afanasyevskiy] We are experiencing serious difficulties in providing staff for work with NATO. The USSR Embassy in Brussels is not large, and in the entire postwar period it was increased by two people at some time in the sixties. Since then the scale of relations with Belgium has increased significantly, and the "NATO direction" is now being activated too. Therefore we have raised with the NATO Secretariat and the Belgian authorities the question of expanding the embassy insofar as the interests of the matter demand it.

[Peresada] What, according to your observations, can we expect from NATO in the foreseeable future?

[Afanasyevskiy] The immediate prospect has no need of forecasts because it is obvious: The Warsaw Pact and NATO countries are to adopt a joint declaration. Its signing will be timed to coincide with the top-level November meeting of participant states in the all-European process, which will take place in Paris. There is already a consensus on the document's main provisions, including the basic principle: that the member countries of the two alliances no longer consider themselves enemies. Together with the decisions of the 35 CSCE participant states and the agreement on the reduction of conventional arms in Europe this declaration will consolidate the common Warsaw Pact and NATO political course of rejecting military confrontation.

However, it is hard to say yet what the North Atlantic alliance will be like in one, two, or three years' time. An acute debate is now taking place within NATO over its role in tomorrow's Europe. Two trends—"Europist" and "Atlanticist"—are mainly manifested during the debate. Associated with the first is the desire of many West European countries to regard the interests of their own and purely European security as a priority; the purport of the other is to preserve and strengthen "Atlantic solidarity" (meaning not only the U.S. military presence in Europe but also the military emphasis generally in the alliance's activity) in the process of the politicization of NATO. And NATO's prospective role will evidently be determined in the struggle between these two trends, in their interpenetration.

[Peresada] In other words, the North Atlantic alliance, like the Warsaw Pact of course, is faced in its own way with the problem of the future. What do you see as our line in this connection?

[Afanasyevskiy] I believe that, while maintaining our own security at an adequate level, at the same time we must utilize all possible ways to expand openness, dialogue, and cooperation. In order in the very near future to achieve joint actions with a view to creating all-European structures and averting threats of destabilization and conflicts. This task is already appearing on the agenda both of our politics and of European politics as a whole.

[Peresada] As is known, the London summit session sent the Soviet president an invitation to visit Brussels and to address the NATO countries' leaders. The invitation was accepted. From conversations with staffers at the alliance headquarters I know the interest with which this visit is awaited. What significance, in your view, will it have?

[Afanasyevskiy] First, such an invitation in itself is an unprecedented event in all postwar history. It undoubtedly attests to recognition of our present policy.

Second, it has to be kept in mind that the contacts we are now arranging with NATO are the very first steps. I am in no doubt—yes, strictly speaking, this is the purport of the invitation extended by the London session—that our Western partners regard the Soviet president's coming to Brussels and his speech as the start of a qualitatively new stage in relations between the two alliances, between the USSR and NATO.

Greenpeace Representatives Explain Operation

PM1810150590 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 17 Oct 90 p 4

[Unattributed interview with Greenpeace representatives A. Lapshin, L. Vorontsova, and Eleanor O'Hanlon; place and date not given: "Novaya Zemlya is a Dangerous Land"—first and last paragraphs are editorial comment]

[Text] Yesterday A. Lapshin and L. Vorontsova, Soviet representatives of the "Greenpeace" movement, and Eleanor O'Hanlon from Ireland, coordinator of the Novaya Zemlya landing project, spoke to the editorial office.

"Not everyone in the USSR has correctly understood our activity," they said. "'Greenpeace' believes that the USSR's position on the question of nuclear tests is positive and aimed at achieving a universal and total ban on them. Our organization's activity is also aimed at this.

"Our landing is a protest against plans to transfer nuclear weapons testing to Novaya Zemlya from the test range in Kazakhstan which is closing down by public demand. By the end of this year we intend to carry out analogous protest actions at test ranges in other nuclear states—in Mururoa and Nevada.

"Something about Novaya Zemlya. Over the years this island which was declared a military zone was used by the military in a completely uncontrolled fashion mainly to carry out tests. As is known, these tests were carried

out in the atmosphere at first, and then underground. Any underground tests lead to a leak of radioactive material and the contamination of the island and surrounding water, and currents disperse the radiation throughout the whole world. Furthermore, over a period of many years, the restricted zone around Novaya Zemlya was used to bury radioactive waste from nuclear power stations, nuclear submarines, and nuclear icebreakers. We were told, among other things, that the old reactors from the 'Lenin' nuclear icebreaker were buried in this region.

"That is exactly why the military authorities block every access to environmental organizations' ships in this area. We believe that the Novaya Zemlya area must be opened without fail and the environmental situation in this area must be studied thoroughly —perhaps all is not yet lost. 'Greenpeace' is prepared to make its ships and modern equipment available for this purpose.

"When we were preparing the landing on Novaya Zemlya, we wanted to act in accordance with Soviet laws and we sent a request to the official bodies (the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet) well in advance—two-and-one-half months ago—asking them to allow us to enter the Novaya Zemlya region. But the reply, which we received from the USSR Defense Ministry (No. 729-21/721 dated 25 September) says: "The Defense Ministry deems it inadvisable for foreign citizens using foreign ships to carry out any research on the territory of the test range and in the USSR's territorial waters and its area..." Then we took the responsibility upon ourselves. In addition, the participants in the activity became friends with Soviet border guards, many of whom were interpreted in our environmental concerns, although they were fulfilling their duty."

From the editorial office: The "Greenpeace" organization has sent materials on the landing in Novaya Zemlya and data from measurements of radiation and pollution to KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. These will be published in the next few issues.

United States & Canada

Cheney Concludes Four-Day Visit to Moscow

Meets With Soviet Legislators

PM1810231590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Oct 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Report by correspondent A. Sychev: "'We Too Are Changing.' U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney at the USSR Supreme Soviet Committees"]

[Text] U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney is paying an official visit to the Soviet Union at the invitation of the USSR Defense Ministry. His schedule includes visits to troop units and military facilities and meetings at all levels. R. Cheney has already held conversations with USSR President M.S. Gorbachev and the foreign and defense ministers. He also attended a meeting at the USSR Supreme Soviet where he was received by members of the Committee for Defense and State Security Questions and the International Affairs Committee.

Questions were asked by both sides and they touched on the development of events in the Persian Gulf, measures to control the arms race, our states' revision of their strategic doctrines, and the progress made over the last two years in bilateral relations and also in the talks on conventional armed forces and strategic arms.

In response to the question of the intended duration of the U.S. troops' stay in Saudi Arabia, the U.S. defense secretary said that one of the aims of stationing U.S. troops in the Persian Gulf region is to avert an increase in Iraqi aggression. "We are striving to protect Saudi Arabia from possible aggression, reinforce the UN sanctions against Iraq, and render them an effective means, we hope, of securing the Iraqi troops' withdrawal from occupied Kuwaiti territory," he said. "This is also the aim pursued by roughly 20 other states who have sent their troops to this region. We will stay there as long as it takes to attain our goals and we will leave as soon as our presence is no longer needed or the Saudi Government requests this."

In R. Cheney's opinion, the United Nations has demonstrated in connection with events in the Persian Gulf that it can be an effective instrument for maintaining peace and security. "We would like to cooperate further with other countries, including the USSR, to reinforce and broaden the United Nations' significance and role in the world," the secretary added. "We want this conflict—in the Persian Gulf—to be settled peacefully, however, we do not rule out the use of other measures if necessary."

Describing the formulation of the new, so-called offensive-defensive doctrine in the United States, R. Cheney pointed out that the United States intends to cut its Armed Forces by approximately 35 percent over the next five years. There will be 12-14 instead of 17 active divisions; the naval forces will keep 450 warships; and contingents in Western Europe will be cut back. R. Cheney recalled that the U.S. Congress is considering next year's budget, which envisages cuts in the Armed Forces of 100,000 men. "I am in favor of cutting back U.S. Armed Forces personnel, but not as rapidly as the Congress is trying to do," R. Cheney said.

In this connection he voiced concern at the pace of military production in the USSR and the scale of arms modernization. According to American data, the Soviet Armed Forces are today developing at least four or five new nuclear missiles, including those to replace the missile arsenal aboard the Typhoon-class submarine. What is more, last year the USSR produced 140 ballistic missiles, while the United States only produced 12. We have built two nuclear-powered submarines, they have built one, while the figures for tanks are 1,800 and 600 respectively. "That is why we display restraint on questions of qualitative arms race control," he stressed. "Can we expect a significant reduction in USSR military production in view of the shortage of funds for other sectors of the economy?"

In response to this question, he received exhaustive information about the military conversion program under way in our country as a result of which 60 percent of capacities are to be converted to the production of nonmilitary output.

R. Cheney asked deputies about the measures that the USSR is taking to ensure the inviolability of the country's nuclear arsenal in areas of heightened sociopolitical and ethnic tension. L. Sharin, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and State Security Questions, replied that the government has not made a decision to move these weapons to other regions, if you do not count some changes of position unconnected with the disturbances.

"It is very important for us to be sure that the changes in the USSR are irreversible. For the military there exist potentials and intentions. The components of potential are armed forces, weapons systems, and the way in which they are deployed, while the Soviet Government's aspirations represent the intention. We are quite clear on the latter that the Soviet side's intentions toward the United States are far less menacing today than previously. The potential is also changing, yet you still have the largest armed forces. But we are reacting to the changes and are ourselves changing," U.S. Defense Secretary R. Cheney said.

Thus, during this visit R. Cheney is seeking "balance between risk and the developing potential," as he writes in his book which has recently been republished in the United States. After so many decades of confrontation and mistrust, this is not easy for either the Americans or for us.

Advocates Arms Cuts, Reform

PM1910092490 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Oct 90 First Edition p 3

[Report by Colonel V. Markushin: "R. Cheney's Stay in Moscow"]

[Text] A meeting took place in the Kremlin on 17 October between U.S. Defense Secretary R. Cheney and members of the USSR Supreme Soviet committees for international affairs and defense and state security questions. The Pentagon leader preferred not to deliver some report specially prepared for the occasion, but to engage in a real dialogue with Soviet legislators. It must be admitted that the dialogue proved interesting. In any event, I felt that it did much to help "clear the air" on a number of very important problems.

One such problem is, of course, arms control. Naturally, our deputies were interested in the position of the White House administration representative on this point above all. What does R. Cheney think about the prospects for disarmament? How, in his view, can the process of qualitative modernization of arms be halted?

Answering basically these questions, the leader of the American military department stressed, in particular, that in principle he advocates reducing troops and arms, since favorable preconditions for this have been created: the general improvement in Soviet-American relations, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Central and Eastern Europe, the resolution of the question of German unification. From Cheney's viewpoint, the general process of demilitarization will depend to a considerable extent on how successful the changes in the Soviet Union prove to be, and on how real the fall in the level of military production in the USSR turns out to be in the immediate future. We have recently become convinced of your country's good intentions, the secretary said, but it is not only a question of intentions, but also of potential. The Soviet Union's military potential worries us, it is growing, despite the acute economic problems within the country.

Arms modernization is, as Cheney put it, a special question. The American side, he said, acts in accordance with the efforts made by the USSR in this direction. In particular, he referred to the work which, according to his information, is in progress in the Soviet Union to create new ballistic missiles. Modernization also affects nuclear ammunition and tests of such ammunition. The American defense secretary expressed the conviction that tests as such represent no danger. In his opinion it is important to make nuclear weapons safe during storage and experiments, and to prevent radioactive discharges into the atmosphere, because that leads to tragedies like Chernobyl.

Events in the Persian Gulf region played a considerable part in the discussion. The Pentagon chief stated that American troops will be there as long as the situation demands it. He noted the important role played by the Soviet Union in forming world public opinion on Iraq's aggression, and also expressed hopes of more effective UN intervention in this and similar military conflicts.

The U.S. defense secretary inquired about the course of military reform in the Soviet Union and its prospects, specifically questioning the transition to the principle of manning on a voluntary basis. In this connection Cheney spoke of the high qualities of American soldiers, which, he said, are currently on display in the Arabian Desert.

Attends News Conference 19 Oct

LD1910085990 Moscow TASS in English 0832 GMT 19 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondents Konstantin Voytsekhovich and Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Moscow October 19 TASS—At a joint conference given here today together with his Soviet counterpart Dmitriy Yazov, U.S. Secretary of Defence Richard Cheney gave a positive appraisal of his visit to Moscow. He is today concluding his four-day visit to the Soviet Union.

The U.S. defence secretary emphasised the importance of developing Soviet-U.S. contacts at various levels, pointing to "fruitful relations" that developed between the two countries' presidents, Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush.

The development of Soviet-American contacts in the military field is leading to better understanding and stronger peace between the two countries, Cheney said.

Matters related to the activities of the Soviet Defence Ministry and the U.S. Defence Department, as well as the state of affairs in the Middle East were discussed during the talks with Cheney in Moscow, Yazov told journalists.

TASS Reports on Primakov's Trip to Washington

Primakov Arrives 18 Oct

LD1810202790 Moscow TASS in English 1903 GMT 18 Oct 90

[Text] Washington October 18 TASS—Soviet presidential envoy Yevgeniy Primakov arrived in Washington today to look for ways to settle the Gulf crisis.

Primakov has already visited Amman, Baghdad, Rome and Paris meeting Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti and Francois Mitterrand.

Primakov will meet President George Bush at the White House on Friday. He will meet U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft today.

Primakov will inform President Mikhail Gorbachev of the results of his discussions after his return from Washington.

Soviet Ambassador A. Bessmertnykh welcomed Primakov at Andrews air base.

Baker, Scowcroft Meet Primakov

LD1910060890 Moscow TASS in English 0553 GMT 19 Oct 90

[Text] Washington October 19 TASS—Soviet presidential envoy Yevgeniy Primakov on Thursday met U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, assistant to the U.S. President for National Security Affairs Brent Scowcroft and head of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff Dennis Ross.

They discussed ways for a peaceful settlement of the Gulf crisis. They noted the need to use all political measures to pull Iraqi troops out of Kuwait in accordance with U.N. Security Council resolutions.

"I believe, we should look for some possibilities to avoid military clashes, but not reward Iraq, of course, for its actions," Primakov told journalists after the meeting.

Earlier, Primakov had visited Amman, Baghdad, Rome and Paris. Asked if he had brought any proposals to U.S. President George Bush from the Iraqi leader on ways to settle the crisis, Primakov said he would prefer not to "comment on the wise question."

CIA Director on Terrorist Information Exchange

LD1810135790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1230 GMT 18 Oct 90

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] CIA Director William Webster has announced that the United States and the USSR are exchanging information on the activities of terrorists. However, with respect to Baghdad, Moscow must be careful as the fate of 5,000 Soviet specialists in Iraq is under threat.

Talks Held With U.S. on Latin American Issues

LD1810165490 Moscow TASS in English 1457 GMT 18 Oct 90

[Text] Moscow October 18 TASS—Soviet-American consultations were held in Washington on Latin American issues, the Soviet Foreign Ministry announced here today.

High-ranking officials of the two countries' foreign ministries expressed support for a peaceful settlement in El Salvador based on understandings reached in Geneva and Caracas between the Salvadoran Government and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front.

Participants in consultations believe it desirable for the warring parties to step up the talks to achieve a political agreement and a ceasefire as soon as possible.

They also believe that the two parties participating in the dialogue should refrain from hostilities which may be harmful to the cause of peace in El Salvador.

Meeting on U.S.-Soviet Trade Ends in Baltimore

91UF0052A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 14 Oct 90 First Edition p 3

[Article by TASS correspondent V. Matyash: "The World Today: Perspectives of Cooperation"]

[Text] Washington, 13 October—The conference that ended on Friday in the U.S. city of Baltimore, Maryland was named "Trade and Investment Possibilities Under the Conditions of the New Soviet Market"—an all-important subject that continues to attract growing interest in U.S. business circles.

The meeting was organized by the International Trade Center Institute of Maryland and the USSR Trade Mission in the United States. During the course of it, special emphasis was placed on the fact that the Soviet-American summit talks and the signing of important bilateral agreements help to create in the political sphere conditions favorable for progress in the development of economic relations between our two countries. According to a member of the Institute's Board of Directors, influential businessman G. Mitchell, trade and economic relations still remain a weak link in the framework of bilateral relations, despite certain achievements. He blames this condition basically on the absence of most-favored-nation treatment, the impossibility of obtaining government credits, and tough export controls on the U.S. side.

"Our discussions," said G. Mitchell, "were made against the background of continuing uncertainty in the USSR political situation and of similar uncertainty in our economic climate. Our continuing economic recession might make it necessary for our American companies to seek alternate markets. At the time when the Persian Gulf crisis forced the United States to look into the issue of alternate energy sources, the worsening economic situation inside the United States might result in the economic need to treat the USSR as a major producer of crude oil and natural gas and to seek new opportunities for American business to become more active in the enormous Soviet market."

Maslyukov Receives U.S. Businessmen at Kremlin

PM1910091790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Oct 90 Union Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Conversation"]

[Text] On 15 October, Yu.D. Maslyukov, member of the USSR Presidential Council, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee, received in the Kremlin a delegation of representatives of the U.S. business world (the "100 Group"), which is on a trip to the USSR under the auspices of the U.S. Republican Party National Committee.

During the conversation, the visitors from the United States were familiarized with the course of the restructuring of socioeconomic life in the USSR and the potential for the further development of large-scale trade and economic links between the USSR and the United States.

The representatives of U.S. business circles welcomed the changes taking place in the USSR and confirmed the U.S. business circles' desire to arrange extensive, mutually advantageous cooperation with Soviet organizations in the economic and scientific-technical spheres.

UPS Enters Venture To Provide Far East Service

PM1810135790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0930 GMT 16 Oct 90

[Report by Leonid Savitskiy from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpt] [Announcer] An agreement has been signed in Vladivostok between the "Primorskavtotrans" Association and the Soviet-U.S. "Sovtransavto" enterprise on providing express transport services to all participants in foreign economic activity on the territory of Maritime Kray. Leonid Savitskiy has the report:

[Savitskiy] Thanks to measures that have been developed involving the use of motor transport, aircraft, and computer technology, documents and small consignments of freight will now be delivered from here on the Pacific coast to any part of the world within days or even hours. Together with Soviet organizations, this is being undertaken by the United Parcel Service—the world's largest parcel delivery service. UPS has 240,000 employees in 185 countries, handling 11 million dispatches a day around the world. [passage omitted]

Obukhov Confers With Canada's Clark in Ottawa

LD1810105690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0930 GMT 18 Oct 90

[Text] Soviet-Canadian political consultations took place in Ottawa when Deputy Foreign Minister Obukhov, leader of the Soviet delegation, met Canadian External Affairs Minister Clark.

Views were exchanged on a number of major world political problems and on bilateral cooperation matters, primarily on preparing talks for Clark's forthcoming visit to Moscow. Both sides expressed firm support for the course toward lowering world military confrontation levels and toward disarmament.

As for bilateral relations, emphasis was laid on developing trade and economic cooperation.

China

Li Peng Makes Remarks on Developing Economy

OW1610144590 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 0700 GMT 16 Oct 90

[Report by unidentified station correspondent from Beijing]

[Text] How will China's economic development proceed and what road will it take in the days to come? Will it be more planned, or will it be more regulated by the market? What is the most effective way for China's economic development? Chinese media and economists are discussing these questions more and more. At present, because it is time for China to adopt its Eighth Five-Year Plan, it is especially imperative to find the answers to these questions.

It is not accidental that China's newspapers published a speech delivered by Premier Li Peng in August at the conference on industrial production. The major debate at the conference was on whether China's economy needed more planning or more market regulation.

Li Peng said: There were different opinions during the conference with respect to China's future economic development. In my view, however, different opinions are a good thing because we should not give prominence to only one opinion.

Premier Li Peng said that the way out is to further develop the market. He said: We must go all out to develop both domestic and international markets, and both urban and rural markets. Expansion of the market will enable us to sell more of our products and invigorate the operations of our enterprises.

PLA Rear Services Delegation Concludes Visit

PM1710162590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Oct 90 First Edition p 3

[Unattributed report: "Visit Over"]

[Text] A delegation from the Chinese People's Liberation Army [PLA] rear services headed by Major General Wen Guangchun, chief of staff at the PLA Rear Services Main Directorate, left Moscow for home 15 October. The delegation was received by Army General V.M. Arkhipov, USSR deputy defense minister and chief of USSR Armed Forces Rear Services, had consultations at the USSR Armed Forces Rear Services Staff, visited a number of troop units, and was familiarized with the service, life, and daily conditions of Soviet troops and the sights of Moscow and Leningrad.

Panel Starts To 'Register' Sections of Border

PM1710163190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Oct 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS "Official Announcement"]

[Text] A joint working group met in Moscow from 4 through 15 October to legally register sectors of the eastern part of the Soviet-Chinese border agreed on at the border talks between the USSR and the PRC.

On 15 October, USSR Deputy Foreign Minister B.N. Chaplin met with Chinese and Soviet participants in the working group's sessions.

Commentary Notes Singapore Leader's PRC Visit

OW1810064990 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 1200 GMT 16 Oct 90

[Commentary by Mikhaylov from the "Current Events and Commentaries" program]

[Text] Dear listeners, 16 October is the first day of Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew's formal visit to Beijing. Our station observer Mikhaylov has the following comment on this:

This is Lee Kuan Yew's fifth visit to China. It is most likely his last visit as a prime minister since he announced he will resign next month. We should say that China and Singapore quite successfully developed their ties before the two countries established diplomatic relations on 3 October. The two countries' state affairs activists, including high-ranking leaders, exchanged visits. Their economic and trade relations actively developed. Last year their trade volume reached $3 billion. Singapore almost ranks fourth as far as the volume of investments in China is concerned. Many people ask what hampered the two countries' establishment of diplomatic relations?

As we all know, Singapore has many Chinese residents. It seems these conditions should have spurred the two countries to establish their diplomatic ties. In the late 1960's until early 1970's, however, Singapore did not take such a step, fearing that China would use the Chinese residents to export revolution. Later, Singapore declared it would establish diplomatic relations with China only after China established diplomatic ties with Indonesia. Indonesia froze its relations with Beijing after the military coup d'etat incident in 1967. Indonesia blamed China for having participated in the coup at that time.

Chinese Premier Li Peng visited Southeast Asian countries last August. He attended the ceremony on the establishment of diplomatic ties between China and Indonesia in Jakarta, then he visited Singapore and resolved questions concerning the establishment of relations between the two countries at the ambassadorial level. Beijing reiterated that it would not oppose Singapore's maintaining economic and trade ties with Taiwan at the governmental level. As for Singapore's using Taiwan's military installations to train its troops, Li Peng pointed out: This question should not obstruct China and Singapore's exchange of ambassadors. Thus, in less than three months, China normalized its relations with Indonesia and established diplomatic ties with Singapore. The significance of normalizing relations with two influential countries in that region is obviously beyond the scope of ties between the two sides because now there is new hope to solve the expanding political confrontation on various questions in that region.

Many observers have every reason to believe that Lee Kuan Yew's meeting with Chinese leaders will discuss the Cambodia issue, which has been the cause of the region's instability for many years. Not long ago China also announced that soon after Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew visited China, Indonesian President Suharto would also visit China. This will be the Indonesian leader's first visit to China in almost 30 years. These days, the press in many countries from the region point out: The meetings between leaders of the ASEAN nations and China will not only help develop relations between the two sides, but also help consolidate mutual understanding and expand cooperation in terms of the Asian-Pacific region.

Northeast Asia

Gorbachev-No Tae-u Reportedly To Meet in 1991

PM1810143490 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 18 Oct 90 p 3

[Report by correspondents A. Kupriyanov, N. Tsvetkov, and TASS from the "In a Few Lines" column]

[Text] It has been announced in Seoul that President Gorbachev has agreed to President No Tae-u's proposal for a personal meeting. The Soviet leader will probably visit Seoul early next year, the agency YONHAP reports, citing government circles.

North-South Korean Premier Talks Evaluated

SK1910060190 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 17 Oct 90

[Commentary by station commentator Oleg Shchedrov: "The Encounter Between the Premiers of the DPRK and the ROK"]

[Text] The second round of the talks between Yon Hyong-muk, DPRK State Administration Council premier, and Kang Yong-hun, ROK prime minister, has begun today at the Grand People's Study Hall [placename as heard] in Pyongyang. The first round of the talks was held last September in Seoul.

With regard to this, our station commentator Oleg Shchedrov writes as follows:

When there was talk on the encounter between the two premiers last summer, I was among those who were skeptical about the possibility that the talks would be held. I now regret this.

Nevertheless, my basic reasoning was that, except for an abstract desire for reunification, there was, at present,

absolutely no catalysis between them due to the genetic incompatibility between the regimes in the North and South.

Actually, several days ago, Seoul and Pyongyang again carried out propagandistic assaults against one another. The ROK President No Tae-u, in his statement, said that reunification would be possible only when East European-style reforms take place in the DPRK. Pyongyang reacted instantly to this by asserting that South Korea is precisely an area where reforms must take place.

Nonetheless, the talks have come to be held between the premiers.

What has happened? I think that the North and South have shelved the discussion of the question of reunification and (?adopted a practical attitude). They thought that they had better talk about easing tension on the Korean peninsula and talk about establishing basic normal relations between the North and South.

For example, signing a declaration of nonaggression with Seoul was Pyongyang's primary proposal at the second round of the talks.

Of course, not everything is smooth even now. North Korea has put three conditions to continue the high-level talks. One of them is the discontinuation of the U.S.-ROK annual military exercise "Team Spirit" or the reduction of its scale. The second condition is the release of Reverend Mun Ik-hwan and other activists who are presently in prison due to their visits to the DPRK without the Seoul government's approval. The last is the abandonment of the attempt for unilateral entry into the United Nations by the North and South.

Seoul has put forth its proposals. Seoul expects North Korea to renounce its attempt to revolutionize the ROK, the work for mutual visits between relatives of the North and South is expanded, and even more active economic relations are established between the North and South. In addition, the ROK demands that North Korea agrees on recognizing one another as sovereign states.

As for the proposals respectively put forth by the North and South, at present it is hard to judge how incompatible they are.

At any rate, there are promising elements. The premier of Pyongyang showed very flexible reactions to Seoul's proposals by saying that they are included in the draft of a declaration of nonaggression.

We can now see that the two sides do not desire to close the door but desire to continue dialogue.

In conclusion, Oleg Shchedrov noted that this, under the present circumstances, can be regarded as a move for reconciliation.

Kaifu Highly Rates Soviet Reform Efforts

OW1910040390 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1000 GMT 18 Oct 90

[Text] Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu, in his speech at a Diet session, said that Soviet plans for democratization, liberalization, and the change to a market economy will stabilize the world situation, and that the Japanese Government is making efforts so President Gorbachev's visit to Japan, slated for next year, brings about improvements in Japanese-Soviet ties. At the same, he confirmed Japan's unchanged stance regarding the territorial demand to the Soviet Union.

According to Prime Minister Kaifu, the Japanese Government plans to promote even more tenacious negotiations for the return of the four islands.

Japan's Kaifu, Nakayama Cited on Kurils, Treaty

LD1810164990 Moscow TASS in English 1515 GMT 18 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondent Vadim Yegorov]

[Text] Tokyo October 18 TASS—The signing of a Soviet-Japanese peace treaty after the settlement of the territorial problem is a key factor of the improvement of Soviet-Japanese relations, Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu said in parliament today.

Responding to the inquiry of a deputy, the prime minister expressed hope that the problem of the return to Japan of four islands, situated north of Hokkaido, would be resolved during Gorbachev's visit to Japan next spring.

Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama also mentioned this problem in parliament today. He said that "Both sides have already agreed to set up a working group for finding compromise solutions with due account for the two countries' stands". The commission will complete its work by the beginning of the visit of the Soviet leader.

Japan Reiterates Demand for Return of Kurils

PM1810150990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Oct 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "All or Nothing"]

[Text] Tokyo, 17 Oct—The Japanese Government has rejected the possibility of compromising with the USSR on the "territorial question." According to T. Watanabe, official spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, any attempts to settle this problem by transferring only two of the four disputed islands or by making them available for joint use are unacceptable.

"The necessary condition for the resolution of this question is the return of all four islands," he stressed, thus confirming the Japanese Government's official position.

Local observers see Watanabe's speech as the Japanese foreign policy department's response to Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze's statement in the USSR Supreme Soviet to the effect that the option of transferring the islands to Japan is not being considered.

The Japanese Foreign Ministry spokesman called on the Soviet leadership to start a serious examination of the question of returning the four islands on the eve of the visit to Tokyo by President M.S. Gorbachev.

Russian Republic Seeks Role in Talks on Kurils

OW1910023790 Tokyo KYODO in English 0123 GMT 19 Oct 90

[Text] Moscow, Oct. 18 KYODO—The Russian Republic should be involved in talks on Japan's claim to a group of islands off northern Japan as the disputed territory lies within it, the republic's Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev said on Thursday.

Otherwise, a solution to the territorial dispute will be impossible, the new foreign minister of the vast republic's government told a news conference.

The Russian Republic has jurisdiction over the Japanese-claimed islands off eastern Hokkaido—Kunashir, Iturup, Shikotan, and the Habomai group—occupied by the Soviet Union at the end of World War II.

Kozyrev said the Russian Republic, as the party concerned, should get involved in Japan's talks with the central Soviet Government on the territorial dispute.

The minister said he has proposed that the republic's Supreme Soviet review its attitude toward Japan on matters which pose obstacles to economic, political, and cultural development between the Russian Republic and Japan.

Kozyrev said a visit to Japan by Russian Republic President Boris Yeltsin to conclude a treaty or an agreement on the territorial issue is under consideration, but withheld further comment, saying that Yeltsin "is now taking medical treatment at home."

KGB Notes Japanese Fishing Violations Increase

LD1810135690 Moscow TASS in English 1323 GMT 18 Oct 90

[Text] Moscow October 18 TASS—Violations of the Soviet sea border and fishing regulations in the Soviet economic zone by Japanese vessels are becoming more frequent, the KGB Public Relations Centre announced today.

It says August and September alone saw 926 such violations.

"In accordance with international and Soviet law, the border authorities take tough measures to put an end to such illegal actions," the organisation says.

"On October 8, a Soviet Coast Guard ship detained the Japanese fishing vessel Miyoshi Maru 23 near the island of Shikotan for violating fishing regulations.

"After the ship gave guarantees that it would pay the fine, it was expelled from Soviet territorial waters and denied permission to catch fish in the Soviet economic zone.

"On October 10, another five Japanese vessels, engaged in illegal fishing, were spotted south of Sakhalin Island. Each ship was fined. The fine claim was sent to the Japanese side," the report says.

New Payment Plan Proposed for Japanese Steel

LD1710121990 Moscow World Service in English 1000 GMT 17 Oct 90

[Text] The Soviet Union has proposed a new payment method that is close to a prepayment system for imports of Japanese steel products in negotiations with Japanese traders and steelmakers, industry sources said on Wednesday [17 October]. Under the proposed system, the Soviet Union is to deposit money in an account with a Japanese bank to secure the delivery of Japanese steel products, mainly steel tubing urgently needed in developing the country's oil and gas reserves.

The Soviet Union was $600 million behind in its payments to Japanese trading firms at one point this year, the sources said.

Japanese Firm To Aid Khabarovsk Airport Project

PM1810085690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0930 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Report by L. Stroykov and O. Ivanov from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] A new Soviet-Japanese joint venture—Kiyama Avia—is being set up in Khabarovsk. Passengers using Khabarovsk airport will soon be able to judge the results of its work. However, the future enterprise already has its problems.

[Correspondent] The partners—a Tokyo joint-stock company and the Far East airline—are determined to realize a long-standing dream and create a truly top-class airport in Khabarovsk. By tradition we refer to Khabarovsk as the air-traffic gate of the Far East. But this gate has long since become a tight and uncomfortable bottleneck. This is all the more serious since direct flights to the United States are to open soon. This is in addition to Japan, Korea, and China with whom connections have existed for a long time.

Direct contacts with foreign construction companies have become possible only now.

[T. Shimokado, president of the Kiyama Shoji company, speaking in Japanese with superimposed Russian translation] We can see that a period of openness has been inaugurated in the Soviet Union. This greatly resembles

our Meiji period when Japan was opened up to the whole world. This is promising. The business which we will engage in in Khabarovsk—construction work at the airport—requires lengthy cooperation. We are prepared to invest our capital here because we believe that things will change for the better in your country.

[Correspondent] During the first stage of cooperation the Japanese firm is intending to build an international-class hotel in Khabarovsk in two years. Similar to those which it has built in France, Spain, and China. A school has already been acquired in Japan where staff, Soviet staff, of the future hotel will be trained. Let me add that the company's motto is: "Seek to be a lender rather than a borrower!"

The second stage is the reconstruction of the existing air terminal, transforming it into an international complex. This is where the problem arose, or rather it has existed for a long time.

[I.N. Spichenko, commander of the combined air detachment] It is necessary to complete the construction of the existing air terminal which is still not finished. Far Eastern construction workers are dragging out the construction unjustifiably. To date only 50 percent of the capital investments allocated under this year's plan have been used.

[Correspondent] Construction workers have been dragging their feet for the past 12 years, thus creating another hotbed of social tensions. The Japanese will build the hotel, but the new internal flight airport is threatening to become the fly in the ointment in the expected changes for the better. The Khabarovsk air terminal complex is the longest ongoing construction project in the city.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Shortfall in Oil Deliveries to Vietnam Denied

PM1810080790 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 16 Oct 90 First Edition p 1

[TASS report under the "International Information" rubric: "Commitments Being Met"]

[Text] The other day the metropolitan newspaper HANOI MOI linked the sharp increase in the price of liquid fuel on Vietnam's domestic market with a failure by the Soviet Union to stick to delivery schedules and with the settlement of accounts in hard currency at world prices. In this connection the USSR trade delegation in the SRV issued an explanation the newspaper published 15 October.

This year, it says, the Soviet Union is meeting its fuel delivery commitments to the SRV strictly at the fixed times and in full volume. In the first nine months of this year the Vietnamese side has received 75 percent of the scheduled annual volume in accordance with the signed documents on trade between the two countries.

Commentary Assails Khmer Rouge 'Offensive'

BK1810124290 Moscow in Cambodian to Cambodia 1230 GMT 17 Oct 90

[Text] AFP reported that after a month-long recess, the Khmer Rouge has started to renew its military offensive in Cambodia.

According to this AFP report, this activity is linked to the fact that the Khmer Rouge recently received T-59 tanks from China. Regarding this matter, our commentator, Oleg Alekseyev, has this comment:

Their ultimate goal is to regain power in Cambodia. At an unofficial meeting held in Tokyo at the beginning of July, Khieu Samphan, leader of the Khmer Rouge, resolutely refused to sign the joint communique which stated the need to immediately cease hostilities. Moreover, immediately after that meeting ended, the Khmer Rouge armed forces in Cambodia launced vigorous attacks [words indistinct] on the government forces.

During the negotiations held in Jakarta in September, the Khmer Rouge seemed to adopt a compromising stance. Together with the other opposition groups and representatives of the Phnom Penh government, the Khmer Rouge approved a program for normalizing the situation in Cambodia arranged by the five superpowers—the permanent members of the UN Security Council. They also agreed to send their representatives to join the Supreme National Council, a joint organization designed to represent the Cambodian people at the United Nations during the transitional period.

All these have brought hope that the Khmer Rouge might adopt a discreet stance and restrain itself from launching any activities that would hamper the situation.

But, regrettably, this hope has been quashed. The military offensive renewed by the Khmer Rouge is not only an (?intentional) step to create an obstacle along the road toward normalizing the situation, but it is also a threat that may renew the tragedy already experienced by the Cambodian people.

The genocidal policy that the Khmer Rouge implemented during the second part of the 1970's resulted in the death of over 3 million Cambodians. It is not difficult to foresee what kind of a bad consequence the Khmer Rouge will bring to this country if it returns to power.

This is why it is believed that the halt of the military activities in Cambodia means not only the removal of the biggest obstacle on the road toward normalizing the situation through political means, but it would also eliminate the possibility of the recurrence of the genocidal regime.

The five permanent members of the UN Security Council, namely the Soviet Union, China, the United States, France, and Britain, at another meeting on the Cambodian problem, have appealed for the cessation of

combat activities in this country. The UN Security Council has also expressed concern over the renewal of the combat activities.

A clear proof of the international efforts to restore peace in Cambodia [words indistinct] UN General Assembly has unanimously adopted a resolution calling for an early normalization of the situation through political means within the framework of the program put forth by the five UN Security Council permanent members.

Near East & South Asia

Commentators Discuss Outlook in Gulf Crisis

LD1810154990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1230 GMT 18 Oct 90

[From the "Point of View" program with all-Union radio commentator Viktor Levin and political observer Nikolay Vladimorovich Shishlin]

[Text] [Levin] Hello, esteemed comrades. In today's program we wish to touch upon a problem that has been engaging all of humanity for almost three months. To be precise, it is the crisis in the Persian Gulf region that has been caused by Iraq's aggression against Kuwait and Iraq's seizure of that sovereign country. You know that the situation there remains extremely tense. I would even say that the tension is rising since the Iraqi leadership in the personage of Saddam Husayn is unyielding in its aspirations to swallow Kuwait and the international community, and the United States of America is playing an active role in this first and foremost, and is also making increasingly resolute statements. I have invited the political observer Nikolay Vladimorovich Shishlin to share his opinions on this situation, to set out his own point of view on the possibilities of the further development of events in the Persian Gulf region.

[Shishlin] I have already had occasion to speak about who is the victim of Iraq's aggression. It is obvious, of course, that this is primarily Kuwait, but it is not only Kuwait. It is also the world community, the Gulf countries and, of course, the Iraqi people. So, in this case the score of the losses is increasing, and I absolutely agree with you that the tension is rising there, and the last time is running out when it would still be possible to undertake some attempts to find a peaceful solution to this very dangerous conflict which might singe everyone if the flame of war really flares up there.

I should like to add that with regard to the Soviet Union, we are entitled to say that the Soviet Union has taken an honest and open position that fully complies with the spirit of the new political thinking, the spirit of that new order based on justice and respect for international law, which can only make our world more secure, more predictable, and more reliable. And not just this. The Soviet Union is really undertaking very serious actions to attempt to feel out at least some paths, ways, to work out ways to a political settlement of this conflict. It is precisely in this context that we have to look at the mission of Yevgeniy Maksimovich Primakov, the special representative of the Soviet Union's president—both the intensive conversations that he held with a number of Arab leaders, including Saddam Husayn, and the other political efforts being undertaken by Moscow to exploit the slightest chance to find a peaceful method of settling the conflict. But we must be realistic. Finding ways to a peaceful settlement of this conflict depends not only on Moscow's efforts, not only on Washington's efforts, not only on the efforts of the Europeans, not only on the efforts of the Arab states, but it depends upon Baghdad. And it must be said that Baghdad's position remains defiant to this day, and I believe that, indeed, the time when any chances of a peaceful settlement of the conflict remain in sight is rapidly running out. In general, the hourglass has been turned over and the last grains of sand are falling to the bottom of the second vessel after which another period of time begins to be counted—a time of war—although, of course, no one wishes to use military means, specifically, to resolve the conflict.

[Levin] Mikhail Vladimirovich, I should like to recall in this connection that while speaking to deputies at the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet on Monday, Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze, our minister of foreign affairs, said the possibilities of a peaceful settlement have not yet been exhausted. What possibilities are there still? How can we hold back those last grains of sand that you are talking about?

[Shishlin] Well, I suppose that the recipes here have been quite well tested. The first thing is a clear position on the part of the Arab states themselves, and in this case it is important that Saddam Husayn and his entourage in Baghdad understand that all these outbursts of emotion in which he attempts to substitute Iraq's aggression against Kuwait with the broad Palestinina problem, all these outbursts of emotion should subside, and be replaced by actions not of sentiment but of reasons. That is the first thing.

The second thing: There should be broad understanding between the Soviet Union, the United States, and the European states in the United Nations so that this broad understanding should also be an active factor of pressure toward sobering up the Baghdad regime.

The third thing, I think, is that the concentration of military forces in itself should also play a sobering role for Baghdad to the extent that this grouping of troops which is almost 300,000 strong and primarily American, but not only American, has not stopped in the desert for eternity, and, in itself, this bloc of forces, which is called a shield, could very easily be transformed into a sword and, in this case, it will also depend upon Baghdad. But it is quite simply a realistic view of things. He should understand, and in this case I mean Saddam Husayn, that he will not manage to digest this acquisition. These are different times, a new world, a new disposition of forces, there is a new political landscape in the Near

East, and a new picture of world interrelations, and I believe that in these conditions aggression canot remain unpunished.

[Levin] I fully share the idea that there is no future now for a policy of force, a purely aggressive policy. There is greater force to respond to force, and there is a suitable response to aggression so that aggression should not bring any dividends.

[Shishlin] This is the lesson we have learned from the past few decades and not only by our own example, for this is a universal lesson, and I think that it will have a specific effect on the development of the crisis in the Persian Gulf, too, and I do not think that this crisis in the Gulf will, in all its revolting characteristics, spill over to 1991.

[Levin] As is known, a situation may occur—and this is now stated loud enough for all to hear—in which a policy of such brute force must be met by force on the basis of law. As far as I can see, a military clash between the troops now in Saudi Arabia and the Iraqi Army is more probable than the possibility of avoiding this clash. If this does happen what position should, in your view, the Soviet Union take? Should we, too, join in and participate in the multinational, international forces, or is it better, all the same, to refrain from this—this is how I would put my question.

[Shishlin] Viktor Nikolayevich, I encountered in our press this point of view: That, it is alleged, it is, of course, not worth it for the Soviet Union to send its armed forces, but that volunteers must, absolutely, be sent. I absolutely disagree with this viewpoint. It is sufficient that the Soviet Union supports the UN decisons. It is sufficient that the Soviet Union adopted a decision to stop military deliveries to Iraq. It is sufficient that the Soviet Union is taking part in the blockade of Iraq. It is sufficient that moral and political support is forthcoming from our country for the UN decisions. Likewise, I also encountered in our press this point of view: that it is Israel, allegedly, that is most interested in war breaking out there. It is utter nonsense. Israel is very well aware indeed that the flames of war will singe Israel, too and they do not want this war there. In this case it must be seen that the settlement of the situation in the Gulf would open up ways for a broad political settlement in the Near East. This is worth thinking about and one must gear oneself for this.

[Levin] And, despite everything, it is your view that it is still possible to hope for this outcome?

[Shishlin] Well, you know this is how I shall put it. The last chance has not yet been let slip. Very vigorous efforts are now being undertaken to somehow try to unlock the deadlock. But you do know that some deadlocks are unlocked by the sword.

[Levin] Well, all that remains for us to do is to wait and see how events develop. It would be very desirable if mankind drew appropriate conclusions from the lessons of history to the effect that aggression must not bear fruit, and it is this that represents the main aim of resolving this crisis situation that has arisen in the Persian Gulf region.

Nonaligned Movement's Gulf Crisis Role Viewed

NC1810203090 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Persian to Iran 1530 GMT 17 Oct 90

[Station commentary]

[Text] Some Iranian publications complain that the Nonaligned Movement is not very active with regard to the Persian Gulf crisis. These publications express regret that the Nonaligned countries have not formulated an independent stance, clearly distinct from the stance of the so-called superpowers, on resolving the Persian Gulf crisis.

With its aggression against Kuwait, Baghdad has shamelessly trampled upon the Nonaligned Movement's principles, just as it has trampled on the regulations of the UN Charter. It is therefore not surprising that in implementing international sanctions against the aggressor, Nonaligned Movement, NATO, and Warsaw Pact members should actively participate.

The fact is that the sizable buildup of military forces of the NATO members in the Persian Gulf has caused definite anxiety in some of the Arabian Peninsula countries as well as in Iran. The social circles of other nonaligned countries appear to be reminded of the military activities of the great powers in the Third World and are expressing their apprehension in this regard.

This does not provide a convincing reason for ignoring the Nonaligned Movement's attitude of avoiding any activity for eliminating the consequences of the Iraqi aggression. This activity would not only culminate in restoring the national sovereignty of Kuwait—a Nonaligned Movement member—but also in removing perturbations over the convergence and concentration of the foreign military and naval forces in the Persian Gulf.

It appears that at present all efforts to create artificial tension and fan sentiments opposed to military agreements among the Nonaligned Movement members would only benefit Baghdad. Today, Baghdad would reap the optimum advantage if a rift or fissure were to surface in the united front of those who oppose Iraqi aggression. It was for this purpose in particular that Saddam Husayn announced jihad against the United States and is endeavoring to link the issue of the restitution of Kuwait's independence to the termination of the occupation of Palestine.

Baghdad is not averse to capitalizing on any sentiments opposed to military pact forces or the Nonaligned Movement in attaining its (?expansionist) objectives. In addition, everyone understands that politico-military pacts do not have the same concept now as they had before.

The roles of great powers have undergone a change, and the world's political atmosphere has metamorphosed completely. Is it possible to talk of confrontation between the military pacts within the framework of Europe? The GDR has united with the FRG, and Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria are within the Warsaw Pact in name only. Armed forces have been reduced, and purely defensive tendencies have increased in NATO countries. The great powers are cooperating to resolve regional conflicts politically. Preliminary conditions for a world shorn of the use of force are being consolidated. For example the United States and Soviet Union are taking joint measures for a political solution to the Afghanistan issue. They are also concurring on reducing the number of their missiles and are acting in concert with regard to the Persian Gulf region.

It cannot be denied that today the use of multinational forces in this region is only possible with the permission of the United Nations. Everything is related to the level of wisdom of Baghdad.

Undoubtedly, the Nonaligned Movement can play a special role in seeking a path out of the present critical situation in the Persian Gulf, as the Nonaligned Movement member countries are linked among themselves on the basis of certain principles, objectives, and obligations. A definite atmosphere of mutual understanding and confidence prevails among them. This is what made up the Nonaligned Movement's structure and should be utilized. What is important is that the Nonaligned Movement countries use this structure and its possibilities for resolving the fundamental issue of driving Iraqi forces out of Kuwait.

Soviet Hills Seizure in Pakistan Denied

BK1810133590 Moscow in Urdu to Pakistan 1300 GMT 14 Oct 90

[Text] Dear listeners, a Pakistani daily—THE FRONTIER POST—has in its commentary alleged that the Soviet forces have seized several hills located in Pakistan and deployed missile systems there. Our correspondent Vadim Melikov writes in this connection:

Gennadiy Gerasimov, the Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman, has described the Pakistani newspaper's claim as a fabricated story. In my opinion, the story is not only fabricated but also provocative. As rightly pointed out by local observers, the story has been published at a crucial time, conforming fully to the interests of certain military and political circles in Pakistan.

The fact is that the U.S. Congress is presently debating the question of massive U.S. aid to Pakistan, amounting to $600 million. Since Ziaul Haq's time, a large chunk of foreign loans and financial aid received by Pakistan has been diverted to the military sector to meet the requirements of the armed forces. If the United States does not provide financial aid to Pakistan this year, the flow of money will stop and the military will be deprived of necessary funds, which will in turn displease the top military brass. Therefore, the persons engaged in military and industrial activities wish to attract the attention of their U.S. patrons, and one of the ways to do that is to have such provocative stories published. So far as I know, very few Pakistanis believe in the report that Soviet missiles have been deployed on Pakistani soil. Even the Pakistani Foreign Ministry has officially described THE FRONTIER POST's story as a fabrication. The diplomats definitely know how much damage the mass media can cause in mutual understanding and cooperation between Pakistan and the Soviet Union by publishing such concocted stories.

Prospects for Comeback by Bhutto Assessed

91UF0051A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 12 Oct 90 Second Edition p 5

[Report by TASS Islamabad correspondents V. Legantsov and N. Semenenko: "On the Hook"]

[Text] A.A. Zardari—husband of Benazir Bhutto, former head of the government of Pakistan—was arrested on Wednesday in Karachi on a charge of kidnapping. The indictment says he committed this crime against the physician Mirtaza Bukhari, a Pakistani living in London.

Speaking in Karachi at a press conference, Bhutto described her husband's arrest as an attempt by the transitional government to bar her from the political struggle on the eve of the parliamentary elections scheduled for 24 October.

Will Benazir Bhutto—the first woman to hold the office of head of government in the modern Muslim world and later removed following 20 months in office—be put on trial? This question is now being asked by many Pakistanis. However, the most farsighted of them are asking it on a somewhat different level: Are legal proceedings against her beneficial to the country's present interim prime minister, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, who was in opposition to B. Bhutto, and to President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, whose edict removed her and her cabinet from exercise of their authority?

B. Bhutto is being charged with many transgressions. The main ones, however, are charges of exceeding her constitutional authority in making official appointments, use of the exchequer to reward her favorites and relatives, and criminal disregard for the problems of maintaining legality and law and order in the country, the TASS correspondents report from Islamabad at the request of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA.

Of course, B. Bhutto had shortcomings and made miscalculations. Even while she was in office as prime minister the local press was reporting that she had for a whole number of diplomatic posts appointed people who were not only very inadequately informed as to international affairs but who only had a vague idea even of where the Foreign Ministry itself was located and what

its business was. The Pakistani public was clearly astonished also by the sudden upturn in the financial fortunes of the prime minister's husband, Asif Ali Zardari, who prior to her assumption of office had been considered a very modest businessmen by Pakistani standards. A very dim view was taken also of the fact that control of the government's financial expenditure was entrusted to Benazir Bhutto's father-in-law, who headed the corresponding parliamentary commission.

The rapid growth in crime, terrorism, abductions, and mass ethnic clashes during the time of B. Bhutto's government was causing the country's inhabitants manifest concern.

It should be said for fairness' sake that neither were previous heads of Pakistan's government distinguished by particular punctiliousness on financial matters, and few of them succeeded in pursuing and maintaining law and order in the country. It is this point that B. Bhutto is currently attempting to use in her defense. She is demanding a thorough investigation of the financial and other activity of all former Pakistani premiers and, simultaneously, of the present president also. However, B. Bhutto's present position itself obviously dooms to failure her attempts to restore justice. As is now being said in Pakistan, if she wanted to make public the unseemly crimes of her predecessors, this should have been done opportunely, when she had real power, not when she has lost it.

Special courts have been set up to investigate the charges against B. Bhutto and other top functionaries of the Pakistan People's Party [PPP], which she heads. All the figures who are found guilty may expect the most dreadful punishment for a politician—a seven-year ban on the holding of elective office. At the same time, however, it is highly significant that these courts have not as yet been distinguished by particular assertiveness. Their activity has been confined primarily to the issuance of subpoenas requiring an appearance in court, pretrial hearings, and the exaction of written undertakings not to leave the country. One has the impression that these courts are most interested in negative publicity for the PPP and its leaders on the eve of the elections to the National Assembly (the lower house of parliament) and the legislatures of the provinces scheduled for 24 and 27 October respectively. It is considerably more beneficial to the country's present leadership to keep B. Bhutto "on the hook," than to try her and thereby evoke sympathy for this woman, who knows how to turn to her advantage even circumstances that are unfavorable for her. It is not without reason that a most popular cartoon in the Pakistani press is the depiction of Benazir floating around a hook in the hands of a person who greatly resembles simultaneously the president and the present interim prime minister.

Reports have long been appearing in the Pakistani press to the effect that the present government is prepared to spare B. Bhutto legal proceedings, however, on condition that she abandon the struggle to return to office. But terminating a struggle at its very height is by no means Benazir's nature. This is shown both by her previous political activity during the military regime of Gen Zia-ul-Haq and the present election campaign. She is still hoping to take revenge and worthily avenge herself on her persecutors. But those currently opposed to B. Bhutto are fully aware of the fate that awaits them should Benazir return to office. For this reason it is perfectly natural that they are now doing everything possible to ensure that she not return, and not unsuccessfully, to judge by everything. As opinion polls show, the popularity of B. Bhutto and her party is suffering considerably from the legal assaults being organized against her.

B. Bhutto is not refusing in principle to appear before the judges, counting on using the courts as a political election platform. However, she has not yet succeeded. Literally, a few days ago she was summoned to appear in the court of the city of Lahore (Punjab Province), but such a crowd of PPP supporters had gathered at the court building for her appearance that the police could not contain it. Supporters of the former prime minister broke into the courtroom and staged a real pogrom there. Benazir Bhutto, who came in for many jolts and blows, suffered in the course of this distinctive demonstration in her support. True, as Aytzaz Ahsan, Benazir's press secretary maintains, the brawl was provoked by police in civilian clothes passing themselves off as zealous supporters of the PPP leader. Ghulam Khayder Vayn, the present chief minister of Punjab, vehemently rejected such assertions and accused the B. Bhutto party of hooliganism and disrespect for the law.

Whatever the case, passions surrounding the former premier are not abating, and the time of the elections is inexorably approaching. It is now clear to all that B. Bhutto was dismissed as head of the government by no means in order for her to be allowed to return.

Human Rights Expert's Visit to Iran Assessed

NC1910075390 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Persian to Iran 1530 GMT 18 Oct 90

[Station commentary]

[Text] Renaldo Galindo Pohl, UN expert on human rights affairs, has visited Tehran again. In his meeting with Ayatollah Yazdi, the UN envoy discussed legal activities in Iran and sought information on the situation of prisoners in Iranian prisons. Our commentator writes:

The second visit by the UN human rights expert has not been accompanied by as much enthusiasm as his first visit to Iran. Iranian mass media pictured the outcome of the former visit as a great victory by the government, which was allegedly able to convince the United Nations of the baselessness of the political propaganda on the violation of human rights in Iran.

But this time the tone of the Iranian press is cautious. For example, KEYHAN writes that if the objective behind the UN envoy's second visit is to assess the

Iranian Republic's behavior from the West's legal viewpoint, then nothing will be achieved. Iran's other newspapers express concern that pressures by opposition groups and by the movement for defending human rights in other countries can influence the UN's assessment of the situation of human rights in Iran.

I think that such worries are not completely founded because the reports prepared by Renaldo Galindo Pohl on human rights in Iran after his first visit were assessed positively even by the Iranian authorities. These reports explicitly and without favoritism refuted all the accusations by opposition groups that had not been practically confirmed.

However, some of the facts that this UN delegation referred to did not conform with the favorable picture of human rights that official Iranian propaganda wants to paint. During his visit to Evin Prison in Tehran, the UN envoy met with Nureddin Kianuri, former first secretary of the Iranian Tudeh Party Central Committee. Kianuri and other Iranian Tudeh Party leaders, as well as thousands of party members, were arrested during the suppression of this and other progressive parties in 1983. These people were arrested on alleged charges of spying for Moscow and for engineering plots to overthrow the revolutionary government.

The remarks by Kianuri and by other Tudeh Party leaders in a television program, during which they allegedly confessed to their crimes, were used as the major evidence for accusation. As UN envoy Pohl said in his report, Kianuri strongly denied that he was spying for a foreign government and that he participated in a plot to overthrow the revolutionary government. He stated in presence of authorities and Evin Prison officials that he had been tortured. He showed his partially paralyzed hand and broken fingers and told how he was beaten. Moreover, Kianuri condemned the execution of thousands of people who, in his opinion, were completely innocent and had been accused of links with the Iranian Tudeh Party. Of course, in the opinion of the Iranian patriots, Kianuri's just comments to the UN envoy cannot lessen the heavy burden of his responsibility, in relation to his so-called former confessions in the mass media, even though tortured.

Recent developments show that the sickness of looking for spies has truly turned into a pretext for hunting leftist forces by the Iranian authorities. However, only recently a number of completely innocent people who supported the movement of Engineer Bazargan and other democratic movements became the victims of spying accusations—and this time spying for America.

The United Nations will not doubt the Iranian officials' sincerity in helping the process of respecting human rights in Iran on the condition that the members and supporters of the Iranian Tudeh Party and other opposition parties are released from the prisons and the Human Rights Declaration is observed. These people have been imprisoned because of their beliefs and because of their sincere support for Iran's freedom and independence. This is the reality that is rousing just opposition in Iran and abroad.

'Rifts' Perceived Between Afghan Rebel Groups

LD1810185890 Moscow TASS in English 1740 GMT 18 Oct 90

[By TASS political observer Yuriy Tyssovskiy]

[Text] Moscow October 18 TASS—Afghan field commander and member of the Islamic Society of Afghanistan Ahmad Shah Mas'ud has paid a three-day visit to Pakistan. This event would hardly merit note in itself as numerous Afghan rebel group leaders scurry to and fro across the Afghan-Pakistan border, a border that has long since lost its status as such.

However, this particular trip was given extensive coverage by the Western media, not only because this was Mas'ud's first trip in 12 years since the war began in Afghanistan. The crux of the matter was Mas'ud's meeting with President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Chief of Staff Mirza Aslam Begh and his old adversary and rival Gulbuddin Hikmatyar of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan.

The Geneva accords on Afghanistan, of which Pakistan is a signatory, call on all parties to the accords to refrain from any form of intervention or interference, overt or covert, and from actions or attempts in whatever form aiming to destabilise the other party.

For more than ten years, Mas'ud and his party superior Burhanuddin Rabbani, as well as Hikmatyar and other rebel chiefs who have settled in Peshawar, have been leading a war against the Kabul government with Islamabad's direct assistance.

Mas'ud undertook his trip straight after presiding over a conference of leading field commanders in Baddakhshan convoked to work out a plan for intensifying warfare inside Afghanistan. He went to Islamabad in order to brief his Pakistani patrons on plans to seize several provincial centres in Afghansitan before the end of November.

The action is aimed to revivify the rebels' reputation as fighters for the liberation of Afghanistan from Communists in Kabul. He also plans to deepen the coordination of actions between rebel groups and the Pakistani army.

Mas'ud was received by Islamabad's top officials—an illustration of the fact that Pakistan regards the international accords as so much paper and that it deliberately ignores the well-known Roman maxim: Accords are signed to be honoured.

Until recently, Mas'ud cherished his reputation as a politician rested on his relative independence from both the Peshawar rebel leaders and Islamabad.

His visit, however, undermined this reputation, a fact of which Mas'ud promptly grew aware. Mas'ud used today's news conference in the Pakistani capital to reject te unrejectable: that the rebels' holy war was from the very start incited by outside forces, above all the U.S. and Pakistan. As regards plans for stepping up rebel military activity, such plans have probably been drawn up. But events will develop not as envisaged in the scenario by the rebel leaders and their Pakistani patrons. The very attempt to rally rebel groups looks stillborn: They are separated by rifts caused by too much bloodshed and treachery.

Doubts Cast on Hikmatyar's Softer Stance

PM1810151990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Oct 90 Second Edition p 4

[Report by correspondent V. Plastun: "It Does Not Add Up"]

[Excerpts] Kabul, 15 Oct—Western agencies, especially the BBC, presented as a sensation the statement by G. Hikmatyar, one of the leaders of the Afghan opposition, that he agrees to support the idea of free elections in Afghanistan.

He accused the Government of the Republic of Afghanistan of continuing the war. In a telephone interview Hikmatyar claimed that he does not receive aid from anyone, has no contacts with the Pakistani interdepartmental intelligence agency, and did not coordinate plans for the capture of Kabul with anyone. But a few days ago he admitted that he took part in a conference where the idea of a massive strike against the capital was discussed together with the Pakistani military.

At a news conference in the Afghan Foreign Ministry Sarwar Yurish, leader of the president's news service, denied the claim that Hikmatyar's proposals and intentions are "peaceful." In fact, Yurish said, armed groups of the "Islamic Party of Afghanistan," which is headed by the diehards' leader, are continuing to conduct combat operations in the neighborhood of Kabul and in other provinces. [passage omitted]

What lies behind the so-called softening in the position of the "most implacable diehard"? Probably disagreement by the majority of leaders of the "seven" with his plans to capture Kabul and his frank desire to steal a march on his colleagues.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Shevardnadze Greets Malian Relations Anniversary

PM1810125390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Oct 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under the "Official Reports" rubric]

[Text] The 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the Republic of Mali was on 14 October. Greetings telegrams on the occasion were exchanged between the two countries' foreign ministers.

In their messages, E.A. Shevardnadze and Malian Foreign Minister N. Traore confirmed the mutual desire for further development of the friendly Soviet-Malian relations to the benefit of our countries and peoples.

New Ambassador to Zambia Appointed

LD1610210790 Moscow TASS in English 1656 GMT 16 Oct 90

[Text] Moscow October 16 TASS—The Soviet president has appointed Eizen Poc the Soviet Union's ambassador to Zambia.

Poc, born in 1939, is an ethnic Latvian. He has been on diplomatic service since 1974. He worked as second, then first secretary of the Soviet Embassy in the United States (1974-1990) and was a consul-general in Indonesia (1985-1988), first deputy consular department head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry and Latvia's Foreign Minister.

Oleg Miroshkhin has retired.

East Europe

Communique Issued After Skubiszewski's Visit

PM1810122590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Oct 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Unattributed report: "Soviet-Polish Communique"]

[Text] K. Skubiszewski, foreign minister of the Polish Republic was on an official visit to the USSR 10-16 October 1990 at the invitation of the Soviet Government, during which he visited the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], and the Belorussian SSR at the invitation of these republics' leaderships.

K. Skubiszewski was received by USSR President M.S. Gorbachev.

USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze and K. Skubiszewski held talks, attention at which focused mainly on questions of the present state and future prospects of Soviet-Polish relations and on discussion of the main international problems.

The foreign ministers emphasized that the full-blooded development of good-neighborly relations and mutually advantageous cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Polish Republic is in line with the vital interests of both countries' peoples. Acting in the spirit of the principles of the 13 April 1990 Soviet-Polish Declaration, both sides will continue to promote to the utmost the preservation and development of everything positive that has become part of the practice of Soviet-Polish

collaboration and to actively introduce new forms of economic, political, scientific, and cultural ties between the two friendly states.

The sides affirmed the need to fundamentally renew the legal treaty basis of relations between the USSR and the Polish Republic, to further develop Soviet-Polish ties on the basis of equality and mutual advantage, and to soberly take into account the sides' real interests and potential and the changes occurring in today's world.

The importance of constant political dialogue between the Soviet Union and Poland at all levels and of the broader involvement of parliamentary structures in it was noted. The ministers advocated the expansion of contacts between sociopolitical, trade union, and youth organizations, cultural and scientific institutions, higher education establishments and schools, and citizens of the USSR and the Polish Republic, which will assist the growth of mutual understanding and friendly feelings between the two countries' peoples. There was a continuation of the exchange of opinions regarding the prospects for opening new consulates-general and cultural and information centers of the Polish Republic on USSR territory.

The sides emphasized their readiness to create, on the basis of reciprocity, favorable conditions for the development of the spiritual life, languages, and national originality of people of Polish nationality living in the Soviet Union and of the ethnic minorities of USSR peoples living in the Polish Republic.

The ministers discussed the present state and future prospects of economic relations between the Soviet Union and Poland. A desire was expressed to seek new forms of Soviet-Polish cooperation at both Union and republic level, and to improve trade and economic ties taking into account the transition, planned for 1991, to reciprocal settlements in freely convertible currency on the basis of world prices. Emphasis was placed on the need to speed up the elaboration of mutually acceptable solutions to emerging problems with a view to signing in the very near future an intergovernmental agreement on transition to a new mechanism of trade and economic ties. Bearing in mind the radical turnabout toward the market and the involvement of the economies of the USSR and the Polish Republic in the world economy, the sides believe that there must be further development of direct ties between enterprises and economic organizations. An important role is assigned to joint firms, associations, and border-zone cooperation.

The sides expressed solidarity as regards the need to *continue the joint work* on the final clarification of "blank spots" in the history of Soviet-Polish relations. The Polish side welcomed with gratification the desire of USSR law enforcement organs to pursue, with participation by Poland's representatives, their efforts to clarify the circumstances surrounding the death of Polish officers in Kozelsk, Starobelsk, and Ostashkovo during the years of Stalin's repressions and to identify their burial places.

Joint belief was expressed that the mutually respectful and friendly attitude toward the national traditions and spiritual needs of the peoples and the historical monuments of both countries is an immutable feature of multifaceted Soviet-Polish cooperation. Any actions that cast shadows over Soviet-Polish relations are not in keeping with our peoples' interests.

The ministers exchanged opinions regarding the conditions for the stay of Soviet troops on Poland's territory, examined questions associated with their forthcoming withdrawal, and agreed to embark on the discussion of this problem at special talks in the very near future.

The sides emphasized that today, when a line has finally been drawn beneath the "cold war" period, further joint efforts by all states are necessary in the interest of consolidating the positive changes in Europe and the world and making the process of disarmament and consolidation of security universal.

The ministers discussed the progress of preparations for the Paris summit meeting within the CSCE framework and emphasized the importance of the adoption of weighty political documents at it. A key importance in this context would attach to the signing of the treaty on reduction of conventional armaments in Europe and a declaration by the 34 CSCE member-states, as well as to the adoption of a joint declaration by Warsaw Pact and NATO member-states which would be a major contribution to disarmament and the building of new suprabloc security structures and of the all-European home.

The ministers welcomed the progressive developments achieved with UN assistance in the settlement of regional conflicts, specifically in Namibia, Central America, Western Sahara, Afghanistan, and Cambodia.

During the discussion of the situation in the Persian Gulf, the sides condemned Iraq's aggression against sovereign Kuwait. They demanded of Baghdad to fulfill the relevant Security Council resolutions so as to unblock the crisis situation. Iraq's withdrawal of its troops from Kuwait must be an absolute condition of this. Resolute support was expressed for the activities of the United Nations Organization and its secretary general to eliminate the crisis which has developed, primarily by peaceful means.

The talks proceeded in a businesslike, friendly atmosphere.

During his stay in Moscow, K. Skubiszewski had a conversation at the USSR Supreme Soviet International Affairs Committee and delivered a report [doklad] at the USSR Foreign Ministry Diplomatic Academy.

Yanayev Delegation Meets Jaruzelski in Warsaw

LD1810223190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1712 GMT 18 Oct 90

[Text] Warsaw, 18 Oct (TASS)—Wojciech Jaruzelski, the president of the Republic of Poland, here today received the Soviet delegation headed by Gennadiy Yanayev, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

During the course of the conversation the processes which are occurring in both countries were discussed—and against the background of these, the state of Soviet-Polish relations.

The Soviet guests who had arrived at the invitation of Social-Democratic leaders of the Republic of Poland had previously had meetings with Mikolaj Kozakiewicz and Andrzej Stelmachowski, the speakers of both chambers of the national parliament, as well as with Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, head of the Parliamentary Caucasus of the Democratic Left Wing, and other members of it. They also visited Jerzy Dabrowski, secretary of the Episcopate of the Polish Catholic Church.

Romanian Envoy to USSR Holds News Conference

PM1710101690 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Oct 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under the general heading: "Official Reports"]

[Text] The advancement of the cause of freedom and democracy is the main direction of Romania's development. This was the basic idea in a speech by V. Sandru, Romanian ambassador to the USSR. On 11 October he gave a news conference devoted to the present situation in his country.

After emphasizing that the new authority in Romania is dealing with a sick economy, the ambassador mentioned some measures aimed at improving its health. It is a question of the economy's transfer to market relations and of the population's social protection. The speaker named the problem of national minorities as an acute problem. Journalists were briefed, in particular, on how the country's leadership sees the resolution of this problem in respect of the Hungarian national minority.

West Europe

Shevardnadze Concludes European Tour in Austria

Arrives in Vienna, Meets Mock

LD1810115390 Moscow TASS in English 1124 GMT 18 Oct 90

[Text] Vienna October 18 TASS—Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze arrived on a one-day visit here today for talks with his French counterpart Roland Dumas.

The aim of the trip is to prepare President Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to France, scheduled for late October. The two men are likely to announce the exact date of this visit.

It is believed in political circles that Shevardnadze and Dumas will also discuss the situation in the Middle East.

At Schwechat Airport the Soviet guest was met by Austrian Foreign Minister Alois Mock and other officials.

Immediately after his arrival, Shevardnadze and Mock held a conversation at the airport.

Discusses Meeting With Mock

PM1910091390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Oct 90 Second Edition pp 1, 4

[Report by correspondent I. Melnikov: "Vienna: Ministers' Dialogue"]

[Excerpts] Vienna, 18 Oct—With a certain degree of surprise—for the Viennese, at any rate—the Austrian capital today became the venue for a lightning meeting between USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze and French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas. [passage omitted]

In the morning the Soviet foreign minister had talks with Alois Mock, his Austrian colleague. The issue of the State Treaty and its significance for Austria's present and future was touched on during the talks. Replying to a question from PRAVDA's correspondent about the "Austrian accent" of the visit to Vienna, E.A. Shevardnadze declared:

"The Austrian minister and I agreed that both sides take an identical view of the problem. The basic provisions of the State Treaty are undoubtedly of great significance and must be preserved under present conditions and for the future. As regards certain points in the treaty, they have definitely become obsolete, and it is necessary to begin consultations in order to remove what is obsolete."

"And do so in the near future?"

"Undoubtedly."

Asked whether the French side shares this viewpoint, R. Dumas said in Russian: "We agree."

The topics discussed by the Soviet and French ministers also included preparations for the all-European meeting in Paris and the progress of the Vienna talks on conventional arms in Europe.

Confers With Dumas on Treaty

LD1810162590 Moscow TASS in English 1612 GMT 18 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondents Vladimir Smelov and Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Vienna October 18 TASS—The Soviet and French foreign ministers today disussed the main articles of a Soviet-French cooperation treaty. Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze spoke to correspondents during a break in his talks with Roland Dumas.

"Our meeting is of much importance, because we are discussing the visit of Soviet President Gorbachev to France... the most important thing is that we agreed that the treaty would be signed. This is a major event in Soviet-French relations," Shevardnadze said.

According to Dumas, the forthcoming visit of President Gorbachev acquires special importance in the present international situation, as well as because the two heads of state will discuss the future of Soviet-French relations.

"We shall be glad to welcome President Gorbachev, to congratulate him on having won the Nobel Peace Prize, to develop contacts and deepen friendly relations," he said. France attaches maximum importance to the visit and the signing of the documents, which will be completed in a few days.

Speaking about their content, Dumas pointed out that it is planned to analyse jointly the new problems facing the two countries. The sides will also discuss disarmament and security problems, he added.

Discusses Talks With Dumas

LD1810221490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 18 Oct 90

[Report by correspondent V. Mikheyev in Vienna; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze's working visit to Vienna started today.

[Mikheyev] Alois Mock, the Austrian minister of foreign affairs, met the Soviet minister at the airport. Although the aim of Comrade Shevardnadze's visit to Vienna was a meeting and talks with Roland Dumas, the French minister of foreign affairs, the Soviet minister discussed a number of issues with Mr. Mock at Vienna Airport.

In particular, the mutual conviction was expressed that the state treaty of 1955 with Austria retains its significance although as a result of the changed situation in Europe several of its aspects may be considered jointly in the spirit of the traditional friendly relations between our countries.

Comrade Shevardnadze's meeting with Mr. Dumas took place in the Soviet Embassy. Issues connecterd with the forthcoming visit by Comrade Gorbachev to France were discussed.

[Begin Shevardnadze recording] The minister and I discussed all of the aspects connected with this event. Our dicussion passed in a spirit of constructiveness and of the traditional mutual understanding. We agreed on the date for the visit. Naturally, we must still inform our presidents. Perhaps, this is not the main thing. The main thing is that we agreed on the content of the visit. We agreed that a treaty will be signed. This really is a major event in Soviet- French relations. We have called it, we wish to call it, a treaty on assent and cooperation. The points, the main articles in this agreement are clear to me. We ministers, and our colleagues who help us, have taken into account the traditions which have taken shape over the decades and perhaps over the centuries in our relations...and a treaty which is directed toward the future, will direct future guidlines, as it were. [end recording] [Mikheyev] Mr. Dumas, the French foreign minister, said he is very satisfied with the work done this morning together with his friend Minister Shevardnadze. We were making preparations for President Gorbachev's visit to France, he said. This visit has special significance by virtue of the complex international situation.

Today Comrade Shevardnadze and the individuals accompanying him flew home from Vienna.

[Announcer] As has been reported to us, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev is to visit France on 28-29 October.

Further on Shevardnadze's Visit

WA1810190390

For reportage on the visit by Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze to Austria, including reports on his talks with Austrian Foreign Minster Alois Mock concerning the Gulf crisis, please see the AUSTRIA section of the 18 October West Europe DAILY REPORT and subsequent issues.

Shevardnadze Thanks De Michelis for Credit

AU1910092190 Rome ANSA in English 0814 GMT 19 Oct 90

[Text] Rome, 19 October (ANSA)—Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze thanked Italy for a credit and export insurance package in a phone conversation Thursday with his Italian counterpart Gianni de Michelis, the foreign ministry said.

The package, announced Wednesday, allowed the State Export Credit Insurance Agency (SACE) to take on responsibility for credit totalling some $4,400 billion between 1990 and 1994, evenly distributed over that period. It also promised just short of $2,000 billion in export credits in the near future to help the Soviet Union with its balance of payments difficulties.

According to the foreign ministry communique, Shevardnadze asked De Michelis to pass on his thanks to Italian Premier Giulio Andreotti.

"Italy's financial contribution is aimed at helping improve the Soviet Union's economic situation, especially in the short term, at a delicate time in the transformation of its economy," the note said. "This is a

tangible demonstration of the Italian Government's willingness to support and participate in a European Community initiative... which will be further developed over the next few months by the Italian duty presidency."

Greek Legislative Delegation Visits Moscow

Received by Nishanov 16 Oct

LD1610235290 Moscow TASS in English 1930 GMT 16 Oct 90

[Text] Moscow October 16 TASS—Soviet and Greek parliamentarians have large possibilities for developing mutually advantageous business cooperation. This was the keynote of a meeting here today between Rafik Nishanov, chairman of the Soviet parliament's Chamber of Nationalities, and a Greek parliament delegation, led by its president, Athanasios Tsaldharis.

During a constructive, interested conversation, Nishanov briefed Greek parliamentarians on the activity of the Supreme Soviet, the process of renewal of political structures in the USSR, the programme for the country's transition to a market economy and the concept of a Union treaty.

The delegation also met today members of the Soviet parliament Committee on International Affairs. Special attention was paid to prospects for the development of events in Europe.

The two sides expressed conviction that the forthcoming meeting of heads of state and government from Europe, U.S. and Canada in Paris will set the stage for establishing specific institutes of the European security system.

The Soviet and Greek parliamentarians expressed readiness to continue mutual contacts at interparliamentary level on a permanent basis.

The Greek delegation laid a wreath to the tomb of the unknown soldier at the Kremlin wall.

Perestroyka Policy Lauded

LD1810184990 Moscow TASS in English 1726 GMT 18 Oct 90

[Text] Moscow October 18 TASS—Soviet parliament Chairman Anatoliy Lukyanov met Greek lawmakers led by parliament President Athanasios Tsaldharis here today to tell them about changes in the Soviet Union.

The Greek parliamentary delegation is now in the Soviet Union on an official visit.

During a meeting held in a warm and friendly atmosphere, Lukyanov described political and economic changes in the Soviet Union, the work of the Soviet parliament to establish a legal basis for perestroika, including the course for switching to a market economy.

The Greek legislators praised the policy of perestroika and new political thinking pursued by the Soviet leadership and wished success to the Soviet people in their efforts to renew the life and activities of the Soviet state and society.

The sides expressed confidence that the visit by the Greek parliamentary delegation to the USSR and its contacts with Soviet lawmakers will give impetus to the development of mutually beneficial relations between the two countries' legislatures and the cause of deepening Soviet-Greek cooperation in various spheres.

The meeting was attended by Soviet lawmaker Kim Yen Oon [name as received] and Greek Ambassador to the USSR Ilias Gunaris.

Germany Approves Treaty on Soviet Troops

LD1810204590 Moscow TASS in English 2032 GMT 18 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondent Viktor Chistyakov]

[Text] Bonn October 18 TASS—The Federal Government today approved the treaty between the USSR and Germany on the stay and withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany.

The treaty was signed by Soviet Ambassador to Germany Vladislav Terekhov and German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher in Bonn on October 12.

The treaty notes that the solution of the question on the stay and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany will promote stronger peace and security in Europe during the creation of European security structures.

Under the treaty, Soviet troops are deployed on a territory allocated to them and have the right to carry out their routine activities, including military exercises.

Their withdrawal will begin since the time the treaty enters into force, will be implemented stage-by-stage and will be completed no later than the end of 1994.

The treaty notes that the German side will respect the legal status of Soviet troops and will refrain from any actions interfering with the implementation of their duties.

The treaty approved by the government will be submitted to the Bundestag for ratification.

Culture Minister Gubenko Hails Ties With FRG

PM1810152390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Oct 90 Second Edition p 5

[Report by correspondent Ye. Grigoryev under the rubric "USSR-FRG Cultural Links": "Minister on Stage"]

[Text] Bonn, 15 Oct—It is not all that often that culture ministers make a personal creative contribution to international contacts. Our Culture Minister N.N. Gubenko began his visit to the FRG by performing the title role in the Taganka Theater's production of "Boris Godunov," staged in Munich's Kammerspiele. Theatergoers and the press in the Bavarian capital greatly appreciated both the production and the performances. After this N.N. Gubenko spent another few days in Germany, but he was now on an official visit and, so to speak, performing on the political stage.

It was mostly this part of the visit that was discussed at the press conference in the Soviet Embassy in Bonn. It is worth noting in general the very fact that the USSR culture minister held such a meeting with the press, and did so not only in Bonn, but also in certain other places in the FRG. This is a great rarity for most of his colleagues, who visit the FRG but do not tell the public why they have come or what they have achieved by their mission. N.N. Gubenko talked of his meetings and conversations with representatives of federal organs and also with the culture ministers of federal laender and visits to various cultural institutions an acquaintance with which may prove useful for our cultural practice.

This year has been very rich in major cultural events in relations between our countries. Think of the Soviet festival in Kassel. Between April and the end of the year Kassel is the scene of meetings with our theater, musical, scientific, and sporting collectives, and debates, book exhibitions, and seminars are being held.

It is particularly worth mentioning the festival "Sergey Prokofyev and Contemporary Music in the Soviet Union." Its program includes dozens and dozens of concerts and musical soirees devoted to Prokofyev and other contemporary Soviet composers.

In N. Gubenko's opinion, Germany is moving into first place among our Western partners in cultural cooperation.

Berlin Group Questions Soviet Monument Fate

LD1810215990 Moscow TASS in English 2117 GMT 18 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Pavlyushin]

[Text] Berlin October 19 TASS—A parliamentary interpellation on the fate of the monument to Soviet soldiers who fell during the Berlin battle was sent to the state government by the right-wing Republican Party group in the House of Berlin's western part.

The monument was built during the first months after the war in Berlin's former British sector, near the Reichstag building in front of the Brandenburg Gates and is protected by the Soviet guard of honour up to this time.

"Republicans" put clearly provocative and anti-Soviet questions in their letter. They are interested whether the West Berlin Senate will permit the Soviet side to carry away "Reichstag ruins" from Berlin to the USSR, out of which the monument was built.

They also ask how this plot of land in front of the Brandenburg Gates will be used after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Berlin. They are also interested whether the Senate will build the central monument to "victims of Communist sway" on this place.

The Berlin state government set out its position to the interpellation in a document published by its press service on October 18.

The document says that the West German government stated in Article 18 of the Treaty on Goodneighbourly Relations, Parthership and Cooperation of September 12, 1990 between West Germany and the USSR that monuments to Soviet soldiers and victims of the Nazi regime built on German soil will be respected and protected by German laws.

These commitments were also set out in a joint letter by the foreign ministers of West Germany and the German Democratic Republic, sent to the foreign ministers of the USSR, the United States, Britain and France.

Taking into account these agreements, the Senate sees no point in "discussing and examining the content of this parliamentary interpellation."

Soviet Jewish Emigration to Germany Increases

PM1910081590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 Oct 90 Second Edition p 5

[Report from PRAVDA-TASS roundup under the rubric "Plus-Minus Fact": "Number of Immigrants Grows"]

[Text] The number of Soviet Jews who have moved to East Germany in recent months has reached 2,500. Their arrival there to take up permanent residence was made possible thanks to a decision which the Council of Ministers of the former GDR adopted in June this year. In all, the then East German authorities expressed readiness to accept up to 5,000 Soviet Jews. TAGESSPIEGEL writes that the FRG Government expects more than 4 million foreigners of German extraction to come to Germany during the next few years. Half a million will arrive in the FRG as early as next year.

Belgian Foreign Minister's Visit Postponed

LD1810185390 Moscow TASS in English 1734 GMT 18 Oct 90

[Text] Moscow October 18 TASS—According to a mutual understanding, a visit by Belgian Foreign Minister Marc Eyskens to the USSR, scheduled for October 18-20, has been postponed.

British-Soviet Trade Commission Ends Talks

LD1810211790 Moscow TASS in English 2019 GMT 18 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondent Pavel Ovchinnikov]

[Text] London October 18 TASS—The 17th session of the permanent inter-governmental Anglo-Soviet Commission on Scientific, Technical, Trade and Economic Cooperation ended its work here today.

The session examined the state of and prospects for economic, industrial and scientific cooperation and discussed economic changes in the Soviet Union and Britain's possibilities in promoting reforms in the USSR.

The commission examined mutual settlements, foreign investments in the Soviet economy, joint ventures and cooperation in agriculture, public health, the power industry and conversion.

The heads of the delegations, Konstantin Katushev, Soviet minister for foreign economic relations, and Timothy Sainsbury, British minister of state for trade and industry, signed a joint protocol on the results of the session.

It notes a growth in trade turnover between the two countries which totalled 3.2 billion roubles in 1989. The growth was achieved thanks to the export of oil and timber and the import of grain, industrial equipment, medicines and technology.

The two delegations welcomed progress in training Soviet managers at British business schools, companies, banks and other organisations. The sides stressed importance of holding educational seminars on management in the USSR.

The document expresses concern over the deteriorating state of the Soviet economy, including arrears in payment by Soviet organisations for goods delivered by British suppliers.

The British delegation stressed that this caused serious financial difficulties for many British companies, especially small and medium.

The Soviet side assured their British counterparts that the USSR Bank for Foreign Economic Operations will continue payment under its obligations and will pay for the executed contracts.

It is planned to hold another session of the commission in Leningrad in 1991.

Gosteleradio Signs Agreement With French TV

LD1210230190

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1530 GMT on 12 October, during its "Vremya" newscast, carries a two-minute report on a television cooperation agreement which was signed today in Moscow between the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting (Gosteleradio) and the French state company Canal France Internationale, CFI, by Lazutkin, deputy chairman of Gosteleradio, and CFI President and Director-General Foid-Benois. The agreement provides for a "substantial widening of exchanges in the television sphere." Following the success of the Europe Plus Moscow and Radio Nostalgique radio services, CFI will provide Gosteleradio with a daily six-hour service, "which can be used in the most diverse programs." It will consist of feature films, news, educational and leisure items, and other video material. "All this is to be on a gratuitous basis." In an interview, Alain Decaux, head of the French delegation, says he would like to see similar Soviet television programs in France.

Supreme Soviet

Supreme Soviet Approves Gorbachev's Market Plan

LD1910085490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0833 GMT 19 Oct 90

[By TASS legislative correspondent at the Kremlin]

[Text] Moscow, 19 Oct (TASS)—The Soviet legislature this morning adopted as a basis "The Main Directions on Stabilization of the National Economy and the Transition to the Market Economy," which was presented by the president, immediately after Mikhail Gorbachev's report, without further discussion.

A total of 356 members of the Supreme Soviet voted for it, with 12 against, and 26 abstentions.

In accordance with the procedure, the legislators may now only propose individual amendments to the document.

Gorbachev Says Plan Not 'Rejection of Socialism'

LD1910100590 Moscow TASS in English 0957 GMT 19 Oct 90

[By TASS parliamentary correspondent Igor Yefimov]

[Text] Moscow October 19 TASS—President Mikhail Gorbachev today called on Soviet parliament members to support the country's transition to a market economy, noting that it does not mean a rejection of socialism.

"We strive for a real, rather than declarative socialism," Gorbachev said. He said the road to this socialism was through a market.

Gorbachev dwelled on the economic mechanisms forming the base of the document "Guidelines for stabilizing the national economy and introducing a market system", submitted to the Parliament.

He said the centre has decided against working out a detailed All-Union plan. The guidelines only outline the main principles, and on their basis, every republic will be able to carry out the plan with due account to local specifics.

In an hour-long speech, Gorbachev noted that the life has led the country to a market. The administrative-command system fettered the country, he said.

Speaking about property reforms, Gorbachev favoured recognition of various forms and their equality. He said he believed that due to historic traditions, social forms of property will prevail in the future. Private property is permissible where it is most effective.

Gorbachev spoke of the need to carry out land reform, but he said it is necessary to be wary about the revival of private property on land, noting that here "the final word rests with the people".

Gorbachev said that without taking account of the sovereignty of union republics, any plan for the transition to a market would be doomed, and the guidelines proceeded from this premise.

Gorbachev called on all republics and social forces to consolidate in order to stabilise the economy and move jointly out of the crisis. He criticised and described as "confrontational" the address by Russian President Boris Yeltsin, who on Tuesday said the president's plan for the transition to a market was doomed to failure.

Ryzhkov Says Government Ready To Initiate Program

LD1910123490 Moscow TASS in English 1217 GMT 19 Oct 90

[By TASS parliamentary correspondent Andrey Orlov]

[Text] Moscow October 19 TASS—"The Soviet Government is prepared to carry out the programme of transition to a market economy and the 'tough and unpopular measures' it envisages," Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Nikolay Ryzhkov said here today.

Taking the floor in the USSR Supreme Soviet in the course of the discussion of the "guidelines for stabilising the economy and introducing market relations", submitted by President Gorbachev, Ryzhkov admitted that the implementation of these measures "would not bring glory to those who fulfil them." But the government is prepared for this, because it "realises that the future of our people depends on it." "To dodge responsibility today would mean to create additional difficulties and trigger an unpredictable political situation," he stressed.

The Soviet premier described the situation in the country as "extraordinary." "The country has approached the line beyond which it would be plunged into a socio-economic chaos and complete disintegration of political and state structures. The system of power is practically paralysed, and I dare say this, because I myself belong to this system," Ryzhkov said.

He called for "concerted efforts to take concrete steps" and "to discard political and other ambitions." "Those who today oppose social concord and who fan up passions, are actually gambling with the fate of our people for the sake of their own personal ambitions," Ryzhkov stressed. But "if changes turn into chaos," he said, "violence becomes very possible."

Ryzhkov said the fulfilment of the economic stabilisation plan depended on the "complete and undelayed consolidation of executive power, clearcut distribution of functions between the executive and legislative arms," and steadfast observance of laws.

The Soviet premier declared his readiness to "discuss once again the structure of the government, to set up special bodies typical for market economy and to invite young efficient people to the new organs."

Deputies Debate Market Plan at 18 Oct Session

LD1810205990

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1840 GMT on 18 October broadcasts a 115-minute recording of the USSR Supreme Soviet session in Moscow, with Economic Reform Committee Chairman Valentin Vologzhin in the chair. He says:

"Esteemed comrades, as you know, on 15 October, USSR President Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev submitted the main guidelines for the stabilization of the national economy and the transition to a market economy to the USSR Supreme Soviet. The committees and commissions discussed them on the 16th and 17th. Today they are being submitted to a joint expanded session of the Committee for Economic Reform; the Planning, Budget and Finance Commission; the Commission on Matters of Labor, Prices and Social Policy Commission; and the Commission for the Social and Economic Development of the Union and Autonomous Republics, Autonomous Oblasts and Okrugs.

"A report at the expanded session will be delivered by Academician Abel Gezevich Aganbegyan."

At 1842 GMT Academician Abel Aganbegyan takes the rostrum and delivers a 45-minute report.

At 1928 GMT Deputy Zhuravlev takes the floor. He says unless we start acting and stop talking, nothing will get done. The transition to the market offers maximum freedom to the republics. It is up to each to decide how to act but all forces must be united around the document under discussion.

At 1932 GMT Deputy Saunin takes the floor. He speaks first of all on behalf of the commission he represents. It noted a series of shortcomings in the document, he complains. It does not pay enough attention to the role of the producer. Saunin says Yavlinskiy's resignation yesterday was "panic" only. We must start to act, he warns.

At 1936 GMT Deputy Bogomolov is next to speak from the rostrum. He points out some differences between the two programs. He also calls for real measures to be taken. He is concerned by the fact that the document does not mention possible risks or failures, or of the sacrifices which will have to be made to improve the situation and he wonders if the sacrifices may be made in vain. He says that the document should not have given the illusion that it will be possible to improve the situation in the consumer market by 1991. As for privatization, there is also much that is unclear in the document. What is proposed so far is the British mode of privatization, not one which conforms to the socialist spirit, he says. Agreement is needed between the center and the republics if the document is to be successful.

At 1945 GMT Deputy Shtoyk takes the floor. He warns that further delay will put us in an even worse situation. The mechanism for holding back the rise in prices will be a matter of acute concern for people. Social tension in mining areas will increase and this will make the transition to the market more difficult. He recommends that the document be adopted.

Deputy Sazonov is next to speak. He says that by adopting the Main Directions approved by the president we can halt the crisis which is gripping the country. If we adopt the presidential program tomorrow we can begin to implement its provisions. If we do not the country is sunk.

At 1950 GMT Aganbegyan takes the floor again and replies to more than 50 questions put to him. He says that every republic will choose its own path for stabilizing the economy.

At 1956 GMT Deputy (Sherbushuyev) takes the floor. He says everything must be regarded as a whole and not individually. The laws which we are planning to adopt contradict those which we are to adopt tomorrow.

At 1959 GMT Deputy Ternyuk is next to speak. He proposes methods of denationalization and calls for the regulation of prices by taxation.

At 2002 GMT Deputy Denisov takes the floor. He says that the program should be examined at each stage to see what already been achieved rather than blindly proceeding to the next stage. He says he fears that they will have to go over to limited private ownership of land. He says its all very well for the document to say that it adheres to the theory of socialism, but life may force it to act otherwise.

Deputy Yefremov is next to speak. He speaks of how the different forms of ownership will affect farming.

At 2009 GMT Deputy Mishuk takes the floor and puts forwards his proposals for the main directions. He says that various publications are needed to explain to people what the market has to offer them. He calls for price increases to be countered with corresponding increases in wages, otherwise strikes might result. He calls for the clause on market relations in housing to be removed, in view of the great lines for housing already.

Deputy Savro takes the floor and speaks on behalf of the Committee for the Protection of the Health of the People. The committee, after two days of studying the document, approves it wholeheartedly, he says.

(Felikchakov), Ukrainian people's deputy, chairman of the Commission for Economic Reform of the Ukraine, and a guest at the Supreme Soviet proceedings, takes the floor and stresses the need for competition, which is possible only if at least 80 percent of property does not belong to the government. He says monetary reform is essential to avert prices going through the roof and he warns that the Ukraine will introduce monetary reform to avert this, even if the USSR does not.

At 2017 GMT Deputy Levashev is next to address the deputies. He thinks Yavlinskiy resigned because it is not possible to implement the reforms.

At 2022 GMT Deputy Ryabchenko comes next to the rostrum and complains that the document does not stress the importance of the scientific and technical revolution for the transition to the market economy. He insists that the document carries a section on technical advance and then begins to examine various points of the Main Directions. He says the Main Directions must show people that progress is being made, otherwise the people won't support it. Proposals in the document on conversion also need working on, he says.

Deputy (Shyutkevich) then speaks. He says a great mistake has been made in the Main Directions document by pointing out that things will get worse during the transition period and people will come to think that the reforms are intended for a certain group of people only.

At 2030 GMT Deputy Gubarev says he thinks the Main Directions document will be adopted and then he dwells on the section dealing with land. He says it is immoral to leave land orphaned; it should be given over to specific ownership. He says that a clause allowing the purchase and sale of land should be inserted into the Main Directions.

At 2032 GMT Deputy (Deset) takes the floor and calls for the delimitation of the functions of the center and the republics. He calls for a general sitting of all Supreme Soviets of the republics to delegate functions and this will allow people to know who they are following and for what reasons.

At 2034 GMT the chairman concludes, saying that the committees and commissions adopted the decision at separate sessions to support the presidential document. No other opinions were put forward during the discussion of Aganbegyan's report today. Therefore, the chairman says, we will go to the Supreme Soviet tomorrow with the proposal to that effect, taking account of course, of suggestions made today.

At this point the recording of the USSR Supreme Soviet ends.

Aganbegyan Report

LD1810210290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1842 GMT 18 Oct 90

[Report by Academician Abel Gazevich Aganbegyan at the 18 October USSR Supreme Soviet session held in the Kremlin—recorded]

[Text] Alongside other comrades, I took part in the preparation of the material presented by the president. But I would like to note that the principal author of the material is the president, and not some group of people who drafted a document which he merely signed. The president himself worked for several days, and when we were working on it, every point was naturally agreed upon by him. The first question that arises is: Why is the document not called a program, but main guidelines?

The recently held session of the Soviet of the Federation, chaired by the president, was very influential in determining the decision to make the submitted document a set of main guidelines. Many republics, and also Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov, the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, expressed the view, with a fair amount of justification, that the document should take the form of main guidelines, and that this is in line with the extended rights of the republics, each of which is now drawing up and adopting detailed and specific programs which take into account the distinctive features and conditions in the republics. If one were to adopt a detailed program, this would tie down the republics. Many points of the program would, simply because of their detail, contradict individual points in the programs already adopted by the republics. And so on. In their adoption of the programs, different republics are emphasizing different aspects. As you know, the Russian Federation adopted the program of Stanislav Sergeyevich Shatalin's group. The Kirghiz Republic, for instance, has tilted toward the government program. To attempt, at a Union level, to compel Kirghizia to adopt a program adopted by the Russian Supreme Soviet, or, conversely, to force the program adopted in Kirghizia on Russia, would hardly be a worthwhile or proper task.

There is a vast degree of specificity in the republics, and to attempt to set everything out in detail from the center is extremely dangerous. You will know that we did, for instance, make an attempt to write out in detail a section on land reform. Some support it, and others are categorically opposed to it, and that includes different republics. Conditions differ totally. A limited quantity of irrigated land in Central Asia is one thing, and the expanses of Siberia are another. The circumstances are quite different again in the Baltic. We attempted to set out the housing reform in detail, we attempted to specify its details. We wrote it all out. But it met with objections from individual republics, and there were different views. You will notice that we have hardly set down anything. At the end of the day, the housing stock is municipal in large measure, and I do not rule out the possibility of there being one set of legislation in Moscow and some other points, unconnected with the capital's housing stock, in another oblast. The attempt to foist uniform solutions on everyone from here is very difficult.

I would like now to get to the gist of the matter. No country has ever adopted detailed programs. If you have confidence in the elected executive bodies of power, you must define the directions of the reform. Beyond that you must trust the bodies of power. There was a very vivid speech at the Presidential Council meeting which compared the situation with the treatment undergone by a patient. The patient trusts the doctor. The doctor makes a diagnosis and describes the general details of the required treatment. But the doctor should not, God forbid, give the patient details of what needle will be used on him, and so on. What is the point? The patient is not a professional, and it is very difficult to explain to

him all the aspects the doctor has at his command; and the doctor's doubts. What is the point?

If you take famous reforms like the Erhard reform in Germany; Japanese reforms; or the recently implemented reforms in Brazil and Argentina; or the reform in Poland—they amount to several pages of text defining the directions of reform. There is no detailed explanation of how much meat is to cost, or what the exchange rate is going to be, or other matters. In fact it is difficult to tell in advance. The famous Balcerowicz plan fits on just a few pages. What one has to accept here is the general direction. Nevertheless, we have set out quite detailed main guidelines—66 pages. Before that, you have the material from the president. There is the detailed government program. There is the program of the working group organized by the president and the chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet. You have all the necessary material. You can compare and examine everything, and get an idea of what is behind every point.

Is it proper to adopt a fat program without taking an in-depth look at its contents? One cannot do that. One would be taking it on trust. We know what the Russian Supreme Soviet did. It unanimously adopted a program with enthusiasm—only four were against, if my memory does not betray me. Did all the deputies sense the logic of this program? Did they proceed in their further activities from the points of the program? Immediately after the program, a decision was adopted to raise the price of gas. This was perhaps an enforced measure, but to raise the price to that extent [as heard] was not enforced. It could have been raised by only half that much. This price increase was higher than envisaged in the price increase of the government of the country. The legislators forgot that this categorically contradicted the whole logic of the program they had adopted. They then began discussing additional sums for the pensions law. Everything in the program is written completely the opposite way round—to delay the implementation of even the Union pension law. And they voted for this. But, immediately, they do not only not delay, but add a vast extra sum. Understandably—and I do not want in any event to cast any reproaches, and God forbid that anyone thinks that I am making an accusation—but it is simply not legislators' business to adopt such detailed programs where it is very difficult to make everything conform with them.

More detailed material could be distributed as information material, but to approve something, and then act in the opposite way, that is the worst thing that could happen.

Therefore, the president and the Federation Council made a conscious choice to call this document the "Main Guidelines." The structure of the Main Guidelines is fully in accord with the structure of the draft program presented by the president. This program begins with a section on economic interrelations in the union of sovereign republics. The program of the Shatalin group begins in the same way. What is new in this section compared with what was there before? First, in accordance with a proposal from the commission headed by deputy Sharipov, and in accordance with the many proposals from the autonomous republics which the president received, this program in general, including this section, takes account of the observations concerning the raising of the role of the autonomous republics and other national formations in the Union's economy.

Another change concerns the problem of the formation of the state budget. Here it is written that the Union's budget is formed on the basis of the Union federal taxes. Not tax, but taxes. The point is that with the inflation which undoubtedly lies in store for us, and which has already begun, the tax on profit as the main tax works very badly. All the more so because there are masses of opportunities to reduce this profit by means of increasing expenses, and so on. Normally in these conditions help is provided by a sales tax, or by a value added tax, on added value abroad, which does not yet exist in this country. Therefore, to restrict oneself to only one type of tax, a profits tax, overall, over the whole transitional period, would be incorrect. But, let me say that the rates of taxes and the objects to be taxed are established in agreement with the republics. That is, it is clear that all of this will be the subject of discussion.

The second section: The logic and stages for improving the economy and the transition to a market economy. It must be stated clearly that the economic situation has, to a certain extent, become more difficult since the time when the previous programs were discussed. Following the raising of bread grain prices, the procurement prices, first the Russian Federation raised meat prices; then our USSR Government, ahead of schedule compared with previous plans, carried out an increase in procurement prices for meat in all the other republics. Moreover, the president, as you know, on 4 October issued a decree on the transition to contract prices in concluding contracts, on contract wholesale prices in industry when concluding contracts for 1991. Some comrades view this decree as something totally unexpected, contrary to the logic of the programs, and so on. If you open the program of Academician Shatalin you will see a point on the necessity for going over to contract wholesale prices when concluding contracts for 1991.

When should these contract prices have been introduced? From 1991? But these contracts are being concluded today, and you know that a catastrophe was looming. Knowing that prices would be raised, that all the program—perhaps in different ways, but they all speak about new wholesale prices—enterprises naturally were not concluding contracts. [sentence as heard] What sort of contract is it if it contains no price? How can one undertake obligations without knowing what price you will be selling at? If it is at a loss then you must minimize the sum of deliveries, and soon.

The main thing, one of the points of the primary measures of the 500 day program, was first to maintain the

existing economic links for at least six months, and then for the next six months to maintain links for fuel, raw materials, construction materials. That was the first point in that program. The second point was the transition to contract prices.

The president implemented this because it was in accord with the 500 day program and the governmental program. The governmental program also spoke of maintaining production links, and also spoke of announcing prices—government-distributed price lists. The president tried, so to say, to implement this. The contract prices, as the presidential decree states, should be drawn up on the basis of the list prices. Moreover, restrictions have been imposed with regard to profit limits. But what it is going to look like in concrete terms—what "on the basis" means and "profit limits" means, and there is also a point about a list of fixed prices which the government establishes—all these points are designed to prevent inflation from taking off, at any rate to set some sort of economic limits.

Everyone can understand this. So when people now pretend that the president has suddenly adopted some sort of decrees which run counter to all programs, and are motivated by one knows not what, this is simply untrue. It is untrue because it had to be done. You will be aware that after these presidential decrees were adopted, it transpired from reports from the State Committee for Material and Technical Supply, and from the republics, that the process of concluding contracts has proceeded very vigorously. These measures worked, but in working, these measures created a new situation. Inflation began to spiral. Thus, the logic and stages of economic revival are set out a little differently from the way they were set out in August, when all the programs were being presented. They were written in August. One of the principal new points is about restraining prices, restraining new decisions on incomes and pay. In other words, as far as possible a barrier has to be erected against the uncontrolled spiralling of inflation. That is one new element. Another new element is that in these circumstances one must immediately, without wasting a single day, carry out major measures to improve finances and the credit and monetary system—as rapidly as possible. That is, we must soak up money and prevent a spiralling of high prices.

To ensure that this does not have a negative effect on the volume of production, it is necessary, at the same time, to very strictly maintain the existing economic links and material flows. The presidential decree is aimed at achieving this.

After the implementation of major measures to improve the financial, credit, and monetary system—and depending on how the republics cooperate on this—this will take three, four, up to six months. And with the holding back of price increases in this period—holding back means... [changes thought] But it is impossible to put an end to price increases. It is impossible to abrogate decisions that have been made. But one can hold them back and not allow this natural process to develop. To hold back price increases means to try to permit only minimum increases.

In these conditions one can subsequently move on to liberalizing prices on what will then be the new financial, monetary, and credit basis. That is the approximate sense of the whole logic. This logic does not lend itself to precise calculation because there are many unknown parameters. What unknown parameters? The effectiveness of the decisions of the Union and republican bodies, how quickly and how fully they will be implemented. It is unclear what will happen with foreign credits, on which—as I will report later—very much depends; and a number of other aspects.

Therefore, it is appropriate not to set such strict timetables as were set in Academician Shatalin's program, where only 100 days were given for emergency measures. Where the next period was day 100 to day 250, and not to day 255, and so on. Many people criticized these specific time periods for their lack of realism, and so forth.

Here the whole period is split into four stages in accordance with the same logic, but the length of each stage is not specifically set out. Nor is there any overall 500 day period indicated. The period of operation of the program for the transitional period is set at one and one-half to two years.

On the whole, the most important section is the one on measures to stabilize the economy. They are drawn up by taking account of the same specific features about which I spoke. Doubt is now being cast, and serious criticisms are now being expressed about the part of this program which speaks about the budget deficit. Academician Shatalin's program envisaged the complete balancing of the budget in the fourth quarter of 1990, that is without a deficit, and a nondeficit budget in 1991. That was written in it.

Unfortunately, it is impossible to do this. The members of this group understood this for themselves when they were shown a detailed list of budget items and of everything else, and when there was a professional conversation with those who are drawing up this budget.

Having looked at all these calculations, and having met several times with the minister of finance and others for a purely professional talk, having looked at all underlying data, we reached the conclusion that, evidently, in the fourth quarter there would be a deficit of 20 billion. [figure as heard] This will be a good thing if it can be done after the price increases for grain crops and meat. As a whole, our government is promising that it will reduce this year's deficit to R600 billion. It is not long before we can check this out. This is in accordance with the figures adopted by the Supreme Soviet.

For the following year we were not able to adopt the proposal of the 500 days program regarding a zero deficit in the budget. Having examined in detail all measures,

we arrived at the conclusion that it is possible to write—and in this we agree with the government—that is to say, there is only one figure: That the deficit will be R25-30 billion. It will not exceed 2.5 - 3 percent of the gross national product. But the main thing is not the size of the deficit. It must be said that the deficit of many countries is also slightly larger, not only in terms of the absolute size, but also in terms of the norm.

We have a batch of specific materials for each item—by how much it is being reduced and by how much expenditures can be reduced, and so forth—prepared by the Ministry of Finance with our participation. It is necessary for us to burden you with specific figures for the program—by how much we intend to reduce expenditures for the needs of the Ministry of Defense; by how much expenditures need to be reduced for production building sites which have already been started; by how much expenditures are to be reduced on the upkeep of the state apparatus; by how much expenditures are to be lowered on state subsidies, and so on.

But the main thing is not just to reduce expenditures. The main thing, of course, is also to supplement revenues. And here revenues are to be supplemented through considerably increased revenue from turnover tax. To this end it is being proposed to expand the range of goods for which this tax is being set. When prices go up, a tax must be levied, of course, on the sale in the form of a turnover tax in order not to introduce changes in the legislation in force. A number of other measures are being undertaken for the budget.

Our key problem is to normalize the consumer market as quickly as possible. There are three factors here. First is the amount of money, the effective demand. Now there is excessive demand. According to our calculations there is something in the area of 200 billion [currency not specified] in excessive, hot, money—money not backed up by goods, which is ready to rush in and buy goods.

According to the USSR State Bank's estimate—Comrade Gerashchenko—it is only half that, and I hope he is right, and even if it were only half, then it would be far easier to normalize the consumer market.

Another question is the quantity of goods and services which are offered for the money. The third question is prices.

In the section on the normalization of the consumer market an attempt is made to reply to all these questions. What is to be done? In order to tie up the surplus money, it is proposed to raise interest rates and to hold back, therefore, part of the money in savings accounts under state guarantees; to introduce interest-free borrowing from the population in return for being able to acquire in the near future, at fixed dates, material goods which are in short supply with firm guarantees on the part of the state that prices will be fixed.

Third, to increase the goods and services that are paid for, to increase the sale to the population of housing, dachas, construction materials, and various types of state property, to charge for giving plots of land in the countryside and to this end to reprofile the capacities of construction organizations, to give them additional incentives, and so on.

In all of these direcitons, naturally, there are advantages.

A system of additional incentives for the production of consumer goods, both in the sphere of taxation privileges and in the redistribution of investments for the benefit of enterprises engaged in the manufacture of consumer goods, is being prepared now in order to expand the production of consumer goods and the sphere of services. Providing light industry with raw materials is an urgent task. This is also a question of normalizing our foreign economic links and a series of measures is also envisaged here. The supply of goods may be increased temporarily also through additional credits, including trade credits.

The organization of the sale of imported goods by mail-order catalogue is also proposed, and this will also naturally, draw off the population's money, and so on.

Now for prices: prices for essential commodities—retail prices for essential commodities—which are part of the subsistence minimum of families, and which are consumed by families which have a per capita income of up to R100 a month—in other words, roughly 100 million people—as far as possible, we will keep these prices at the state level as it exists today. However, we will give individual republics the opportunity to raise these prices, if they consciously choose to do so, as Estonia has done. As far as nonessential goods are concerned, we propose, in the case of some of these goods which are acquired only by high-paid groups, going over to prices determined by supply and demand. A wide range of these goods will appear in the shops right away. After all, the range of goods available is also an issue at stake. The price of other goods, nonessential goods, will be fixed by the state, but the price will be raised by reasonable amounts. In other words, the price will not be increased twofold, threefold, or fivefold—but it will go up by a certain percentage. The percentage will vary, naturally, according to the type of product. It may 20, 30, 40 percent—the increases will be of those proportions, roughly. These percentages will, of course, be linked to the increase in money wages and income. Evidently, in due course, we will also have to increase to a certain extent the prices of essential commodities, but probably not from 1 January, and not on the scale which the government had planned. As you will remember, it had been planning to raise food prices by 110 percent. Naturally, compensation should be given for these price increases. But I will talk about that later.

We think that during this most complex period, lasting until at least next spring or summer, individual regions and republics should ration a limited selection of essential commodities. These decisions should be made by

local bodies in light of their own stocks and the opportunities at their disposal. This is not the prerogative of the central authorities.

We know that Leningrad is getting ready to bring in coupons. Moscow is, in principle, in favor of bringing in coupons, and so on.

Then follows a large section on the measures forming the market economy. The section on destatization and privatization sparked the most debate. First, I would like to say that de-statization is a fairly general process, the essence of which is the separation of the function of economic management from the function of state administration. This is a policy of granting independence to enterprises and economic bodies which are responsible thenmselves for their own revenue and their own expenses and, consequently, enjoy a wide range of rights to self-financing and many other rights.

Privatization is not a good word. This word is criticized by very authoritative foreign researchers. Privatization is not a switch to private property. It is more a general term, connected with a change in owner. In place of state ownership there will be other types of ownership, including collective forms of ownership, joint-stock ownership, cooperatives, and also a switch to private ownership. Therefore we should not be afraid of this word. We should not think that the authors of the program beleive that private property should prevail in our country, and so on. This section states firmly that the right of private property is recognized, and that is all. That is the form in which it is stated.

The specific questions of ownership must be resolved by the republics. Laws on the protection of ownership, guaranteeing the right of ownership to corporate bodies and citizens, including—and that is very important—foreigners, are to be adopted at the level of the Union as a whole. Speaking of the general strategy for destatization and privatization, the program says that it is to be carried out, above all, in those spheres where the functioning of non-state structures is most expedient. Here one is speaking of trade, public catering, consumer services, construction and repair organizations, and small enterprises in other industries. It covers the transformation of large- and medium-scale enterprises in various industries into joint-stock companies and partnerships. But all this will be done in accordance with the legislation of the republics, taking into account the specific conditions. It will be done step by step. There will be no sudden actions. It is not as though everything is going to be abolished and created anew as of 1 January.

The section on land reform was fundamentally reworked following the criticism made here. As in other sections, stress is also laid on the legislation of the republics with regard to land use. It is not stated here that there will be private ownership of land, or that it will not exist. Let the legislation of the republics and special union legislation decide the matter. The idea of land reform is put forward. It is supported by all republics. But the specific nature of land reform has to be decided by the republics with due regard for the specifics of land use. Here, as in other places, a firm line is taken toward creating mixed economy and establishing mixed forms of ownership. Not a single form of ownership is deemed unsuitable or is brushed aside. The many varied charges that attempts are being made forcibly to get rid of collective and state farms, and so on, are completely divorced from reality.

Comrades, the section on social policy has been drastically widened and enriched. This proved to be one of the central sections, and attention here is above all placed on strategic guidelines. An attempt is made to reply to the question of what the transition to the market gives people, as from the strategic point of view the transition to the market is needed in order to orient our whole economy toward people, and to create better living conditions for people in the broad sense of the word. Above all, we have to give people broad opportunities for realizing their vital abilities and needs, on the basis of free labor and a growth of private income. The most vulnerable sections of the population, who because of specific factors cannot at present utilize their abilities, must also find themselves here. I refer to children, the disabled, and pensioners. They must have as much state protection as possible.

The very concept of the population's income is being filled with new qualitative content. In general, the policy and the course of the reform and of the transition to the market are leading to a position in which, when considering wages, one must take into account the articles of expenditure—and regarding this wages should increase sufficiently quickly—expenditure on housing, expenditure above the social norm on health insurance, and many other types of expenditures in connection with the expansion of the paid services sphere. People should have a conscious choice.

At the same time, the whole system of social funds should be strengthened. They will provide a guaranteed level of social benefits for the entire strata of the population. But this level should be regarded as a minimum one.

The new qualitative content of real incomes is that for them, one can acquire goods and services on the market, on a normal balanced and saturated market. In effect, the transition to the market economy in the first instance naturally envisages the existence of such a market. It is written here that over a period of six months to a year we should normalize the consumer market by means of a massive implementation of various groups of measures. It is clearly written here that the decisions adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet to raise pensions and allowances will be implemented.

On employment policy, a whole system of measures is envisaged—the creation of a special state employment service—naturally, within the composition of local soviets; a special program, on a state-wide and a regional

level, to create jobs for regions with excess labor; the introduction of allowances for those who temporarily lose their ability to work due to unemployment; and the introduction of a state system, at state expense, for the retraining of workers, and so on.

A special section—quite detailed, although the material is very compact—is devoted to what we call the nonmarket sector, primarily in the social sphere. There is a special examination of questions of public health, science, education, culture, art, and nature protection. It is stated that this is the only sector of the economy to which, in principle, financial and other restrictions will not be extended, even in the complicated period of the stabilization of the national economy.

The final section on the reorganization of the management system was rewritten—it was discussed in very great detail at the Council of the Federation. You have already adopted the general proposition—that the transition to market relations and the tasks of stabilization require a strong and efficiently organized state power. The experience of other countries also provides evidence of this. The general proposition is advanced that the road to authoritative and strong power of this sort lies in the attainment of social accord and the unification of all the country's social forces that value the destiny of the country and its peoples. As you know, the president has set about this work.

Moscow and Leningrad leaders were invited to the Soviet of the Federation meeting. This was done for the first time. The president met roughly 50 of the country's trade union leaders. He met with 20 newspaper editors in chief. He held a preliminary meeting with members of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. He has also planned a number of similar meetings to consolidate general efforts.

But the powers of the president, recently granted to him by the Supreme Soviet, must be used as much as possible. The proposition on enhancing the role of the Soviet of the Federation, which is to work out and implement decisions reached between the republics through an all-Union republican body, is something new. The government has agreed with the need to set up an interrepublican economic committee. It has been deemed desirable for this interrepublican economic committee, made up of plenipotentiary representatives of the republics, specialists, and scientists, to be attached to the Soviet of the Federation, as a working body of the Soviet of the Federation.

Given, the increased responsibility of the president and the Soviet of the Federation, the structure and functions of executive power, including the upper level, need to be assessed. This matter was discussed in detail at the Soviet of the Federation meeting, and it was unanimously agreed that this matter must be tackled when the Union treaty is being concluded. In connection with this, the presidents of the republics, the chairmen of the Supreme Soviets, asked the USSR president to do what he could to speed this up, and Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev promised to send, in the next few days—I think yesterday he was to send it to the republics—a specific draft Union treaty. Naturally, the transition to a market requires the creation of a number of all-Union and republican bodies which are going to be performing new functions engendered by the transition to the market.

A state property fund has already been set up by the president's decree, but a number of other bodies are also to be set up to make up the market infrastructure. It is natural that in this complicated period the roles of legislative bodies of the USSR Supreme Soviet and of the supreme soviets of the Union and autonomous republics, which are to examine the main bills ensuring this transition, are enhanced.

I will read the last sentence out loud, as it is so important: The measures to improve the economy and to transfer to the market—the stages of their implementation—are directly linked with political stability in society and with the normal functioning of the organs of government and administration. The real state of affairs requires the introduction without delay of corrections into the mechanisms of adopting and carrying out decisions, and into the forms and methods of work of all echelons of legislative and executive power. It also requires raising the personal responsibility of officials involved in realizing these program measures.

Commission Supports Gorbachev Plan

LD1810153690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1410 GMT 18 Oct 90

[By TASS parliamentary correspondents Boris Sverev, Ivan Ivanov, and Vladimir Isachenkov, from the Kremlin]

[Text] Moscow, 18 Oct (TASS)—At their joint expanded sitting today, the USSR Supreme Soviet's committees and commissions said "yes" to the "Basic Guidelines for Stabilization of the National Economy and Transition to a Market Economy" presented by the country's president.

A final decision is to be made at a joint sitting of the chambers.

"There's no room for stepping back further. We are obliged to adopt a decision tomorrow at the USSR Supreme Soviet," said Aleksandr Zhuravlev, a member of the Commission on Issues of Labor, Prices, and Social Policy. The orator agreed that "it is not necessary to do the impossible, to try to detail the behavior of the Soviet economy in each sector."

He was supported by Anatoliy Saunin, member of the Commission on Planning and Budget and Finance, who stressed that in the Basic Guidelines only the principles and regulations of the transition to the market are outlined. In this regard, he did not agree with the assertions that the document presented by the president

of the USSR cancels the "500 days" Russian program, characterizing as a "panic" action yesterday's resignation by one of its authors, Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, deputy chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Council of Ministers.

Garriy Shtoyik, member of the legislative committee on questions of economic reform, expressed the hope that the document under discussion "will serve as the economic basis for the voluntary unification of the sovereign republics within the framework of a renewed Union and will at the same time guarantee the satisfaction of people's requirements." In the opinion of the deputy, the concept of the document "offers the maximum opportunities for the free choice of the sovereign republics."

The speeches delivered today at the joint sitting of the commissions and committees give grounds for hoping that the presidential document will receive the support of the legislature.

Aganbegyan Dismisses Yeltsin Speech as 'Political'

LD1810173290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 18 Oct 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] My producer has just informed me that our legislative correspondent has prepared a report on the Supreme Soviet committees and commissions session.

[Begin recording] [V. Tsygankov] At the Kremlin today, the joint extended session of the committees and commissions of both chambers of the Union parliament, and representatives of the public, discussed "The Main Directions on Stabilization of the National Economy and the Transition to a Market Economy." This document has been put forward by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, the country's president, and by a group of scientists and experts who worked on it.

In his broad, over-an-hour-long report, Academician Aganbegyan presented a substantiated analysis of the new draft. It incorporates seven sections and covers all spheres of the economic and sociopolitical life of the country during its transition to a market. Answering the deputies' notes—there were over 50 of them—he presented detailed answers to questions about the people taking part in the elaboration of the document, prices, taxation, privatization, foreign investments, the delegation of certain rights to the center by the republics, and the readiness of legislative acts during implementation of the program. Answering a question about the speech Yeltsin made to the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet members, Academician Aganbegyan said, among other things:

[Aganbegyan] How do you view the speech of Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin where he says that according to preliminary calculations, next year the budget deficit will reach about 300 billion rubles [R]—thus exceeding the entire budget income?

I do not know from where Boris Nikolayevich has taken these figures. The republics have not yet calculated their budgets. They will be discussed beginning today, only today, as the Federation Council ruled. I believe no one in the USSR or at least nobody among the ones who have prepared this program, could have seen these budgets together.

It is not clear how this budget deficit is calculated, what constitutes the budget deficit, and what is counted as taxes, incomes, and expenditure. In other words, I think the speech by Boris Nikolayevich was of a political nature.

When I read the text of his speech I got the impression that he had not seen the "Main Directions" because some of the figures he listed—for example, he said the document mentions a budget deficit of R40 billion—were not contained either in any of the previous drafts of this document, nor are they contained in the present draft. Several times he called this document a program. There were a number of other factual inaccuracies. Therefore, his speech was a political one. Whatever program we presented he would still have made the same speech.

[Tsygankov] The debate that took place on the document presented to the deputies can be noted this time for its businesslike approach without any polemical excesses. The majority proposed that "Main Directions" be endorsed as a whole and that a start be made as soon as possible to implement the program put forward by the country's president for taking the country out of the crisis. [end recording]

Gorbachev Criticizes Yeltsin's Economic Statement

LD1910111490 Moscow TASS in English 1105 GMT 19 Oct 90

[By TASS parliamentary correspondent Andrey Orlov]

[Text] Moscow October 19 TASS—Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev today criticised Monday's statement by Russian President Boris Yeltsin, in which he denounced Gorbachev's plan for economic stabilisation and the transition to market relations.

Defending his plan in Soviet parliament today, Gorbachev accused Yeltsin of intending to "turn the economic stabilisation programme, which affects the vital interests of the country, into a subject for political games". Gorbachev described such actions as "immoral".

"The content and tone of Yeltsin's speech make it a political statement, so it cannot be left unnoticed," Gorbachev said.

He said he shared Yeltsin's concern about the aggravated situation in the country and would have had "no questions" if the Russian president had spoken about ways to solve problems and called for public accord and consolidation.

"Regrettably, other, confrontational motifs and sharp words, instead of solid arguments and proposals, prevailed" in Yeltsin's speech, Gorbachev said.

Gorbachev described many of Yeltsin's remarks as "strange, to say the least".

Responding to Yeltsin's fears that the presidential plan would boost inflation in the country, Gorbachev placed part of the blame for this on the Russian government, which increased purchasing prices on farm produce and took some other unilateral steps.

"One has the impression that the Russian leadership, to some extent, is afraid of difficulties," he said. "It wants to make central bodies of power fully responsible for possible negative consequences, which are inevitable during such a major turn, and reserve ways for retreat.

"I think it is time for it to shift the emphasis in its work to practical deeds."

Commenting on Yeltsin's proposal to form a coalition for the transition to a market economy, Gorbachev said that "coalitions based on ultimatums do not exist."

"The heated and dictatorial manner in which the issue was raised makes one doubt whether (Yeltsin's) intentions are sincere."

Interregional Deputies Deliberate on Economic Plan

LD1810130390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1200 GMT 18 Oct 90

[Report by Kremlin correspondent Lyudmila Semina on the 18 October session of the USSR Supreme Soviet—live or recorded]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Discussions in the Kremlin continue, and a sitting is under way, but a meeting of the Interregional Group of Deputies just ended in the Small Hall.

The group's position has been worked out, and I am extremely glad that the deputies' sober reasoning has rejected some proposals, such as, that this document should be opposed and that the Basic Guidelines should not be adopted. The Interregional Group of Deputies acknowledged that it has let the moment pass when it had to defend the Shatalin-Yavlinskiy program. The majority of deputies have agreed that they have to support the Basic Guidelines, that they should not avoid the implementation of this concept but, on the contrary, should take all subsequent steps under their control and strive for the creation of a coalition government, which would be capable of participating competently in the process of transition to a market economy. The deputies intend to complete a draft statement by the Interregional Group of Deputies by tomorrow's sitting.

Committees, Commissions Debate Economic Plan

PM1810142390 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 18 Oct 90 Second Edition p 1

[S. Karkhanin report under the rubric "In the Supreme Soviet Committees and Commissions": "The Economy Can No Longer Wait"]

[Text] Of the 350 billion rubles in savings bank deposits 150 billion belongs to just two percent of depositors. Describing the scale and potential of the "shadow" economy an expert, Professor R. Belousov, cited these figures at the 17 October sitting of Soviet of Nationalities commissions. And USSR People's Deputy S. Palchin, sovkhoz [state farm] director from Krasnoyarsk Kray, added that underground wheeler-dealers, when building up their unearned capital, certainly extend their operations far beyond kebab stands in the capital's streets. Smart cooperative members roam as far as the Far North, get the reindeer breeders drunk, and buy their animals for next to nothing.... Other countries' experiences shows that an outbreak of corruption inevitably accompanies the market economy. How are we to halt spiritual degradation when personal advantage is becoming almost the sole yardstick for behavior and intentions?

A commentary by Ye. Yasin, chief of department at the USSR Council of Ministers State Commission for Economic Reform and one of those who produced the draft, helped to clarify matters. The situation has changed over the last six weeks or so. Despite the bumper crop, the quantity of grain purchased is 15 million tonnes less than last year. The result of decisions on purchase prices has been to switch on the mechanism of outright inflation, making it now impossible to implement in the country the "500 days" program which envisaged the ruble's stabilization. A fresh line is needed—a tough financial, monetary, and credit policy.

Be that as it may, one point is clear: Economists have been taught a harsh lesson. It has been reaffirmed that it is impossible to make up for lost time while events are developing at lightning speed. Ye. Yasin admitted that, since last November, he has taken part in the elaboration of six drafts for transition to the market. Of course, the document's formulation can be put off for a long time to come, but the economy—falling apart before our very eyes—will not wait. Next year is already in jeopardy, because economic ties between enterprises and regions are being broken. Therefore, when tackling the two eternal questions of who is to blame and what is to be done, priority must be given to the second.

Incidentally, the draft, apart from everything else, provides for reorganization of the management structure. It is planned to enhance the role of the Council of the Federation, which must elaborate and implement decisions agreed between the republics via all-Union and

republic organs of power. It is intended to create an Interrepublic Economic Committee comprising plenipotentiary representatives of the republics, specialists, and scientists. "There is need for a certain renewal of the structure and staffing of the government and the republics' representation on USSR executive organs," the document says.

And so, the most painful aspect of the debate has been clearly highlighted: Mutual relations between center and republics at the crucial stage of the path to the market. But does the document really infringe the regions' rights? I think that a convincing answer was provided when the floor was taken by USSR People's Deputy A. Girenko, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. While criticizing the draft, he noted, we tend to forget that the initial material also contained similar and even more substantial shortcomings. It is probably impossible to elaborate a totally faultless document. The president is striving to submit to the Supreme Soviet a draft taking into account the realities of life and the republics' desire for real sovereignty. They are given an opportunity for broad maneuvering when switching to the market. A rigid program would place the republics in different conditions, which would be unequal. The present draft does not tie anybody's hands.

It provides that we will continue to live and work within a single economic space, within a single Union, A. Girenko emphasized. This may not accord with the positions taken by some politicians in some republics. But attempts to solve all problems autonomously—quite alluring on the surface—can lead to nothing good, and it is extremely dangerous to break existing economic ties.

Belorussia already adopted a program for transition to the market a few days ago. The Ukraine has also elaborated its own concept. What is the position of the document prepared on the president's instructions among these programs? This question, perfectly justified one would think, was also heard at the sitting. The actual draft does not offer a clear answer. But it would probably be necessary because if the republics fail to act in a coordinated fashion, they would have to protect their own domestic markets by all possible means. This is another problem which will be discussed Thursday at a joint sitting of the USSR Supreme Soviet's four committees and commissions in the Kremlin.

Comment by Doctor of Economic Sciences and USSR People's Deputy A. Zhuravlev:

The proposed draft suggests giving maximum freedom to all sovereign republics and all labor collectives. To release enterprises from the shackles of Union ministries but not to burden them with fresh shackles—those of republican organs. The central power declares that it intends to use all possible means to withdraw from economic activity, the center must become economic-political rather than economic-administrative. The labor collective enjoys total economic autonomy under a market economy. This, in my view, is the main point. The essence of the document we are about to adopt is to make labor collectives the masters. The multitude of ownership forms, de-statization, and privatization are also taken into account. Republican parliaments and regional organs of power will be able to elaborate their own specific documents which will be coordinated via the Council of the Federation.

It seems to me that many of the draft's critics are simply trying to break down an open door. It can even be assumed that people who have taken on the implementation of the "500 days" program are already encountering serious difficulties and are trying to identify those to be blamed in good time, as if reinsuring themselves in the event of failure. After all, no matter what program we adopt in the country's Supreme Soviet, the next 12-18 months will bring rising prices and falling living standards. Let us face up to the truth and try to do everything so as to get through this difficult stage with minimum losses.

As for B. Yeltsin's speech, this is one of the few occasions when I neither understand nor share his position. Today I perceive no need for confrontation between the country's and Russia's supreme soviets. We are ready for an open and constructive dialogue, but we do not accept either retreats or ultimatums. If there are any specific complaints about the draft—let us argue and discuss them.

Bunich Predicts Deficit of Over R80 Billion

LD1810150790

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1130 GMT on 18 October broadcasts a five-minute report by correspondent Aleksandr Ruvinskiy on proceedings at the USSR Supreme Soviet committees and commissions. "Yes, I should report that Academician Aganbegyan made a report to the representatives of the committees and commissions," Ruvinskiy notes. "He spoke in detail about the president's program, about the main directions in stabilizing the country's economy, the transition to the market, and for one and half hours he replied to questions put by people's deputies."

Ruvinskiy then interviews Pavel Grigoryevich Bunich who speaks about the differences arising between the republics and the center over the program. He quotes Yeltsin on the state budget deficit, that it is more likely to be R300 billion than 30. This year's deficit is set at 60, but Bunich thinks it will probably be 80-85. "I think that 30 is too optimistic a figure, whereas 300 is a figure that means bankruptcy for the country as a whole because the entire national income is 650, for example, so half of the country's national income would just be deficit. This is how I understand what Boris Nikolayevitch said."

Ruvinskiy concludes this: "Obviously some kind of clarity will be introduced into that tomorrow at the session of the Supreme Soviet. One may expect that Mikhail Sergeyevich will evidently also come out with

some explanations." Bunich replies, "I do not know. I cannot say anything about that."

Ruvinskiy further concludes that during the short interval in the session, the interregional deputy group assembled in order to define their stand. A draft statement was submitted for discussion which is upheld by the entire tribute, containing demands for the resignation of Ryzhkov's entire cabinet, and calls for the deputies in the interregional group to refrain from voting for the program put forward by the president. "During the discussion that I attended the majority of the people's deputies belonging to the interregional group, at least those who spoke in my presence, did not support a statement like this," Ruvinskiy says he notes that this discussion is continuing.

TASS Observer Views Gorbachev Market Plan

LD1810132390 Moscow TASS in English 1209 GMT 18 Oct 90

[By TASS observer Andrey Orlov]

[Text] Moscow October 18 TASS—The programme to stabilise the economy and transfer to a market, presented by President Gorbachev to parliament, could help end the dispute over the future of the country's economy: There will be no capitalism in the USSR. At the same time another, no less important question, remains unanswered. Will there be a market in the USSR?

The president's stand changed markedly, following a month of actual political struggle against the background of a rapidly deteriorating economic situation. At the beginning of the parliamentary session, the president supported Academician Shatalin's "500-day" programme, which is close to shock therapy. Now Gorbachev favours the government version.

The presidential programme, just as the government one, presupposes the preservation of a strong centre, centralised pricing, a moderate pace for the privatisation of state property and continued subsidising for a number of enterprises in the red.

The "market package" prepared by the Shatalin group is possibly the only form of surgery that can help the ailing Soviet economy recover, provided the weakened organism is able to survive the operation.

Gorbachev is unwilling to consider radically breaking the managerial structures amid the increasing political instability. Such a break would be inevitable if the Shatalin programme were adopted.

Possibly the president submitted his plan in the hope of preserving political stability, even if only temporarily. However, will his plan stabilise the economy? A large amount of foreign aid would certainly help (the USSR finance minister mentioned a sum of 120 billion dollars). But getting this aid is not a certainty.

The answers to some questions will be provided tomorrow when deputies, having discussed the programme for three days in commissions and committees, hold a bicameral meeting. Debate will certainly be acute, particularly since the deputies are considering many ideas that they have previously rejected.

If the president wins support, then, in order to implement the programme, he will have to resort to the additional powers granted to him by parliament for 500 days—the very 500 days that were needed to implement the Shatalin plan.

The coincidence is too obvious to be missed by deputies.

Kucherenko Urges Implementation of Economic Plan

PM1910102590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Oct 90 Second Edition pp 1, 2

[S. Oganyan and V. Shirokov report under the rubric "At the USSR Supreme Soviet Session": "'We Have Nowhere to Retreat to...'"]

[Excerpts] An enlarged sitting of the Union parliament's committees and commissions yesterday discussed the "Basic Guidelines for the Stabilization of the National Economy and the Transition to a Market Economy." [passage omitted]

In our report today we have decided not to enumerate the purely economic details which arose time and again during the discussion of the draft, and we have asked V. Kucherenko, chairman of the Soviet of the Union Planning, Budget, and Financial Commission, to make a general assessment of it:

"In practice this program represents a coagulum, the quintessence of the drafts already submitted to the Supreme Soviet. And so, in my view, there are no grounds for saying that it differs radically from its predecessors. All these programs proceed from a single concept and lead to a single goal—market relations. Hence my conclusion: It is necessary to stop talking and at last adopt a decision on how to proceed more quickly to stabilization measures. It is time to begin implementing the program, for time waits for no man and we have nowhere to retreat to." [passage omitted]

General Prosecutor Sukharev's Resignation Accepted

PM1810152190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Oct 90 Morning Edition p 3

["USSR Supreme Soviet Resolution 'On the Release of Comrade A.Ya. Sukharev from His Duties as USSR General Prosecutor'"—IZVESTIYA headline]

[Text] Having examined a submission from the USSR president, the USSR Supreme Soviet resolves that:

Comrade Aleksandr Yakovlevich Sukharev is to be released from his duties as USSR general prosecutor in connection with his retirement on pension.

The submission of this question by the USSR president for approval by the Congress of USSR People's Deputies is to be supported.

[Signed] A. Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet.
Moscow, The Kremlin, 15 October 1990.

Political & Social

Gorbachev Briefs Editors on Economic Reform

PM1910075390 Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 19 Oct 90 p 1

[Report by Anatoliy Yurkov under the general heading: "USSR President M.S. Gorbachev Is Expected to Deliver a Speech at the USSR Supreme Soviet Today Presenting This Document. Basic Guidelines for the Stabilization of the National Economy and the Transition to a Market Economy"]

[Text] Last Monday the USSR president sent us—a group of chief editors—an invitation: Mikhail Sergeyevich wanted to explain something important.

The president was cheerful and full of vigor. News had just come from Norway that he had been awarded the 1990 Nobel Peace Prize. We congratulated him on this highly prestigious international recognition. Without concealing his satisfaction, he thanked us merrily and also merrily commented: They know when to award it. He was thus indicating that he now needs support on all fronts—the country is entering an excessively complex period, finally forcing the transition to the market.

The president did indeed brief us on important matters. He explained why the "Basic Guidelines for the Stabilization of the National Economy and the Transition to a Market Economy" had appeared instead of a program for transition to the market.

Every republic, he said, has its own specific features, its own conditions, it is not possible to direct everyone and everything from the center. We must only determine the aims and the means of attaining these aims, without suppressing the republics' initiative. A program is too rigid. The republics will each elaborate their programs for themselves.

Academicians Aganbegyan and Shatalin, sitting there, confirmed the advisability of this approach.

The president was brief—he was in a hurry. He said that the whole team—himself included—was now going to Volynskoye to put the finishing touches to the document once and for all. Representatives of the republics, the USSR Supreme Soviet commissions, and Presidential Council members have been acquainted with it and made comments.

In the morning it has to be duplicated and distributed to legislators.

While we were making our way downstairs and out into the Kremlin's Ivan Square, automobiles were rolling up to the entrance to take the presidential team out of town.

We are all growing accustomed to the new beat.

We were sent the finalized document as the president had promised.

Today we publish it in abridged form.

Popov Calls on Gorbachev To Head Coalition

LD1810134690 Moscow World Service in Russian 1030 GMT 18 Oc 90

[From the "Soviet Chronicle" feature of the "Soviet Union Day by Day" program]

[Text] Gavriil Popov, chairman of the Moscow City Soviet, has called the situation in the country more than grave. Talking to Igor Yakovlev, editor-in-chief of the weekly MOSCOW NEWS, he said that the bodies of representative democracy have smashed the old system but have not managed to consolidate two forms of power—executive and judicial. To this end, the influential politician reckons, a coalition is needed. In the capital, for example, one is confronted with a predominance of left-wing forces. It looks as if the city committee of the Communist Party is already agreeable to this. A different correlation of forces may come about in other towns.

On a nationwide level, Popov said, the president should head the coalition. And here the matter is one of him forming a cabinet for himself and taking on personal responsibility for foreign and domestic affairs, defense and security. It is only under such a system that even small property owners can be protected and a market can be set up.

Council of Ministers Discusses Budget 18 Oct

LD1810225890 Moscow TASS in English 2109 GMT 18 Oct 90

[Text] Moscow October 18 TASS—The major guidelines for the 1991 state plan and budget were considered at a meeting of the presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers on Thursday. The meeting was attended by prime ministers and government officials from all Union republics.

A constructive discussion was held of ways to stabilise the country's economic situation and solve complex economic problems under conditions of the transition to market relations.

The presidium meeting was told that the preparation for next year's plan and budget will be considerably affected by the greater independence of Union republics, the development of direct horizontal links between them, as well as such new factors as new enterprise taxes and pricing and changes in credit-and-finance policy.

Participants agreed that only concerted efforts and stronger integration links could help overcome negative processes in the economy and create favourable conditions for the transfer to the market.

Mutually acceptable solutions were found for most issues under discussion, including supplies of foodstuffs, medicines and other essentials.

It was stressed that despite all economic difficulties, the earlier approved social plans must be fulfilled unconditionally. The presidium reaffirmed the need to give high priority to housing construction and ensure the required supplies of material and machinery for the purpose.

The discussion then centered around the situation with currency in the country and the elaboration of new approaches towards the formation, distribution and rational use of current reserves with due account taken of the interests of enterprises, republics and the country as a whole. Preference was given to purchasing raw and other materials for the light food and medical industries.

It was deemed advisable to create a federal-republican currency committee composed of the USSR prime minister and the premiers of the Union republics.

The presidium also considered price formation, finance-and-credit problems and the way to reach a balance between people's income and spending.

Special attention was given to active measures to reduce the federal republican budget deficits.

Summing up the results of the discussion, Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov stressed the importance of preserving and developing economic links between republics, searching for new forms of their organisation and creating a single all-Union market.

The presidium identified the range of tasks to be accomplished through the concerted efforts by central economic agencies and union republics in order to finalise the 1991 plan and budget proposals.

Alekseyev Seeks Privatization of State Property

LD1810132490 Moscow World Service in English 0800 GMT 18 Oct 90

[Text] The chairman of the Soviet Constitutional Supervision Committee, Sergey Alekseyev, has called for an immediate privatization of state property.

This, he says, is the only way to save the nation's economy and prevent a major conflict between the center and republics in the process of dividing state property.

Speaking in a press interview, Sergey Alekseyev dismissed as groundless the fears that state property may fall into the hands of shadow economy dealers or foreign investors. Major plants and factories should be turned over to labor staff as their property or taken on lease by them.

PRAVDA Editorial on CPSU Plenum Results

PM1810110090 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Oct 90 Second Edition pp 1-2

[Editorial: "The Transition to the Market and the Tasks of Communists. On the Results of the CPSU Central Committee October (1990) Plenum"]

[Text] During the two days in October when the CPSU Central Committee Plenum was taking place any unprejudiced person could have noticed yet again that interest in the words and deeds of Communists certainly has not died, as certain ill-wishers who seek to undermine our party's political positions maintain. People followed the plenum's work with rapt attention and hope. This is understandable, for the first and chief item on its agenda was an issue to which hardly anyone will remain indifferent—the situation in the country and the CPSU's tasks in connection with the economy's switch to market relations. People in our country and throughout the world greeted with understanding the words which M.S. Gorbachev spoke on opening the plenum to the effect that the switch to the market is "entirely dictated by human interests and its purpose is to create an efficient economy geared to the person and conditions for encouraging talent, diligence, and a high degree of interest in the results of labor."

The party Central Committee resolution "On the Situation in the Country and the CPSU's Tasks in Connection With the Transition to Market Relations" points out that profound political and socioeconomic transformations have developed in our society and a broad democratic process is taking place. But Communists are not inclined to embellish the situation in the country. It was pointed out at the plenum that the new and progressive is being asserted under complex conditions of a deepening economic and political crisis, the disintegration of economic ties, and a reduction in the volume of production and national income. Universal shortages, speculation, rising prices, an increasingly brazen criminal world, ongoing seats of interethnic conflict—these are the unsightly features of our reality. The report by V.A. Ivashko, deputy general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and the speeches by participants in the plenum stated that the polarization of political forces is continuing in this situation, destructive trends are becoming increasingly active, and a growing number of attempts are being made to push the CPSU into a back seat in public life and to outlaw it. The CPSU Central Committee expressed a resolute protest at such actions by anticommunist, nationalist, and separatist forces.

However, all these phenomena and facts were hardly a revelation to the majority of our readers. For they have firsthand knowledge of the situation in the provinces and of the burdens of life today. Not that the chief purpose of the Central Committee plenum was to state these facts. We must not disregard the fact that during the preceding months the party constantly analyzed the evolving situation and pondered important problems, including the transition to the market. A critical, responsible approach

enabled the Communists at the 28th congress to make a sober assessment of the state of affairs and to formulate political guidelines for the future.

The leitmotiv of the work at the Central Committee plenum was the desire not only to amplify and supplement what was outlined earlier with due regard for the new circumstances and factors, but also to waste no time in translating the adopted decisions and the entire activity of party organizations into the plane of practical actions. It has to be emphasized that the success of the transformations depends to a great degree on this if you bear in mind the tremendous influence and the role which, despite certain losses, the CPSU still plays in our society.

To surmount the inertia of old thinking and the hesitancy which many party members have not yet overcome and to make a decisive turn toward living constructive work—this is not an abstract slogan now but the most urgent demand of the day. Every primary organization and all Communists must overcome passiveness and hesitancy in implementing the political course of the 28th CPSU Congress, work persistently to normalize the situation in the country, and uphold and defend in a principled manner the ideas of October, socialist ideals, and panhuman values.

It was in just such a broad context that the question of whether our party will be able to stand the rigorous test of time was raised at the plenum. Both its ability to preserve its position as the ruling party and its historical destiny itself will depend to a decisive degree on how it operates under conditions of the country's transition to the market, the reforming of our multinational state, and the formation of new political structures.

Which areas of practical work did the plenum define? Above all, the party proceeds from the premise that the market economy is not an end in itself but a means of improving the people's life and of resolving acute social and ethnic problems. This means that Communists are faced with waging a very active struggle against any attempts to curtail social programs and to infringe working people's interests.

Can party organizations really remain indifferent, let us say, to the threat of unemployment? It is their duty to help to create a unified state system to prevent it, to train working people in good time, to find jobs for them, and to make material provision for those temporarily unemployed. At the same time, Communists can do quite a lot to help working people to better comprehend the radically changing way of life and to master new economic thinking. To this end more efficient use must be made of the system of political and economic education, ideological establishments, and the party mass media. Of course—and this too was stated at the plenum—we cannot manage without the serious retraining of cadres for work under conditions of a market economy.

Communists are essentially faced with mastering anew the art of working among the masses and influencing the state of affairs in society through the soviets of people's deputies. Having initiated the transfer of power to them, do party members have the right to remain detached observers? Of course not. In some cases a party committee, acting according to the circumstances, can use the right of legislative initiative, while in others it can act as an opponent and advance an alternative proposal. There are many forms and approaches, and they are certainly not prompted by instructions from above but by the specific conditions and the specific situation.

Having reminded us of this, the Central Committee plenum directs Communists toward very close and fruitful cooperation with the soviets and their executive organs. Party groups and factions of the soviets can make an appreciable contribution to this. The plenum recommended not delaying over their creation and seeing to a reserve of party members capable of engaging in legislative activity and constructive cooperation with other public organizations. The plenum resolution specially emphasizes that it is only possible to change the situation for the better on the basis of joint actions by all the country's truly democratic forces. The CPSU Central Committee appealed to everyone who holds dear the present and future of our homeland to pool their efforts in the name of civil and national concord.

We believe that it was quite rightly pointed out at the plenum that the destructive stance of certain political forces has recently been having a very unfortunate effect on the work of the national economy. Some no longer hide the fact that their chief goal is to "get into power" as quickly as possible and to denigrate the CPSU on a wave of general discontent. Hence the perfidious principle: "The worse things get, the better."

Therefore, while implementing under difficult conditions the policy outlined by the 28th party congress of civil peace and concord and cooperation among all true supporters of perestroyka, at the same time party organizations will have to clearly define their position with regard to extremists on the right and the left and those who openly place the satisfaction of their own political ambitions above the interests and good of the people. There can be no doubt that the broad masses will support the Communists in this. There is hardly any need today to convince anyone that the impairing of discipline and of law and order promises nothing good and that only their persistent strengthening can promote the success of all progressive transformations.

As is known, the mass media are now making different assessments of the plenum's results. The range of views and interpretations is very wide, from the traditionally approbatory to the deliberately negative and skeptical. A number of publications which essentially kept quiet about the work of the CPSU Central Committee plenum are now trying to belittle or even distort the purport and essence of its decisions. Without entering into polemics with our opponents, nevertheless we will say: It is hardly possible to dispute in a well-reasoned manner the fact that a distinguishing feature of the Central Committee

plenum was the atmosphere of utmost openness and of comparison of all existing views and the realistic nature of the conclusions, which were sometimes very tough but quite convincing. The debate, which sometimes displayed polemical excesses, but was on the whole constructive (well-known scientists, party and soviet workers, representatives of the working class and the peasantry, and leaders of large party organizations, ministries, and departments took part), will undoubtedly help to draw up the optimum program for the transition to the market in the interests of the Soviet people.

Many people said: In transferring direct managerial functions to the soviets of people's deputies, the CPSU must not absolve itself of responsibility for elaborating and realizing an efficient socioeconomic policy. It is important now for both Communists and nonparty people to know the party's viewpoint on the most vital issues: What must be the price of bread; how to ensure the social protection of low-paid sections of the population; how to preserve cultural, moral, and spiritual values?

It is characteristic that a majority of people now perceive the cardinal economic reform and the transition to market relations as an objective natural law. The only question concerns the methods for implementing radical transformations, whether additional sacrifices and a drop in working people's living standards are necessary here and the political and social outcome facing society. The plenum's conclusion is unambiguous: The market is just a means of renewing economic relations in a socialist state. The purpose of the transition to it is to improve people's lives and fully emancipate their initiative and business activeness.

Why has the transition to the market been given a guarded welcome in the provinces? As S.A. Osminin, Kirov Obkom [oblast party committee] first secretary, remarked, some people interpret this as a return to capitalism. They even contrast October 1990 with October 1917, as a revanche. Others foresee a flowering of economic freedom and scope for initiative and enterprise within the framework of a socialist formation. Where is the truth? The plenum participants did, in fact, seek to answer this chief question by ascertaining a complex range of public opinion, pointing to possible mistakes and miscalculations, and helping to seek positive solutions. The market economy is our future, U. Karamanov, chairman of the Kazakh SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers, pointed out in his speech. But if we fail to concentrate all efforts on practical deeds today, tomorrow we will lose even what we have today.

We also recall the speech of S.A. Kalinin, secretary of the party committee of Rybinsk Motor-Building Production Association in Yaroslavl Oblast: "It is not enough to use the single word crisis when speaking of the situation in the country and the party today. We are tired of references to the former administrative bureaucratic system and to past leaders of the party and the state. Serious miscalculations and mistakes have also been made in the course of perestroyka. But, as before, no one has borne any responsibility for them... The entire country is in session, but no changes for the better have even become apparent yet. People ask: When will the chaos and anarchy in the country end, and when will the laws function, rather than talk of a rule-of-law state? Why are presidential decrees not fulfilled? Why do soviets at all levels not recognize USSR Supreme Soviet and government resolutions? And, in general, how do we intend to preserve our Soviet state?"

Similar thoughts were also aired in other speeches. B.V. Gidaspov, CPSU Central Committee secretary and Leningrad Obkom first secretary, pointed out that this crucial step is being taken in circumstances that are the least favorable for this moment from the political and economic viewpoints. However, he said, we also realize that we are given no other choice... But a political declaration is one thing, while the practical introduction of market relations is another.

It was repeatedly said at the plenum that it would naturally be wrong to identify perestroyka with the current confusion and disorder. However, it is in those complex conditions that the question of the transition to the market is being resolved. According to Yu.A. Prokofyev, Moscow CPSU Gorkom [city committee] first secretary, the people are faced with an extremely crucial decision, and the state's future depends on whether the decisions adopted are well thought out. Literally the whole country is waiting for them tensely. Therefore, having outlined the transition to the market as the long-term aim of economic reform, it is now important to concentrate on stabilizing the economy and rectifying the state of affairs.

Problems of working people's social protection and associated questions of privatization; the destatization of production; and the introduction of private ownership, including ownership of land, were subjected to strict, thorough analysis at the plenum. All of these problems are burning ones. On the one hand one must not pretend that they do not exist at all and avoid resolving them, and on the other hand, it is no less dangerous to try and implement transformations by means of a cavalry charge and instructions from above, without consulting with the people. It was no accident that the idea that the question of the market economy should first be submitted to a nationwide referendum was persistently repeated in the speeches. Let the people—those who actually produce material and spiritual wealth—have the last word...

The speakers stressed that privatization must be carried out on a voluntary basis with the consent of labor collectives, most importantly through the soviets of people's deputies. They believe that first there must be sovietization of ownership, and only then can we move onto privatization.

In elaborating a suitable program which is called upon to pave the shortest way to success, the "naive"—at first glance—question posed by A.A. Prigarin, director of the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Questions All-Union Research Center for Labor Organization, must also be taken into consideration: "...Why should the people pay for perestroyka, and why is it necessary to go through another period of lowering the standard of living in addition to what we have already done? Experts involved in the government program estimate that as a result of the implementation of Shatalin's program, public consumption will decrease by 20-30 percent, while their opponents say the same about the government program. But why is this necessary at all?..."

Life itself presents us with such questions; and they must be answered not by good intentions but by precise, scientifically verified plans that take into consideration all the realities and features of the various republics and regions.

Serious critical observations were expressed at the plenum about the leading CPSU organs, to the effect that they delayed in discussing these questions in the party and among the people. "How can you talk about the party's participation in the discussion of decisions that are vitally important for the country," V.D. Kadochnikov, Sverdlovsk CPSU Obkom first secretary, said, "when even some Central Committee members, not to mention most Communists, are practically unacquainted with the various versions of the programs?"

In this connection, it was noted quite correctly that the CPSU remains the ruling party and that means it has a duty to have a well-founded program for its activity and its own clear position with respect to the market economy. Even if it finds itself in the position of the constructive opposition on a number of questions, the CPSU must defend the working people's interests staunchly and knowledgeably.

It stands to reason that far from every plenum speech can or should be seen as the ultimate truth, particularly if it concerns an economic reform program elaborated by top professional economists. However, one cannot fail to hear sincere alarm about the country's future in the Central Committee members' speeches, and a desire to defend the interests of the least protected strata of working people.

The most fundamental question is the social cost of the transition to the market. As a result of the discussion, the plenum believes that it is extremely important to make a thorough prediction of the possible consequences of a radical about-face, and to reduce to a minimum the inevitable expenses of the crisis period. At the same time, the CPSU Central Committee advocates effective actions in support of economic ties and the observance of contract discipline, and it insists on resolute measures being taken in the struggle against speculation, growing crime, and extremist phenomena.

The CPSU Central Committee Plenum, while advocating a multiplicity of forms of ownership and forms of destatization of enterprises and a mixed economy, stressed, at the same time, that collective forms of ownership are a priority. It is necessary to create equal economic conditions for the development of kolkhozes and sovkhozes [collective and state farms], peasant and private farms, and cooperatives and associations. The plenum rejected the idea of transferring or selling land into private ownership.

Communists must advocate a kind of market relations and a kind of Union treaty that would enable all strata of the population to consolidate and that would revive the USSR as a strong renewed federative state where all the republics would be interlinked on the basis of natural economic, political, cultural, and moral ties, as well as traditions of friendship and mutual understanding.

The USSR Supreme Soviet deputies are now familiarizing themselves with the "Basic Guidelines for the Stabilization of the National Economy and the Transition to the Market Economy," proposed by the USSR president and general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee (the full text of the draft is published in today's edition of PRAVDA). Discussion of them will begin on Friday in the Union legislature. Economic perestroyka and the practical assimilation of new forms of economic life will determine the country's future and the people's future.

Council of Ministers Presidium Discusses Crime

PM1810090690 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Oct 90 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "United Front Needed in Fight Against Crime"]

[Text] Rising crime in the country cannot be overcome without consolidating law enforcement bodies and coordinating their actions. That was the opinion reached by participants in the USSR Council of Ministers Presidium session held in Moscow on 4 October to discuss law enforcement bodies' work to combat crime and measures being taken to safeguard legality and law and order in society.

Reports were delivered by USSR Internal Affairs Minister V.V. Bakatin and USSR KGB Chairman V.A. Kryuchkov.

Members of the Presidential Council pointed out that laws recently passed by various republics in breach of the USSR Constitution and given supremacy over Union laws have caused disunity among law enforcement bodies and given a new lease on life to the criminal world.

The crime situation in our country has become more difficult as a result of all this, the internal affairs minister stressed. Crime is growing in scale and is still one of the

main factors of social tension. The minister drew attention to the fact that the overall number of crimes committed in the first eight months of the year rose by 13.1 percent, while serious crimes increased by 19.7 percent.

The greatest increases have been observed in Armenia, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, and krays and oblasts in the Volga-Vyatka, North Western, and Far Eastern economic regions of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic]. The crime rate has also risen sharply in Kharkov, Vitebsk, Chernigov, Nizhniy Novgorod, Tver, Lvov, Ivanov, Ashkhabad, and several other cities.

It is the general opinion that there must be a united front and a united approach to organizing the fight against crime, clear regulation of legal powers in relations between the center and the republics, and the adoption of an all-Union program to fight crime.

The acute need to provide law enforcement bodies with new equipment and improve staff training was voiced again. The following facts were cited: In New York one police officer "serves" 150 people, and in Paris the ratio is one to 180. But, in Leningrad, one member of the militia for every 1,500 people is the norm, while the ratio in Leningrad Oblast is one to 2,500. The equipment of our point-duty personnel does not bear comparison either.

The KGB chairman stressed that the fight against organized crime, as a symbiosis of the criminal world, the shadow economy, corruption, and active intrusion into structures of power, politics, and, consequently, the security of the state and society, is a political problem.

The following figures were given: In just 18 months, KGB bodies have brought to light more than 1,200 organized criminal groups. In the course of operations involving KGB forces and resources, including joint operations with the public prosecutor's office, internal affairs bodies, and state customs control, money and valuables totaling 214 million rubles have been removed from criminal circulation.

In the opinion of the KGB chairman, legislation should stipulate that fighting organized crime is one of the functions of state security bodies, a special body should be set up under the USSR Council of Ministers or the USSR president to coordinate the work of law enforcement bodies and ensure interaction, and important normative acts should be adopted, such as the Basic Principles of Criminal Legislation, laws on the Soviet militia and crimes against the state, and others. Measures should also be taken to raise the standard of equipment of law enforcement subunits fighting organized crime and to provide them with the necessary financial, currency, and other resources. A special fund could be set up for this purpose by allowing law enforcement bodies to keep up to 50 percent of all monetary and other resources levied as compensation by the courts or confiscated directly from criminals.

V.I. Kravtsev, USSR deputy general prosecutor, and V.I. Simenko, chairman of the Ivanovo Oblast Court, expressed serious concern in their speeches. They stressed that the principle of inevitable punishment is being lost. Half of all crimes in the country remain unsolved, and a considerable proportion of criminals go unpunished in cases that have been solved. This impunity gives rise to new crimes.

Soviet people's main concern is not the empty stores but the destruction of the state administration system, D.T. Yazov, USSR defense minister and member of the Presidential Council, said. We are busy counting up the number of crimes across the country and in the republics but it is possible that there will be no one to analyze these figures in the future. Illegal laws adopted in the Baltic, the Transcaucasus, Moldova [Moldavia], and the Ukraine are completely undermining the foundations of the Army, as well as law enforcement bodies.

The presidium session was also addressed by the following: B.M. Belousov, USSR minister of the defense industry; V.S. Pavlov, USSR finance minister; V.Kh. Doguzhiyev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; S.G. Guchmazov, head of a USSR Council of Ministers department; L.I. Karebin, president of the Union of Industrial Construction Cooperatives; and M.F. Nenashev, chairman of the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting.

Speakers emphasized that under no circumstances must the problem of rising crime be oversimplified. The transitional period of switching to a market economy will only aggravate the crime situation. They also pointed out that it is impossible for law enforcement bodies alone to successfully resolve such a complex, labor-intensive task as combating organized crime. All healthy forces in society must be consolidated, the people's militia revived, and a complex of measures implemented to localize the causes of crime and prevent offenses.

The concluding speech was delivered by N.I. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

The results of the session will be used as a basis for adopting a resolution, which it is intended to publish in the mass media.

Demidov Discusses Arms Confiscation Decree

LD1810155390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1352 GMT 18 Oct 90

[Text] Today, as you probably know, at the USSR Internal Affairs Ministry, there was a briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists on fulfilment of the decree of the USSR president on banning the establishment of armed formations not envisaged by the legislation and on confiscation of weapons in cases of their being kept unlawfully.

The briefing was attended by our correspondent, Anatoliy Fedorov. Let us hear what he has to tell us:

[Begin recording] [Fedorov] A total of 84 days has passed since the signing of that decree. As you know, it was extended on 11 August because the first two weeks produced practically nothing. As a result of implementation of measures after the extension of the time limit, in the country to date just over 20,000 firearms, both rifled and smooth-bore, have been handed in or confiscated, along with 3 tonnes of explosives, 700,000 items of ammunition, more than 100 radio transmitters and communications equipment. A total of 711 hijacked motor vehicles have been returned.

The government decision concerning extension of the deadline for handing in weapons shows that nearly 90 percent of them were handed in during the second period, i.e., August-September of this year. During this period, 24 paramilitary groups and formations were disbanded and more than 146 submachine guns, 22 machine guns, and a large number of other types of weapons were received or confiscated. Active work in confiscating this arsenal has been carried out this month, too. Apart from this, inventories and checks have been made of 132,000 facilities where more than 1 million firearms are kept.

From educational establishments and DOSAAF [Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy] organizations and enterprises, over 500,000 weapons have been confiscated. For blatant violation of the rules of the permit system, 34,000 depots have been closed. A total of 864 criminal cases are now being investigated of theft of weapons and raids on internal affairs bodies and military units and other facilities for the purpose of taking posession of weapons.

I ask Nikolay Ivanovich Demidov, deputy minister of internal affairs, to comment on the progress of execution of the decree:

[Demidov] It is well-known that execution of the decree has been entrusted to the local bodies of power and units of the internal affairs bodies. I should also stress that we try to carry out all the work of disbanding the formations and confiscation of weapons lawfully and with a minimum of violence, i.e. avoiding the occurrence of casualties during the disarming of gangs and confiscation of arms, and we do everything to avoid bloodshed. But, it must be frankly said that it has, nevertheless, not proved possible to avoid losses. Thus, during disarming operations in Armenia, 55 people were killed. The new leadership of Armenia continues the search for more acceptable ways of disbanding armed groups whose activity has not yet been neutralized.

In our conviction, this work must be stepped up because most of the stolen and seized firearms in the republic have not yet been confiscated or returned. The Internal Affairs Ministry, together with other law enforcement bodies, will step up efforts to disarm and eliminate criminal gangs of bandits and to confiscate weapons, ammunition, and explosives being kept unlawfully. These actions are being carried out in contact with the power bodies of the Union republics.

In this work, which is of exceptional importance for ensuring law and order and for protecting the honor, dignity, and safety of citizens and workers, we count on the understanding and help of the public and the mass media.

[Federov] Nikolay Ivanovich, how are relations shaping up with the USSR Defense Ministry, because inventories of its arms depots are also being made. Are there any problems here?

[Demidov] There are no problems. All the work of implementing the requirements of the decree of the president are being carried out by us in close contact with the units of the Defense Ministry, both at the center and in the local areas. [end recording]

Commentary on Crime Resolution Prospects

PM1810082590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Oct 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Yuriy Feofanov "Political Diary": "How Am I Supposed to Stand By a Militia Officer?"]

[Excerpts] On Friday, after "Vremya," the USSR Council of Ministers chairman granted his traditional interview. The topic that worries each and every one of us is the scale of crime and the measures to combat it. Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov stated that crime is dangerously rampant. You cannot go onto the street without feeling apprehensive, everyone fears for his wife and children if they are not at home, and speculation has replaced trade. It was all true, what the premier told us, we know from bitter experience. The nagging question as far as I and, I hope, others are concerned is: What is to be done? [passage omitted]

It follows from what the premier said that a new resolution on intensifying the fight against crime is in preparation. Well, let us prepare ourselves for new hope. But, for the moment, the interview with the Council of Ministers chairman scared rather than reassured people. We have enough laws, and they are not that soft. How to put them into practice is the question to which we have not had specific answers. Will we get them in the new resolution? [passage omitted]

Our premier certainly has a hard time. He is in charge of the executive in an atmosphere of total insubordination. All the more reason for not wanting the government to undermine its own prestige by making noises instead of getting things done. After the interview with the prime minister on the subject of the fight against crime I heard many opinions; alas, not one instilled confidence. What I want to say before the promised resolution is issued is: Let it not be a "routine" affair, but let it provide a real instrument for establishing public order. We are all waiting to see that.

KGB To Intensify Fight Against Organized Crime

LD1810163590 Moscow TASS in English 1339 GMT 18 Oct 90

[Text] Moscow October 18 TASS—The Soviet KGB have discussed measures to intensify the fight against organised crime, stemming from the October 11, 1990 resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers "On urgent measures to strengthen legality and law and order in the country".

KGB chief Vladimir Kryuchkov noted that many billion roubles are concentrated in the country's shadow economy. Attempts at contraband transactions, illegal financial deals and large swindles involving Soviet and foreign currency have increased. A sort of shadow export-import system is forming. Corruption has struck deep root.

The State Security Committee has elaborated additional measures to step up the fight against organised crime, for which purpose special units are being set up. The central apparatus and local bodies of the KGB have been given specific instructions to this effect.

Plans for Phone Taps in Criminal Cases Outlined

PM1710105090 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Oct 90 Second Edition p 4

[Major S. Anisko report: "An Hour of Eavesdropping—$36,000. That Is in the United States. What About Our Country?"]

[Text] "In our country tapping a telephone conversation for one hour costs 300-500 rubles," Candidate of Legal Sciences Militia Colonel V. Kolomiyets said 9 October at a briefing in the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs]. And Doctor of Legal Sciences V. Sergeyev, chief of the administration for the legal protection of the activity of USSR MVD internal affairs organs, said more precisely: "It does not cost any more than any investigative action."

A discussion of problems of operational and technical possibilities in the struggle against crime was taking place within the framework of the USSR Law "On the Introduction of Amendments and Additions to the Principles of USSR and Union Republic Criminal Legal Procedure" adopted 12 June 1990 by the USSR Supreme Soviet, whereby the existing Fundamentals of USSR and Union Republic Criminal Legal Procedure are supplemented by Article 35-1, which grants internal affairs organs the right to tap telephone and other conversations on the telephone line of a suspect or an accused person, or other parties to a crime.

Let me note that the right to tap telephone conversations in the struggle against crime has long been used in countries such as the United States, Austria, Great Britain, and the FRG...

As the authors of the law noted at the briefing, they understand that the tapping of telephone conversations by internal affairs organs affects the constitutional rights of citizens, but nevertheless they believe that this measure is necessary to strengthen the struggle against crime.

The new law stipulates that tapping will only be carried out in cases when proceedings have been instituted and only on the prosecutor's approval or on the court's decision.

The possibility of using video recordings, photographs, and sound recordings in the process of operational investigation measures was also enshrined in the law.

Incidentally, something about Article 29 in the "Inquiry" chapter. It includes:

The investigation organs consist in the militia, institutions and organizations so authorized by law, and commanders of military units and formations and chiefs of military institutions.

Asked who will train highly qualified military investigators capable of using television, video, photographic and listening equipment, and when and where this training will take place, Doctor of Legal Sciences Militia Colonel V. Sergeyev said the following:

"This question has not been elaborated in detail yet, but work has begun in this direction with the military prosecutor's office organs."

Kryuchkov 'Inclined' To Pardon Gordiyevskiy

LD1910111990 Moscow World Service in Russian 1040 GMT 19 Oct 90

[From the "Soviet Chronicle" feature of the "Soviet Union Day by Day" program]

[Text] The Soviet press has for the first time published an interview with KGB Colonel Oleg Gordiyevskiy, who fled to the West in 1985. He was sentenced in absentia to be shot. Oleg Gordiyevskiy said that for over 10 years he had been a double agent and worked for British intelligence.

Meanwhile, it has become know that Vladimir Kryuchkov, chairman of the KGB, is inclined to release the former member of his agency from criminal liability if he returns to Moscow.

Gordiyevskiy Defection Case Detailed

91UF0048A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Sep 90 First Edition p 4

[A. Nikolayev article: "Betrayal. An Afterword to the 'Sensation' about Superspy O. Gordiyevskiy"]

[Text] The Western press has "christened" former Soviet Embassy worker Gordiyevskiy "superspy." But this is

what is being said about him by people who knew him personally when they used to worked with him in the organs of state security.

Gordiyevskiy was a cunning, calculating man. He managed to pull the wool over people's eyes and present himself in a favorable light. There was something ingratiating in his behavior, as if he were a man with some secret sin that he wanted to hide. And perhaps an extraordinary ambition. Even when he was in England after betraying the motherland, he repeatedly stated that he was the Committee for State Security [KGB] resident in London even though he had never occupied that post.

Oleg Antonovich Gordiyevskiy was born in 1938. He worked in the KGB for a long time, ending up with the rank of colonel. He did several long tours of duty abroad as director Soviet intelligence. But he was never a personal aide to the present KGB leaders, as former General O. Kalugin claims. Gordiyevskiy is married and has two children.

He fell into the meshes of the British intelligence services when he was an associate at the Soviet Embassy. It has now become clear that this occurred because he had too a great a love of the Bohemian life, and of women. Since he was somewhat cowardly and afraid of being blackmailed, he was unable to behave with dignity and honor, as befits an intelligence officer; rather he was faint-hearted and preferred treachery.

He was helped in this by the fact that his immediate chief in Denmark was a certain Lyubimov—a man who was not guided by the strictest of moral rules and who was dismissed from the organs of state security for his extraordinarily amorous disposition toward women. Incidentally, it is common knowledge that on the eve of his defection from the Union, Gordiyevskiy went to Lyubimov's home. Their tete-a-tete conversation was lengthy. And perhaps this was a blessing? Unfortunately, KGB foreign counterintelligence, led at that time by former General O. Kalugin, failed to notice the obvious "weaknesses" in Gordiyevskiy's character, which were taken advantage of by British intelligence.

And for his espionage services Gordiyevskiy received very decent honoraria, so that it was not an "idea" that forced him to betray his motherland and his comrades and, finally, his family. It was later that Gordiyevskiy tried to put a good face on the matter. This is what he said in his interview with the journal TIME: I quite deliberately and purposefully provided assistance for my British colleagues, and likewise to American intelligence.... Would I be happy to work for Western intelligence agencies at this time? Yes, even more now, since I am far from convinced that democracy and freedom will triumph in the Soviet Union."

It turns out that in order to help progress in his own motherland and safeguard its state interests, it is necessary to stab it in the back? Such is the logic of the traitor.

But how did Gordiyevskiy manage to defect to England? Under the pretext of looking into the question of his promotion he was recalled to Moscow from London. In fact, it was intended to examine the reasons for the failure of certain operations conducted by Soviet intelligence with which he was connected. In Moscow there were detailed interviews with Gordiyevskiy. No one tried to accuse him of anything or extract some "confession" from him with the help of drugs, threats, or psychological pressure.

During the course of the interviews, his insincerity and desire to confuse the situation became obvious, and because of this it was decided not to send him abroad. He was offered an official vacation in a sanatorium and no steps at all were taken to restrict his freedom. And here, as in his recruitment to the Intelligence Service, fear pointed him toward the path abroad. Obviously the question of moral responsibility to his mother and his wife and children did not worry Gordiyevskiy at that time.

The "skirmish with the KGB people and police" that Gordiyevskiy talked about to Western journalists did not in fact take place, and British intelligence secretly removed him from our country. Incidentally, this was disclosed to readers by the English press, which remained silent about the fact that by removing Gordiyevskiy illegally from the USSR, the British representatives in Moscow were permitting a grossest violation of international law.

It has been established that as a result of Gordiyevskiy's actions the security and state interests of the USSR were seriously compromised. The security people had to spend a great deal of effort to localize the negative consequences of his actions. Taking these circumstances into account, on 14 November 1985 the USSR Supreme Court found Gordiyevskiy guilty of betrayal of the motherland in the form of espionage and defection abroad, and sentenced him to death in absentia.

Pieces have recently appeared both in the West and in our own press accusing the KGB of "cruelty," which, they say, is stopping Gordiyevskiy from being reunited with his family, who remained in Moscow....

It is not difficult to imagine what his wife had to endure when she learned that her husband was a traitor to the state and had fled to the West while she was on vacation in the south with her small children. In the KGB they were sympathetic to the family of Gordiyevskiy, who had left them to their fate because of his fear of retribution. His wife and children still enjoyed the right to make use of the departmental polyclinic and the little daughters attended kindergarten, and later they traveled to a Pioneer camp. It was at the initiative of the KGB that the USSR Supreme Court decided to suspend the sentence of the court in the Gordiyevskiy case, with respect to confiscation of property. KGB associates have several times offered Gordiyevskiy's wife various kinds of jobs,

and moreover, in places where she would not have to fill out any questionnaires in which there would be questions about her relatives.

The Soviet Embassy in London has informed Gordiyevskiy at an official meeting with him that if he returned to the Union his life would be guaranteed and he would be able to find a job. Gordiyevskiy, however, even rejected these proposals. He considered them to be a "trap." Moreover, traitors do not decide things for themselves. In this case, why did the British authorities not agree to our proposals?

The agreement of his masters would have meant the virtual admission of their own actions in his illegal removal from the USSR.

Former KGB Officer on Gordiyevskiy Case

91UF0048B Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 12 Oct 90 p 3

[M. Lyubimov article: "The Confession of a Spy Who Was Not Shot"]

[Text] **In the summer of 1985 a Soviet diplomat disappeared from Moscow under mysterious circumstances; but in reality, he was a staff member of our intelligence, one Oleg Gordiyevskiy. He surfaced in England some time later. It turned out that Gordiyevskiy had been cooperating with British intelligence for a long time before he fled.**

For understandable reasons, this story was not discussed extensively in the press. But now, five years later, at the end of September this year, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA published an article under the garish title of "Betrayal. An Afterword to the 'Sensation' about the superspy O. Gordiyevskiy." We quote from it: "He fell into the meshes of the British intelligence services while he was an associate at the Soviet Embassy. It has now become clear that this occurred because he had too great a love of the Bohemian life, and of women.... He was also helped in this by the fact that his immediate chief in Denmark was a certain Lyubimov—a man who was not guided by the strictest moral rules, who was dismissed from the organs of state security for his extraordinarily amorous disposition toward women. Incidentally, it is common knowledge that on the eve of his defection from the Union, Gordiyevskiy went to Lyubimov's home. The tete-a-tete conversation was lengthy. But perhaps it was a blessing?"

Since this "certain" Lyubimov, who was unambiguously accused of complicity with British intelligence, is not only alive and well, but also, despite expectations, also free and even publishing quite successfully in a journal his novel about the life of Soviet intelligence officers, we were interested in hearing his viewpoint on these distant events.

Friends are telephoning constantly and saying: "Congratulations, old man! Now the KGB is having to pay for giving you such a reputation!"

This is both funny and annoying. The insult has died away and I am not a man given to rancor. And there is no smoke without fire. It is pointed out in my pension book that "the pension is awarded for 25 years service," but the real reason for my retirement was that I was fired.

As far as "giving a blessing" to Gordiyevskiy is concerned, it was implied that I was supposedly a spy, probably even the resident for British intelligence and the person who organized his defection, and there is not an iota of truth to this: I worked in England for many years and I love that country; my candidate dissertation had to do with England. I still try to read English newspapers and journals and I have respect for Scotch whiskey (for some reason KRASNAYA ZVEZDA did not mention this in my biography), and I was engaged in the organization of work in England at the center.

I worked hand in hand with Oleg Gordiyevskiy from 1976 to 1978 when I replaced the chief of the intelligence post in Denmark; he had already been working with the deputy for several years.

I would like to show him as he seemed to me at the time, although many of his actions are naturally now seen in a different light. Gordiyevskiy impressed me with his extensive knowledge in the fields of politics, history and, religion; Danish temperament and customs; and I liked his intelligence and his obliging character. The most laughable thing that stopped us from becoming close was precisely his indifference to the "Bohemian life": I am sorry to say that I love to make merry and I love company, but he seldom joined in; he loved solitude and music. In the Soviet colony people reacted to Gordiyevskiy in different ways: some valued his politeness and courtesy and his readiness to help, and his sense of humor, and very few thought him hypocritical or smug.

In 1978 Gordiyevskiy left Denmark, and when I returned to the Union two years later, he was already preparing to go to England. He soon left for London, and we sometimes corresponded and we met once or twice when he was on leave. Once, in the summer of 1985, I received a telephone call: Gordiyevskiy had been recalled by the leadership. He told me on the telephone that there was some unpleasantness, and on the following day he visited me at my home.

His appearance astonished me, I had never seen him like that. My God, I thought, what has happened to him? He drank the whiskey he had brought with him in great gulps, which, aware as I was of his indifference to hard liquor, also astonished me. He told me that they had not confirmed him as resident and that he had been recalled. "Why" was my surprised question.

And here he drew a beautiful picture, which I, as a professional, could appreciate: He said that someone had seen emigre books in his house and reported this to the center, as "dissident sentiments." The shot was right on target: All my life I have collected Russian poetry published abroad, and the books of Solzhenitsyn, Zamyatin,

Shmelev, and Zaytsev. I was full of sympathy for him and was really indignant about the intrigue that had been woven around him, even though I still had a feeling that he was not telling me everything.

I remember exactly that I "blessed" him thus: "Let them all go to the devil. Take your pension and defend your candidate dissertation; you are a natural-born historian!" And with that we parted, agreeing to see each other again. But the meeting left me with a bad impression. And the whole business was not about books but about Gordiyevskiy himself: Why had he gone to pieces? Was it such a great drama that you had to be recalled? But I still considered him a man who was quietly working at his career! That what was I was thinking, not suspecting that he was walking on a knife blade and expecting to be arrested. And he visited me not long before his defection and was again overwrought, and the tete-a-tete did not last long, but we agreed to meet again.

Soon after that he surfaced in London.

Why did he come to me? I think that it was not just to "unburden himself." Did he perhaps sense an impending threat? Perhaps he reckoned that he could obtain some kind of information about the plans for himself: Had any of his former colleagues suddenly said anything to me?

There is now a great deal of talk about intelligence officers who turn traitor. There really are a lot intelligence officers, but intelligence operates abroad under the fire of powerful special services that mobilize all their resources to recruit intelligence officers. I am against making intelligence officers the "whipping boys." With all its drawbacks, intelligence is very useful to the country, and there is a mass of departments in the KGB, especially at the local level, the reason for whose existence is not known. I am not a supporter of harsh reprisals, but I am against advancing the careers of people who become traitors (and I include myself in this because I myself wrote a fine reference for Gordiyevskiy), enjoying a meteoric rise as if nothing had happened.

So why did Gordiyevskiy defect to the West? We shall not quickly arrive at the truth of this; Gordiyevskiy himself will scarcely tell it, and the history of his recruitment is under lock and key in a dossier belonging to British intelligence. When we conduct an analysis on a act of treachery, it is necessary to start not with the details but the main factor—the avalanche of traitors has been born out of the crisis in our country, which started long before perestroyka and has seriously affected the "sharpest weapon of the party"—the organs of state security, which for decades have helped in the realization of a policy based on immorality. Gordiyevskiy was always quite skeptical about the Brezhnev regime and communist ideas, but I have met hardly any colleagues who were aflame with love for the system and who thought that, well, after developed socialism the long-desired time of communism will come. Of course, everyone observed the rules of the game, and, as in a good performance, said the right thing when they spoke from the dais, and always stuck to the party line, but perestroyka had matured long ago within many people who were ready to rip through the envelope of this external loyalty. But there is a world of difference between a critical attitude toward developed socialism and cooperation with a foreign intelligence service.

This kind of cooperation requires a special combination of character and particular psychological qualities, and deciding to enter the service of a foreign army means total dependence on one's bosses.

Gordiyevskiy was proud of his affiliation with British intelligence and he thought that he was thus fighting for freedom and democracy in the USSR. Alas! I myself once believed in secret methods, but now it seems to me that political struggle should be open. I now support a complete end to the "cold war" and cooperation between our intelligence services against the fanatics, of whom we have more than enough in the world.'

My version of Gordiyevskiy's betrayal amounts to this: For a long time, deliberately and in a sophisticated manner, he was involved in cooperation on an ideological basis; and I am quite ready to assume that other factors were also involved—in the struggle by intelligence officers no one has clean hands. And it also seems to me that any man of ours working for foreign intelligence, no matter how he might hate communism and the KGB, and the government and the entire system, must also have had his feeling of love for the motherland blunted, even atrophied, for, as the great Russian thinker Vasiliy Rozanov wrote: "It is not a great thing to love a happy and great motherland. What we must do is love her when she is weak, small, humiliated, ultimately stupid, ultimately discredited." I know how people will answer me on this: But surely your system has crushed the entire homeland, has it not? The system has tried, I agree, but I am convinced that when one is in the ranks of British intelligence it is a very complicated thing to examine the national interests of Russia because they will always be overshadowed by the national interests of the United Kingdom.

There is nothing new or original in the KGB's obvious desire to shift all responsibility onto the "chief" with whom Gordiyevskiy worked for seven years before his betrayal, and to avoid any in-depth analysis of the reasons for the betrayal. It sometimes seems to me that since 1917 a dreary kind of man has been ensconced in the Lubyanka who with one hand has been hanging "Bohemian" labels on all those who disagree, and now also on Kalugin and others who support reform in the KGB, and linking us to the traitors, as if we were all tarred with the same brush and indistinguishable from foreign spies, as if it were 1937. With the other hand he infers that criticism of the KGB is inspired by foreign intelligence services. Forgive me, is there no basis at all for criticizing the KGB? Crime is overwhelming the country, but for some years the KGB has been unable to "regroup its forces," in other words, create what would

perhaps be the largest KGB department to direct the fight against the organized mafia. Meanwhile, in the United States the internal special service—the FBI—is allocating 60 percent of its resources for the fight against organized crime, and only after that engages in counter-intelligence and the fight against extremist organizations.

I do not consider myself a person of high moral principles, and I have still not been absolved from my past, and I am ashamed that I not only failed to find the strength within myself—which is not likely!—to publicly protest during the events in Czechoslovakia, the banishment of my idol Solzhenitsyn, and the invasion of Afghanistan, but also served the Brezhnev policy, and I am ashamed because, like many intelligence officers, in contrast to the majority of the people, while stewing in my own juice of foreign information, I understood, perhaps not clearly, but I understood, that our government was a senate of ignoramuses and old idiots and its policy fatuous and dangerous, both for the country and for the world.

I have not worked in intelligence for 10 years and my moral principles have started to trouble me more, even in trivial matters. For example, what principles form the foundation for dividing dining halls into several parts—for the chiefs, and for the rank-and- file—and why is this same feudal-hierarchical principle embodied in medical services in the KGB? I would even be curious to know, excuse me, why it is that starting from a certain level of leading position, people have personal toilets in their offices; what is the great humanitarian principle that lies behind this? Or behind the fact that for some reason the leadership is afraid to stand in line with subordinates? I am very worried by the state of affairs with respect to the morals of some generals, particularly from party circles, who pursued the policy of repression famously and are still at the helm and have no intention of taking a well-deserved rest because they were not reared on those principles. Do they sleep well? Does not the late Sakharov, whom they crushed, appear in their dreams? Is their sleep not interrupted by the sounds of the exiled Galich's guitar? Are they not tortured by the cries of those locked away in the psychiatric hospitals? I know what their answer will be: We acted in accordance with the laws of the time. But Yezhov and Beriya were also killed in accordance with the law—we had Article 58 of the Penal Code. When they give me an answer to these questions perhaps I and the majority of those now working in the KGB will have better moral principles. Twelve years ago, when in Denmark, I wrote some verse about the stagnation, disguising it as something about Francisco de Goya in Spain. Very many of my colleagues read it and they all understood the subtext very well and no one squealed on me, but many of those around me were decent people, and are now, and it is a great pity that some people depict all KGB associates as stupid time servers. The verse contained these lines: "And the devil in the form of a goat reads a maxim about principles, and he shakes his brigand's hoof and kicks at Heaven!"

I wanted to sign off in jocular vein—"On behalf of the English intelligence officer Michael Lyubimoff"—but something put me out of the mood to joke.

Army Deputies' Criticism of Shevardnadze Viewed

PM1910092990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Oct 90 Union Edition p 1

[Yuriy Makarov "Political Diary": "With Whom Cannot Political Workers Keep Pace"]

[Text] The report which Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze delivered at Monday's session of the chambers of the USSR Supreme Soviet could not have been expected to leave many deputies indifferent, particularly representatives of the Army. For it discussed the Foreign Ministry's work in ensuring the country's interests and security. And so it was no wonder that the first to speak after the report was People's Deputy Colonel N.S. Petrushenko, agitprop instructor in a troop unit's political department.

Without particularly bothering to comprehend what the minister said or sundry "diplomatic matters" there, N.S. Petrushenko bravely went into the attack, as befits a political worker. After providing a general characterization of the minister's report, in which, in the colonel's view, "the chief point vanished as if into the sand," he proceeded to details.

The method of attack was as simple as it was old hat: speed, onslaught, and thoughtless misrepresentation of the theses of the report which had just been delivered.

First, the people's deputy was "concerned at the lightweight approach to the possible use of military force, even if under UN auspices."

Neither someone who watched the television relay of E.A. Shevardnadze's report nor someone who studies the stenographic text of it under a microscope will find even a hint of a "lightweight approach to the possible use of military force." Neither in general nor specifically in the Persian Gulf. Here are just two quotes from the minister's report: "I will say right away that the Soviet leadership has no plans to use its troops in the Persian Gulf. Before the question of the participation of Soviet troops in a UN action to curb aggression can arise in theory, the mechanism provided for in the charter must be created. At the same time all decisions must be adopted with your consent." "...Any use of troops outside the country will require a Supreme Soviet decision. In this way alone, and in no other way."

Nevertheless, having already detected a "lightweight approach," Col. Petrushenko builds the following conclusion on this speculation of his: "I wish to say in this connection that all wars are started by civilians, started by talentless politicians, but for some reason the military is entrusted with continuing and ending them."

And the next thought just slides on out: "I believe that the foreign minister ought also to name some negative

consequences of the possible use of the USSR Armed Forces under the UN flag...." As though the report contained even a word about the "positive" aspect of such a turn of events!

The good old bugaboo of world imperialism, which for so long nourished literally and metaphorically our ardent agitprop workers, has not turned rusty even today. The reduction of arms and the Army to a sufficiently prudent level? A concession to the United States... The phased withdrawal of troops from the East European countries? A concession... The elimination of the Krasnoyarsk radar? A concession... Conversion? A concession. And so forth. And here is the political worker's modest conclusion: "I too can ensure the USSR's interest by means of concessions, and unfounded ones at that."

It is, of course, pleasing that the agitprop worker feels strong enough to manage the country's foreign policy activity. But it is also distressing: We already have sad experience of managing both domestic and foreign policy from inflexible ideological positions, when "not one step back" in fact meant "not one step toward the other side." Toward whom was it possible to take a step? Toward the likely enemy? No, rapprochement from those positions was possible only in close combat....

But when people today meticulously calculate the millions [of rubles] we have lost by withdrawing troops from foreign countries and destroying missiles, and when they draw the conclusion that we are "economizing on defense capability" and, thus, on our own security, it is appropriate to recall other figures. In addition to the human casualties and suffering, the war in Afghanistan cost us 60 billion rubles [R]. The creation of a military infrastructure to oppose China cost R300 billion. When did we feel more secure—when we were supporting collapsing "allied" regimes with weapons and putting forward the bayonet as the chief diplomatic argument, or today, when we have normalized relations with our neighbors and abandoned interference in other people's affairs?

How hard it is to part with such dear stereotypes! With what nostalgia another people's deputy and another colonel—V.I. Alksnis—spoke of the absence of even a hypothetical enemy. That is, he is certain that an enemy exists, but why is it not designated? "The situation is such that we are abandoning the concept of the 'likely enemy.' We do not have any likely enemies, but nor do we have any friends. Probably for the first time in its entire history our power does not have any allies: We are on our own. And I cannot regard this as a foreign policy achievement...." And again from Col. Alksnis: "...When people appeal: Let us disarm fully, regardless of what is happening in the world arena—I cannot agree with this."

But who appeals for this? It is not clear. If it is an allusion to the foreign minister, here are his words: "I hope, I believe, I beg that the Supreme Soviet will support the policy of ensuring security at the level of reasonable sufficiency, at a level which will not ruin our economy once and for all and lead us into a position where we will have nothing to defend."

However, when there is nothing to defend but there is something to use for defense, it is perfectly possible to defend ideological gains. Without paying attention to what is happening all around. Without waiving good old-fashioned "principles." Without moving a single meter from the "red corner."

Here is one of political worker N.S. Petrushenko's charges against our foreign policy department:

"It is also impossible to disregard the moral and psychological training of our personnel. We spent a long time saying a lot about the fact that Iraq was our friend, and now we suddenly have to restructure our work. We never called Iraq our likely enemy. I must say that army political workers cannot keep pace with the reprofiling of our Foreign Ministry's political views."

Just so. It turns out that it is not the world outside our window that is changing, but it is simply the Foreign Ministry that is being "reprofiled."

What, nonetheless, is to be done if political workers just cannot keep pace with the rapidly changing world? The answer suggests itself—it is necessary to slow down the world.

And not, after all, to restructure political work....

Further on Shenin's 17 Oct News Conference

PM1910082590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Oct 90 Second Edition p 5

[N. Yeniseyev report on 17 October 1990 news conference in the CPSU Central Committee Press Center with O.S. Shenin, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo: "Who Will Defend the CPSU? The CPSU"]

[Text] The first question to O.S. Shenin, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, showed that the traditional press conference in the Central Committee Press Center would be uncompromising, to put it mildly.

One question of many, so to speak. Which Central Committee office came up with the wonderful idea of raising the prices for party publications and, in essence, voluntarily abandoned control of something that is virtually the most important for any party?

Answer: Following lengthy reflections and discussions in the Secretariat, it was decided that it would be wrong to give the party press any kind of privileged conditions. It was a different matter that we asked the grass-roots party organizations to think about subsidizing and assisting their Communists. Today the Central Committee has returned to this question. We will probably have to adopt special measures. Preliminary estimates are citing 250-270 million rubles in subsidies.

Incidentally, many people are talking lightly and freely about the surplus of party funds in the CPSU, O.S. Shenin went on. However, this "cache" will only last two years at best. After that, the CPSU will have to earn its money. And of course abolishing the party press would be as foolish as, for instance, killing the hen that lays the golden eggs.

What does the Central Committee think of the incipient eviction of primary party organizations from enterprises? The law on social organizations has been formulated accordingly, taking account of international law. And nevertheless, loud demands that they be "closed down," "stopped," and "wound up" are being voiced, which is completely undemocratic. It is a different matter that we simply do not know how to work at places of residence. This means that we have to learn this difficult art and go out to the people. But in any case the law must be above emotions. We, like everyone else, will defend the rights of primary organizations, and this includes the ones in enterprises.

Changes in the ranks of the CPSU. A total of 800,000 persons have left the party since the beginning of this year, and 200,000 persons have joined. This has had an effect on the budget. The percentage of party dues has been reduced, and payments to the "center" have decreased. The CPSU budget as a whole is being reduced by more than one-half.

It would seem that a news conference with a senior Central Committee official is a strictly internal matter concerning our country. But foreign news agencies' interest in our changes is as great, and perhaps even greater than that of Soviet people. Here are a few questions from abroad.

"Mr. Gorbachev found it far easier to come to an understanding with Mr. Bush than with Mr. Yeltsin. How long will the Soviet people suffer because of this lack of understanding?"

They have taken many steps to accommodate one another, O.S. Shenin answered. I have not yet had the time to study B.N. Yeltsin's speech of yesterday in great detail. But the first impression is not particulary pleasant. It is rather difficult to live in conditions of confrontation. Meanwhile it seemed to me that this speech is couched in ultimatum-confrontational tones. And when you constantly go for confrontation, it is first and foremost the people who suffer. In the end, we have to think about civic accord.

Question from LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA: A recent issue of PRAVDA carried an article entitled "Who will Defend the CPSU?" Why does the CPSU need to be defended? Let us go on. Moscow City Soviet Deputy Balashov is stating publicly that he is preparing to take the CPSU to court....

"The CPSU must defend itself. Not by shouting I am great, but by acting, by getting down to work. And then people will understand for themselves what is going on. Many people are saying today: When will it all end? Let the president give the order to stop attacks on the party. This will not happen. Life is different, and the party's role today is also different.

Taking the CPSU to court.... There probably are questions that the CPSU should answer. But those who are blaming the party for 1937, must remember that it was primarily the party that suffered. Is there no blame attached for the nurturing of traitors in its ranks? There was inability to figure out the economic development in recent years. But this does not apply to the whole of the CPSU. We have to make distinctions between a lathe operator with 25 years of party membership behind him, and the policymakers. These people were not equal at the time and today they are certainly not equally responsible.

"Oleg Semenovich, please explain what you yourself understand by the word 'treason'"?

"All kinds of things happen in the party, in society, and in the family. A person feels that something is a burden... and leaves. Or he might reinterpret his life, look into his character, and leave. But you do not have to fling dirt at your former family or on everything else, because if you do, you are flinging dirt at your own self, is that not so? This is what I call betrayal... Remember that while people tolerated fools in Russia, they never liked traitors."

Urges 'Positive Work' in CPSU

PM1910083990 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 18 Oct 90 Second Edition p 2

[Unattributed report: "Fighting for the CPSU's Prestige"]

[Text] "One of Communists' main tasks now is to determine their position in the new conditions and do everything to ensure that the party works better," O.S. Shenin, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, said during a meeting with Soviet and foreign journalists at the CPSU Central Committee Press Center in Moscow 17 October.

The discussion period has dragged on, and he believes that those people who are directly resolving practical tasks are correct. The party must defend itself by specific positive work against occasionally unfair attacks, and then attitudes toward it will change and the CPSU's prestige will increase.

The CPSU Central Committee secretary described the process of cleansing the party. He said that roughly 800,000 persons had left the CPSU this year, but 200,000 persons had joined its ranks.

Touching on the rise in prices of party publications by a factor of 1.5-2, the speaker said that approximately 250-270 million rubles will be needed to maintain the rayon and municipal party press next year. But in two or

three years' time these subsidies will have to be abandoned and emphasis laid on developing publications' entrepreneurial activity.

In response to the question of who will maintain [soderzhat] party officials who have been released from the Army and Navy, O.S. Shenin said that their work will be "paid for out of the party budget" and officers should of course receive money from the USSR Defense Ministry coffers according to their rank.

The exacerbation of the political situation in the Ukraine is bound to cause alarm. Extremist appeals, including violence against Communists, are often heard at unauthorized rallies. It was stressed at the press conference that the CPSU advocates the resolution of conflicts "by political means alone."

Veterans Protest Against Desecration of Monuments

PM1610142990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Oct 90 First Edition p 1

[TASS report: "All-Union Council of Veterans' Statement"]

[Text] Expressing the will of millions of Soviet people of the older generation, the All-Union Council of War, Labor, and Armed Forces Veterans has issued a statement in connection with cases of vandalism and illegal actions against monuments to V.I. Lenin. It says, among other things:

Veterans of war, labor, and the Armed Forces regard the demolition of the monuments to V.I. Lenin in the cities of Tbilisi, Ternopol, Chervonograd, and a number of population centers in Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova [Moldavia], and certain other regions of the country as unwarranted anti-Soviet, antisocialist provocation. This not only represents desecration and mockery of national historical and cultural relics, but also an organized coordinated blow to the origins of the Soviet social system and our state system and practical actions to dismantle the existing political system.

Criminal, illegal actions are being committed which the law and order agencies should suppress. But this is hardly happening. We demand that authorities at all levels comply strictly with the law and eschew concessions to antiperestroyka forces. Everyone is equal before the law. Dictatorship inevitably ripens with a disregard of laws and constitution, or else a society plunges into the abyss of civil chaos.

The statement appeals for all honest people to resolutely rebuff any attempts at illegal, unconstitutional actions.

It is signed by the All-Union Council of War, Labor, and Armed Forces Veterans.

Third Komsomol Central Committee Plenum Meets

12 Oct Information Report

PM1810155190 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 13 Oct 90 p 1

[Unattributed "Information Report on Third Komsomol Central Committee"]

[Text] The Third Komsomol [All-Union Lenin Communist Youth League] Central Committee Plenum opened on 12 October. Two items are on the agenda: "On Practical Actions by the Komsomol Central Committee in View of the Situation Developing in the Country and in the Komsomol" and "On the Youth Mass Media."

Reports were delivered by V. Zyukin, first secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee, and A. Aleynikov, secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee.

During the discussion of the main issues, information reports were delivered by the following: A. Sharonov, secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee, "On Creating a Social Youth Service"; Yu. Shunin, head of the Financial and Economic Department of the Komsomol Central Committee Administration of Affairs, "On New Principles for Utilizing the Material and Financial Base of the Komsomol"; A. Khokhlov, chairman of the Sputnik International Youth Tourism Bureau, "On Transforming the Sputnik International Youth Tourism Bureau into a Joint-Stock Concern"; and V. Fronin, chief editor of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, "On the KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA Statute and Program."

In the evening plenum participants met with V.A. Ivashko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and deputy general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; A.S. Dzasokhov and G.V. Semenova, members of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee; and V.A. Kuptsov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

13 Oct Information Report

PM1610141490 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 14 Oct 90 p 1

[Unattributed "Information Report"]

[Text] The Third Komsomol Central Committee Plenum continued its work yesterday. Draft resolutions that had been elaborated previously in the course of the work of standing commissions and councils were discussed.

The plenum adopted a resolution "On Youth Mass Media" and a decision to ratify on the whole the KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA editorial office statutes. The cofounders of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA are the Komsomol—in the person of the Komsomol Central Committee—and the KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA editorial office labor collective.

Resolutions have been adopted "On New Principles for the Use of the Komsomol Material and Financial Base" and "On the Practical Actions of the Komsomol Central Committee in View of the Prevailing Situation Within the Country and the Situation Within the Komsomol." The plenum deemed it possible to convene the 22d Komsomol Congress in spring 1991.

The plenum in addition elected new members of the Komsomol Central Committee Bureau. V. Kopyev, who worked previously as chairman of the Moscow City Komsomol Conference and first secretary of Moscow City Komsomol Committee, was elected second secretary instead of S. Smirnov.

The plenum ended its work there.

The Second Komsomol Central Control Commission Plenum was held 10 October. The plenum examined a report from the Komsomol Central Control Commission Bureau regarding its work in the period since the First Komsomol Central Control Commission Bureau Plenum, the results of an examination of work with letters, complaints, and petitions received by the 21st Komsomol Congress in Komsomol Central Committee departments and subunits, and the results of an examination of the use of motorized transport serving the Komsomol Central Committee. V. Parfenov, chairman of the Komsomol Central Control Commission, spoke on these issues. The plenum adopted a corresponding resolution.

The plenum confirmed the Status of Komsomol Central Control Commission Member, the Standing Orders, the Provision on Standing Commissions of the Komsomol Central Control Commission, and its structure and staffing levels.

The plenum made changes to the composition of the Komsomol Central Control Commission.

A session was held of the Komsomol Central Control Commission standing commissions which drew up the Komsomol Central Control Commission's findings on the conformity of the Third Komsomol Central Committee Plenum materials to the Komsomol program aims and statutes.

'Democratic Platform' Conference Forms Party

PM1910082990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Oct 90 First Edition p 3

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Major A. Stasovskiy report under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Regional Conference"]

[Text] Moscow—The "Democratic Platform" Moscow regional organization has held a conference in Moscow. Its main result is the proclamation of a new party, the adoption of program documents and statutes, and the elaboration of the organization's structure and concept. "Democratic Platform" leaders V. Lysenko, I. Chubays, and V. Shostakovskiy delivered reports on the current political situation, the situation within the country, and the party's tasks.

A whole section of the "Democratic Platform" action program is devoted to problems of defense capability and the Army. Its main ideas are as follows: forming organs for the social protection of servicemen, excluding the use of the Armed Forces for violent actions inside the country, abolishing political organs, and switching to a professional army.

Many conference delegates pointed out that people in the country have grown weary of politics, slogans, and promises. Despite the proclamation of the new party, there was no particular optimism to be seen in the "Democratic Platform" ranks. The problems raised for discussion during the conference were remote from the needs of the country and the people. On the other hand the participants wasted a great deal of effort and energy on arguing about the party's new name and leadership structures.

Further on CPSU Ideology Conference Proceedings

PM1610150290 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Oct 90 Second Edition p 2

[PRAVDA-TASS report: "Following a Course of Civic Consensus"]

[Text] An all-Union conference of ideological workers was held at the CPSU Central Committee 11-13 October. Secretaries of Union republic Communist Party Central Committees and party kray committees [kraykom], oblast committees [obkom], and capital city committees, party committee workers studying questions of nationalities policy, leaders of a number of central and republic ideological institutions, social scientists, and representatives of the party press took part.

The present generation of ideological workers is carrying out its activity in unusual conditions, A.S. Dzasokhov, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, said when opening the conference. It is a question primarily of the tense socioeconomic situation, the unprecedented increase in the politicization of society, and the new and largely unusual characteristics of the functioning of the party itself. The conference's task is to work in a comradely and open atmosphere to find answers to the vast number of questions which have arisen at a crucial moment in the renewal of society—a difficult, demanding, and contradictory but logical moment.

The long-term aims are unavoidable and objective, A.S. Dzasokhov stressed. Our time is one in which we have the difficult task of giving up the rigidly regulated and centralized economy based on command and administration methods. We are parting company with the unitary organization of the Union and are embarking on the formation of a union of sovereign states. The party

has relinquished the political monopoly. The transition to a pluralist society is being carried out. All this requires a reconsideration of the party's ideological activity, which the 28th congress and the CPSU Central Committee October Plenum discussed with interest and great concern. There is an understandable need for the nonplan, urgent development of mass literature on the formation of market relations and the history and contemporary views on the organization of a multinational state. Life itself has placed on the agenda the question of the intensification of propaganda activity and the clarification of the tasks of party scientific centers and academic institutions.

The floor was then given to L.I. Abalkin, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, who talked to conference participants about the concept of the transition to market relations. Why do we need the market, what is the regulated market, how far it is compatible with our country's socialist choice, and the problem of ownership in market conditions—a keen discussion began on those and other questions.

The enthusiastic debate continued into the afternoon. There were no prearranged texts or previously approved list of speakers. Everyone could express a viewpoint which did not coincide with the official or generally accepted one. This was helped by the relaxed, comradely atmosphere of openness and trust.

Local-level participants in the conference talked about urgent problems, expressed their concerns, highlighted questions connected with the crisis situation in the country and the processes taking place in the party, and offered specific suggestions aimed at stabilizing the situation, building new economic relations, cooperating with other democratic forces, and achieving civic consensus. In the opinion of B.Ye. Ostrozhinskiy, secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, the party should pay paramount attention to five questions. They are: the propaganda of the theory of Marxism-Leninism cleansed of dogma (its authority has been undermined by one-sided publications and broadcasts in the mass media); the correct interpretation of the so-called "depoliticization" of education; the situation in the youth movement; the attitude toward culture; and problems of the party press. Yu.S. Davydov, secretary of Stavropol Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Communist Party Kraykom, devoted his speech to the problem of studying the 28th CPSU Congress documents and the social protection of working people in conditions of market relations, while the theme of the speech of N.S. Kryukova, chief of Kemerovo party obkom ideological department, was devoted to ideological workers' cadres in conditions of the reduction and reorganization of the party committee apparatus.

On the first day of work the following also took part in the discussion of various problems of restructuring ideological activity: Zh.T. Toshchenko, director of the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences Sociological Research Center; G.N. Derevyakin, secretary of Kuybyshev party obkom; V.Ye. Goncharuk, secretary of Lvov party obkom; Yu.V. Petrov, secretary of Tomsk party obkom; T.M. Gudima, secretary of Arkhangelsk party obkom; B.G. Kibirev, secretary of Krasnodar party kraykom; A.I. Smirnov, chief of Moscow party gorkom ideological department; K.S. Sultanov, chief of the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee ideological department; and Yu.P. Izyumov, chief editor of the weekly GLASNOST.

The second day of the all-Union conference's work began with a speech by V.N. Kudryavtsev, vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, on legal questions of concluding the Union treaty. This is the central question of our political life, the speaker noted, and is interconnected with building the new economic relations because it is impossible to resolve economic questions without making a definitive choice on the type of multinational state system. And conversely: You cannot form a Union treaty without knowing what the economic system will be like.

Afterwards there was a meeting with CPSU Central Committee secretaries. Politburo members and Central Committee secretaries answered written and oral questions from those present. A keen dialogue developed. In particular, V.A. Kuptsov talked to the conference participants about contacts with the new political parties and movements and their activity and also about the CPSU's attitude toward them. The CPSU Central Committee Secretary stressed the need for cooperation with all democratic movements and with everyone who supports the socialist path and who respects the country's socialist choice. Anticommunism is growing, that is clear to everyone, so passivity and nonintervention are unacceptable today, instead there must be a unification of all truly democratic and patriotic forces on a platform of general civic consensus.

O.S. Shenin, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, conducted a keen dialogue on problems of organizational and cadre work, the practice of and prospects for party building, the future of the All-Union Lenin Communist Youth League, and the strengthening of the CPSU's prestige. Many questions were put to G.V. Semenova, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. The creation of a new area of work connected with problems of the women's movement and the family are a sign of renewal, the Central Committee secretary noted. It is very important, albeit not easy, to help women, because social crises, as a rule, affect women, too. So far perestroyka has simply told our women the truth, namely, that their lives are bad. There must be a program to enable women and families to take part in the system of market relations. There must be a separate program for organizing a system of vocational education and retraining for women. There must be social protection measures and monitoring to ensure that these measures are carried out.

There was also a meaningful dialogue with V.M. Falin, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, on the CPSU's approaches to the establishment of ties with the new political parties and movements in the East European countries, on the economic and political reforms in the PRC, on our allies in the immediate and long term, and on the likely fate of the Warsaw Pact. Questions of the budget and property of the CPSU were the theme of the speech by N. Ye. Kruchina, CPSU Central Committee administrator of affairs.

In the afternoon, the participants in the conference had a roundtable meeting with leaders of the central mass media. Participating in the conversation were: M.F. Nenashev, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting and member of the CPSU Central Committee; D.F. Mamleyev, first deputy chairman of the USSR State Committee for the Press; Ye.A. Manyakin, USSR deputy minister of communications; N.B. Bikkenin, N.S. Irgunov, and V.D. Popov, chief editors of the journals KOMMUNIST, PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN, and DIALOG respectively; M.Ya. Korolev, deputy chief editor of PRAVDA; and A.P. Yurkov, chief editor of RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA.

The final day of the all-Union conference's work began with a report from G.I. Revenko, member of the USSR Presidential Council, on progress in the preparation of the new Union treaty. Then there was a meeting with V.V. Bakatin, member of the Presidential Council and USSR minister of internal affairs.

The conference participants heard a speech from V.A. Mikhaylov, chief of a CPSU Central Committee department, on problems of the party's nationalities policy at the present stage. Secretaries of a number of party committees and A.S. Kapto, chief of the CPSU Central Committee Ideological Department, took part in the discussion on these questions. The results of the discussion were summed up by A.N. Girenko, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

The closing speech at the all-Union conference of ideological workers was delivered by A.S. Dzasokhov. He characterized the contribution made by the 28th CPSU Congress and the CPSU Central Committee October (1990) Plenum to the development of the theory of the socialist choice and outlined the party's tasks in implementing the program for achieving general civic consensus and stepping up the CPSU's work among the masses.

The participants in the conference laid a wreath at the V.I. Lenin Mausoleum.

CPSU Secretary on Changes in Party Apparatus

AU1810200290 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 17 Oct 90 p 7

[Interview with Valentin Kuptsov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, by Zdenek Porybny; place and date not given: "Our Party Is Alive and Changing"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Porybny] Could you tell us something about the ongoing changes in the apparatus of the CPSU Central Committee?

[Kuptsov] Our party plays a new role and is abandoning many of the managerial tasks which it used to have within the framework of its leading role. The composition and size of the party apparatus are changing as well. The first cuts were made last year and this year the apparatus is being reduced by an additional 40 percent. Departments for individual economic branches are being abolished and new ones are being set up—such as a department for work with political parties and movements, a department for legislative work, etc. The new apparatus in Moscow will consist of about 850 people, which is not all that much for a party with some 18 million members. We want to enhance the role of various commissions made up of a broad aktiv of Communists. These commissions should replace paid staffers. The same process is underway in the republics, oblasts, and cities. The CPSU is renewing itself and it does so actively. Some members are leaving but the number of new members who are joining the party and of former members who are returning to it is not small. All this is a reflection of the tumultuous social life in our country. Our party is alive and, hence, changing.

CPSU Role in Multiparty System Examined

91UN0045A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 4 Oct 90 p 2

[Three statements on prospects for the CPSU: "What Kind of Party Will Feed Us?"]

[Text] **Sergey Stankevich, Deputy Chairman of the Moscow City Soviet, People's Deputy of the USSR**

Our action committee prepared its version of the bill, several months of work were performed, and much of what we suggested has already been approved and supported. But there is no complete satisfaction, of course. The sharpest arguments have developed around Article 18—the extent to which the activity of political parties may be permitted in the most important state structures: the Armed Forces, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and KGB authorities, the State Arbitration Tribunal and the courts. Party membership, yes, go ahead; but participation in the activity of primary organizations should be outside of the institutions. We believed that the insertion of this formula and provision in the law might reconcile everyone....

One further issue on which we have had to "mark time"—economic activity. Many parties are starting to become commercial corporations. Money is being invested, property is being acquired, enterprises are starting up. Imagine that somewhere in Moscow, for example, the democrats have assumed office and are leasing property to Travkin's party. Travkin's party begins to supervise the stores—we would be going this far. I believe that we may under no circumstances confuse production, economic, and commercial activity

with the activity of parties and political organizations. The prestige of a party depends, you will agree, not on its material property, but on its ideas—it is ideas that determine the popularity of a community of the like-minded among the people. It was this amendment that I attempted to defend for its insertion in the law.

Has a multiparty system taken shape, you ask? In principle, yes, there is the whole political spectrum here, from monarchical parties through the anarchosyndicalists. Even prior to the enactment of the law about which we are speaking, new public formations were being registered in Moscow. The growth of their numbers will prompt a new law also to a certain extent. But it has to be affirmed that politically and organizationally the multiparty system in society has not yet progressed very far. The parties that have newly arisen are still weak, and they are hardly capable of constituting any serious political competition. The lack of material conditions is reflected here: no premises, no printing equipment, and the absence of much else also. Nor, of course, can we overlook a certain public skepticism in respect of the activity of any party....

Nonetheless, I see social democratic parties finding electoral support and "gaining weight" within five or six years. N. Travkin's party will "work," in my view, thanks to his personal leadership. I do not rule out success for the Christian democratic movement, and it will, possibly, be supported outside of the major cities.

I myself am not a specialist in the field of politics and am not a member of any party and have no intention of joining any, for I would like to concentrate on practical activity in the soviets. But were you to ask me whether the law will contribute, say, to an outflow of members from the CPSU, I would answer: An outflow or influx will depend primarily on the state of the party and on purely political factors and to a lesser extent on the enactment of this law or the other. I do not discount, incidentally, the need for cooperation with the CPSU also....

So, the law exists. I believe that ideological multiparty conditions, which have arisen and which actually exist, will soon be realized in the form of the equal competition of certain actual and important parties.

Viktor Mironenko, First Deputy Head of the CPSU Central Committee Department for Work With Social and Political Organizations, People's Deputy of the USSR

The CPSU cannot be renewed in the environment in which it existed earlier. Having forfeited the monopoly of power with the rescinding of Article 6 of the USSR Constitution, the party was confronted with the need to give up 80-90 percent of its customary forms and methods of work. With the enactment of the Law on Public Associations it will find itself in a new legal situation—it will be equal with other political forces, even if its weight in society is the most substantial.

To speak of the multiparty system, I have once again to begin with the CPSU. In my view, it is a post-party structure that has coalesced with the machinery of state. A tortuous process of a separation of the functions of state and party lies ahead. On the other hand, several protoparty structures, which are not parties in the full meaning of this word, have been formed. Thus the nuclei of new organizations have begun to separate from the social democratic association that had arisen. Something similar has happened with the constitutional democrats—there are several branches laying claim to being "the most constitutional democratic of all the constitutional democrats."

The question of consolidation needs to be elucidated also, I believe. There cannot be complete consolidation, for the multiparty system itself would then be meaningless. But supraparty consensus—why not. Gorbachev and Yeltsin have shown us that, given the political will, consensus is attainable. Where, in my view, is interparty cooperation possible: the economy, environmental protection, formation of the civil society, education of the new man, foreign economic activity.

I once took part in a Russian-Swedish seminar on problems of a multiparty system. Professor Kurashvili, who spoke there, characterized the situation in our country precisely and successfully, in my view. We have three currents. Conservatives. Modernists, who believe that it is necessary to move forward by employing both the positive and negative experience of the past. And, finally, the liquidationists. These leading forces are now clashing in the space of a small political nickel. Now, new public formations also.

I heard a joke from a Frenchman on a visit here: What is your CPSU—the ruling party or in opposition? There is a grain of truth in this, unfortunately.

And what about the "theoretical soles" under our feet! I will express a seditious thought: Our entire history is still being interpreted in the context of the "Short Course." To what have we come—has anyone intelligibly said? What is happening in society—revolution or evolution? The latter, I believe. It is not fashionable now to quote Lenin; it is fashionable to desecrate monuments to him and to dismantle them. Nonetheless, he was right when he said that whoever embarks on a solution of particular questions without having resolved general ones finds himself at an impasse....

Yuriy Makartsev, Political Correspondent of RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA

I recently met with USSR People's Deputy Yu.N. Afanasyev. Here is a fragment of a journalist's conversation with him:

"Yuriy Nikolayevich, what is the opposition in the USSR, about which you are having much to say in our country and overseas? Please explain: Has it seriously taken shape here, has it become a factor of democratic and social balance in society?"

"No, it has not. For the opposition to be considered an instrument of the democratic self-regulation of society the main condition—complete freedom of the individual—is lacking. Nor are there traditions connected with the expression of a 'separate opinion'. The economic grounds for such freedom are lacking...."

"And B.N. Yeltsin? How do the 'Interregionals' view their cochairman, who has become chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet? Boris Nikolayevich now has no time to attend mass meetings.... Does this mean that the opposition has lost all its rights to him?"

"It seems to me that Yeltsin, as head of the republic Supreme Soviet, will have more thinking to do about his new position in the new political alignment of forces in the country. He, Popov, Stankevich, Zaslavskiy, Sobchak.... All these people from the camp of our opposition are now in office themselves. How they will build their relations with Gorbachev, with the government—we have thought through this question insufficiently. Yes, the situation needs thinking about. Whether Yeltsin, Popov, and Stankevich, in their offices, will, as before, be members of the opposition to the current leadership or whether they will merge with it? So far there is no answer to this question, although reality will, I believe, quickly make it known."

This is how Yu. Afanasyev evaluates the political situation and his fellow thinkers.

Legitim—from the German: legitimate—is now a fashionable word with us. The legitimization of new forms of social relations and the imparting to them of legal certainty is confronting political leaders with a new choice. Power is all the more compelling, as categorically as can be an answer to the question: What does politics mean to you—a play on people's feelings or a means of struggle for the progress of your fatherland? Let us remember, of course, that Yeltsin is an impassioned critic of the system, but today it cannot be denied that he is attempting with the profound concern of a statesman to grope his way toward paths of Russia's socioeconomic revival. And A. Sobchak, who even recently was maintaining that he intended upholding the position of an "independent lawyer" in the country's parliament, now has complex and down-to-earth concerns in the Leningrad City Soviet....

"When ideas," N. Berdyayev observed, "conduct a bloody struggle in the squares, on the streets, on the highways and in the fields and in the woods, then truth itself ceases to be of interest; it is of no concern." Did not our mass meeting grounds appear this way even recently—highly strung, at times aggressive, any minute an electrified crowd might in the city find for itself some lightning rod. The precautionary measures adopted by the militia were entirely appropriate. Will the nature of the dialogue of political opponents and its tone change following the enactment of the Law on Public Associations? Possibly. Three days ago I observed at a press conference in the Supreme Soviet how Yu. Manayenkov and N. Sazonov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and member of the Social Democratic Party Board respectively, sat at the same table, answering journalists' questions. "May it be like this forever!" I wanted to exclaim.

However, we will refrain from optimistic forecasts. The reality is this: On the streets the citizens are being offered publications in which the editors compete in, as expertly as possible, smearing the top persons in the state. The speakers in the squares are not at a loss for words. Merely the fact of official recognition of political forces of various social nuances does not in itself make us a civilized country.

Will fellow citizens now rush in concert to the banners of various parties, when no one will condemn anyone for this step and there is no danger that you will be asked to leave if you occupy a top seat? This is a question also. In the West the multiparty system and mass politicization are brought about by the mentality of the citizens, Catholicism, and society's economic system. But we are not Germans, not French, not Italians, and a "Western calque" in the same model of multiparty system is hardly possible in Russia. While realizing that without a market economy we will fail, many people are at the same time worried: Will we not become "wolves"? Will we not lose our essence, mutual respect for one another, respectability and readiness to take off one's last shirt and give it to a neighbor. So it may be assumed that major parties will not emerge in the country in any great numbers. Even the fiercest opponents of the CPSU, who had predicted its collapse, are today more guarded in their assessments; serious new political formations need time....

Obviously, the future level of our domestic political culture and progress will be determined by successes or new failures in economic reform, and whether things are "clamorous in the state" or whether there is order, when we respect ourselves and everyone respects everyone else, despite the difference in views, will depend on this.

Center for Applied Political Research Opens

LD1310180490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0800 GMT 13 Oct 90

[Text] A new public organization, the Center for Applied Political Research [Tsentr Prikladnykh Politicheskikh Issledovaniy] debuted today. Sergey Stankevich, Nikolay Travkin, and Nikolay Federov, Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic minister of justice, are taking part.

Economic

State Bank Official Explains Devaluation

LD1710175390 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 17 Oct 90

[Report by correspondent N. Chernyshova from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Not a day passes without fresh rumors about monetary reform.

[Begin recording] [Chernyshova] This time the excitement was caused by a report of the introduction of a commercial rate for the ruble which will be approximately two rubles to one U.S. dollar. The dollar now stands at about 60 kopeks. This report ended with a rather vague phrase. At the end of last week Soviet official representatives reported a presidential decree being drafted in which it is said that the devaluation of the ruble would be announced. Aleksandr Yevgeniyevich, is there any cause for alarm for our ordinary citizens?

[A. Ye. Voytenkov, deputy head of administration of USSR State Bank] I do not feel we have any cause for alarm because the adoption of the decree on the change in the rate of the ruble does not in any degree affect either our savings in the savings banks or our pay or the money that the population has in the ordinary way. But if it does have any effect it will be on those citizens who have foreign currency accounts in the Bank for Foreign Economic Activity and on Soviet enterprises. But I should say that even here, fears that there will be a devaluation of foreign currency funds in these accounts are completely unfounded. Their value in rubles will treble, and the total of the foreign currency will be the same.

[Chernyshova] So we can definitely tell our citizens to keep their money in the savings banks and not to rush and spend it on luxuries?

[Voytenkov] That is all we need tell our citizens. [end recording]

New Bank Notes Do Not Signal Currency Reform

914A0025A Moscow TRUD in Russian 12 Oct 90 p 1

[Interview with A. Orlov, deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Planning, Budget, and Finance Commission and doctor of economic sciences, by Yu. Ursov; place and date not given: "The Ruble May Change Its Color, But That Does Not Mean Monetary Reform"]

[Text] This week the USSR Supreme Soviet adopted the draft bill "On a USSR State Bank" on the first reading. It stipulates that the worth (face value) of the bank notes and coins, their distinguishing marks, as well as the types of tender in rubles being circulated on the territory of the USSR are determined by the USSR State Bank. Many readers of TRUD viewed such a broadening of the rights of the USSR State Bank as preparation for currency reform or a currency revaluation [denominatsiya]—an exchange of money. A. Orlov, deputy chairman of the Planning, Budget, and Finance Commission of the USSR Supreme Soviet and doctor of economic sciences, is the chief designer of the general concept of banking reform and offers an elucidation of the draft bill.

[Orlov] I especially wish to stress that today it is not a question of monetary reform of the "mild" or the "severe" confiscational type, as happened in 1947. The draft bill stipulates the possibility of a currency revaluation. That is something quite different. Printing of treasury notes in denominations of 1, 3, and 5 rubles will cease entirely. In return, bank notes and coins produced by the USSR State Bank will be introduced. The entry on the paper currency will be changed accordingly. I will explain. Currently, treasury notes are backed "by all the possessions of the USSR," but "possessions" always have a specific owner. It is awkward to say that under market conditions the ruble will be backed, for instance, by the joint-stock property of the Kama Automobile Factory or goods in the cooperative store. Bank notes, on the other hand, are a promissory note of the state in the form of its central bank. And as a result they should be backed by its assets and liabilities. So it will be written on any form of paper currency that it is backed by the assets and liabilities of the USSR State Bank.

The bank notes will have various face values, and there may be a change in their outward appearance—in color, format, and the picture. This does not mean that it will be necessary to withdraw from circulation, for example, 1 ruble [R] notes. Currency of that value will be retained, but it will receive the designation of a bank note, not a treasury note, and it will have a different "appearance." The treasury notes that are being withdrawn will remain legal tender for five years from the date of the declaration of their removal and may be presented for exchange for an additional five years.

[Ursov] When will all this begin?

[Orlov] In my opinion, the sooner the better. But only the USSR Supreme Soviet has the right to adopt a ruling on a currency revaluation. Maximum efficiency is needed to avoid many unfavorable phenomena.

[Ursov] Any innovations affecting cash are quite painful... How does this possible currency revaluation threaten the man who received a monthly wage of R150-200 for many years and, denying himself, put away a few thousand rubles in a savings account?

[Orlov] It does not threaten him at all. He will receive his wages in other bills, and the security of his savings in the Savings Bank are guaranteed by the state. But a blow is struck against the bosses of the black market. They hold great amounts of ready money in their hands, which goes to service illegal operations. Here is an example from the press: The Moscow Soviet declared its intention to privatize the capital's trade. Immediately two representatives from one of the southern republics appeared and offered R20 million cash for the "Budapesht" department store! And what kind of "bribery" potential, so to speak, is present in this? Judging by this incident alone, one can imagine...

The currency revaluation together with other measures will help us prevent both invasion of ruble-denominated

monetary mass from abroad and, consequently, it will shore up the purchasing power of our money.

Power Station Fuel Stocks Down From Last Winter

PM1510150190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Oct 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Report by I. Taburyanskaya under the "Fact and Commentary" rubric: "How We Will Keep Warm in Winter"]

[Text] This year the railroad has transported almost 18 million tonnes of coal fewer than during the same period last year. So, is the railroad not coping—as usual?

The Ministry of Railways explained to us: "Almost all the coal that has been mined is being transported and only a minimal quantity remains at the pitheads. Alas, the basic problem is that this year the volume of coal mined at many mines in the Donbass, the Kuzbass, and Karaganda has decreased by almost 20 million tonnes. Most of the shortfall is their responsibility.

The situation with the delivery of coking coals is the most complex. Although there are practically no instances of gondola cars being delayed during loading, many metallurgical enterprises are working "from one day to the next." For example, the majority of coking plants in the Ukraine only have supplies of coal for a few hours' work, while two furnaces at the Novolipetsk metallurgical combine had already stopped work by the end of September. The reason is the same: Not enough coal has been mined.

The situation regarding stocks of fuel at the country's power stations is more stable. Over 32 million tonnes had been transported for them by 1 October: This means that the railroad workers practically fulfilled the nine-month plan by 100 percent. However, stocks could have been even bigger if a number of power stations, such as the Karaganda, Omsk, Troitsk, and Reftinskiy GRES [state regional electric power stations] had not been so slow to receive fuel.

The situation in the Far East is causing particular alarm among power and railroad workers. The former are concerned because, as a result of insufficient mining and delivery of coal by the "Primorskugol" and "Dalvostokugol" Production Associations, the regional thermoelectric power stations' winter fuel supplies are already over 1 million tonnes down. And the railroad workers are concerned because in the fourth quarter the transport workers will have to transport this missing million tonnes to Maritime Kray from Krasnoyarsk and Irkutsk. Well, as it is the threshold of winter, they have no choice. But is the transportation of coal over such long distances justified?

Merchant Marine Head Meets Press in Vladivostok

LD1310033190 Moscow TASS in English 1955 GMT 12 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondent Alla Prozorova]

[Text] Vladivostok October 12 TASS—"The Soviet Merchant Marine is an association of all shipping companies of the country with a traditional division of labour. This is why, despite the revision of organizing structures, it continues to be a single complex," Soviet Minister of Merchant Marine Yuriy Volmer said at a press conference here. He visited Vladivostok on the way to Japan, where he will take part in the week of the USSR at the Nagasaki-90 exhibition (on October 18-25).

The country's shipping companies received greater independence, primarily in the sphere of commerce and foreign economic activities. Coordination functions, control over the safety of navigation, high-level international relations and the charter policy were delegated to the ministry.

At the initiative of the recently created Merchant Marine Council, which rallies members of the ministry collegium, representatives of the Association of Ship Owners and Ports, captains and sailors, a single fund was created for financing the building of new ships. A programme of the radical renewal of the fleet is intended for five years. In accordance with the programme, shipping companies will receive 400 new transport vessels. Agreements on the building at foreign shipyards of 132 ships with a total deadweight of 2.5 million tonnes have been signed. They will be financed not from the state budget, but with the help of credits amounting to four billion dollars, granted by foreign banks. One hundred ships will be built by shipyards subordinated to the Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry, and another 200 will be purchased.

Volmer said that the Soviet Merchant Marine will ensure a reliable supply of all needed cargoes to free enterprise zones, which are being created in the country. A radical modernisation of all Far Eastern ports, started recently, is other proof to it.

Economic Reform Plans Seen as 'Fairy Tales'

PM1810104590 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 17 Oct 90 Second Edition p 3

[Article by TASS observer Yu. Vorobyevskiy, especially written for SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, under the "Polemics" rubric: "What Will We Use to Trade With? Reflections on Our Economy's Problems"]

[Text] Things are always more easily said than done. Consultant academicians hastily scribble prescriptions to cure the economy, but nothing seems to be happening. Things go from bad to worse with each passing day.

Initially, L. Abalkin asked us to wait some 12-18 months (this period runs out in December). S. Shatalin now

claims: We need another 500 days. In total, the credit of confidence is being extended over more than 1,000 days. Or rather, over 1,001 nights...

Is it worth adding it up? After all, supporters of Shatalin's concept and of Abalkin's updated concept emphasize their incompatibility. In reality, however, the difference lies mainly in the pace at which we move toward the market. Both sets of supporters perceive the market as some sort of goal in itself, which would automatically guarantee prosperity... Given time, of course...

Meanwhile, only one-tenth of mankind has managed to secure high living standards for itself. Therefore, we are hardly likely to find consolation in the slogan "The present generation of Soviet people will live under market conditions!" After all, it is not only prosperous countries that live in these conditions: Therefore, the cause of prosperity lies somewhere else.

Let us try and work out where. And in order to do this, let us investigate some of the economic fairy tales of 1,001 nights.

The most "democratic" one among them, typical of both programs, is about the feeling of being master. This feeling, it is claimed, miraculously develops within people who are fed up with working for "absentee bosses" and become shareholders.

This is indeed true for someone who gets his hands on a controlling packet of shares. But in the United States, workers have managed to completely buy out just 500 medium and small enterprises. As for the rest, they are still working for "absentee bosses." And they are to be envied for their efficient work.

Working people's financial opportunities in our country are even more modest. The average amount of savings bank deposits is 1,500 rubles [R]. If, for example, members of the collective of a well-equipped plant were to risk investing all their savings in securities, they would hardly have enough for one single shop. This is reservation number one.

Here is reservation number two. Let us assume that this enterprise is operating successfully. Given a high yield of 10 percent, someone investing R1,500 will earn the princely sum of R150 in dividends at year's end! Will this make a machine tool operator or an engineer change his work attitudes? It looks as if the "feeling of being master" is rather akin to the feeling of legitimate pride and profound satisfaction.

The important point is not to have the feeling, the important thing is to be. The joint stock system is nothing but attractive camouflage for those who are in a position to acquire the controlling packet of shares. The value of fixed production assets in the state sector stands at R1.69 trillion, and shadow economy accumulations are already estimated by experts at R0.5 trillion. Think about it...

But we are repeatedly told the fairy tale that only "energetic and enterprising people," having succeeded in getting their millions together by hook or by crook, will effect economic recovery by buying out the plants. We have to object, even leaving aside any juridical or moral considerations. In the conditions of excessive money supply, the bulk of capital accumulation originates from brokerage rather than production activities. Our businessmen have no experience in modern management. Therefore, the ones to succeed will be only those who manage to hire European-class managers. Managers who know how to handle incentives and people.

But why is the state incapable of hiring them? Why run the risk of social tremors as a result of shifts in ownership?

Let us ask ourselves one question before concluding our conversation about shares. What is more familiar and more understandable to a worker—the R150-odd he might receive at year's end or the amount he earns as regular (and already familiar) wages and the opportunities to exchange it for goods in the stores?

If it is the second, then let us talk about workplace economics. Especially since our academicians and all their programs seem to have forgotten: Our shortfall of national wealth can only be created at specific machine tools, blast furnaces, and Kuhlmanns [kulmany].

"You are obviously idealizing the market," I was told, for example, by L. Bauer, director of the Vienna Institute for Economics and Politics. "It is nothing but a place where people buy and sell things. It is only a consequence of production. **You actually have nothing to trade with. Therefore, it should be a question of improving the labor process.**"

"What makes the capitalist economy more efficient than yours? The market? No, instead it is the different systems for the organization and incentives for labor at the workplace," he was seconded by the vice president of the Austrian firm "Fischer," which is installing its equipment in our country. "I am particularly amazed by the viability of piece-work remuneration in your country. Machine tool operators, for example, frequently breach technological rules in the pursuit of piece-work earnings. The workers are great at using our equipment while you look over their shoulders. As soon as you turn your back, they start producing scrap. This cannot happen in our country. The personnel receive so much per hour in conditions of really tough and scientifically substantiated norms. The assimilation of new and more productive machines results in substantially higher rates."

...Yes, we talk a lot about Western freedoms and our administrative management. But the freedom to work badly, which we enjoy, is not to be found in a single civilized country.

Specialists know well how much is being paid abroad and for what. Why is all this not immediately adopted in our state sector?

This also applies to the world experience in financial recovery. Let us start with the declaration by the "500 Days" program's authors that progress to the market will be achieved at the expense of the state rather than at the expense of ordinary people. Is this so? Let us take a look.

You have to agree: Our hopeless "economic mood" is due to the hopelessness of money supply. With nothing to buy, money is no incentive for working people. It only goes to fuel corruption, speculation, and racketeering. How do we cope with this ninth wave of crispy banknotes?

Our staff theoreticians suggest "syphoning off" rubles by expanding the market. We start by paying out money for work that has not been done, and go on to sell things that have not yet been produced. An interest-free loan of R10 billion, guaranteeing that scarce goods can be bought in the future, is just the first step. Money forward! According to estimates by A. Aganbegyan, another one of our reformers, an additional amount of R35 billion could be earned from the sale of still nonexistent automobiles. True enough, according to the academician's reservation, this would apply to approximately 20 percent of society...

What about the remaining 80 percent? Obviously, they should be grateful because, at the moment the market is introduced, the rich will hand a sizeable proportion of their money to the state and consequently prices will not rise all that much.

But they will rise nonetheless, and everything valuable that will be produced in the foreseeable future will already have been bought in advance... What are the 80 percent to do? Hire themselves out to private entrepreneurs for big money? But will that money be really big? History teaches us: Exploitation can only be merciless at the stage of the initial accumulation of capital.

It emerges that, in actual fact, it is the poor who are expected to pay for the solution of financial problems. Money reform would guarantee a different outcome. But people are scared by its confiscation option. Meanwhile, postwar Germany took a different path. Each person was given the right to exchange 40 marks for new banknotes. Enterprises and institutions were granted new money credits to maintain the production process. All the rest (on the basis of income declarations filed) was deposited in bank accounts and frozen. The "thaw" occurred as store shelves started gradually filling. The only ones to suffer were those who had excess goods for speculation. After all, prices dropped sharply as a result of the decline in money circulation.

Our fairy tale narrators assure us: A money reform will not hit the emirs and sultans of the shadow economy. It is claimed that they are actually spending their rubles. But what will they do without circulating capital? The nonfulfillment of the cash transactions plan shows: One-tenth of money currently in circulation never comes back.

These are the funds that will be cut off by money reform! These are the people who will have to pay when the check is presented!

Hence, I think, it follows: It is labor and the money circulation associated with it that are diseased in our country. But the official diagnosis differs: It is all a matter of ownership. Is that the disease to be cured?

For decades on end we were told that the state of the whole people is the master in our country. It has now been explained that this term implied a departmental system. Nonetheless, we did fulfill one of Marx's prophecies: He wrote that the state might end up as the private property of the bureaucracy. We have never had any of the all-people's property whose "inefficiency" is now being propagandized.

What we are doing now is replacing one blinkered selfish interest (that of the caste of functionaries) by another—that of producer groups. We are replacing one fetish, the plan geared to gross output, by another—profit.

The power-hungry have ended up in positions of power. We can pay as much lip service as we like to the sale of light industry enterprises or the development of leasing in them, but it is impossible to overlook the fact that so far only 60 percent of the raw materials needed for the sector's production output have been secured. Profits nowadays are generated by the quest for the richest consumers, and not by the growth of manufactured output. And certainly not by declining production costs.

The authors of our reforms, when speaking about society's consolidation, present us with similar contradictions at every step. They moreover emphasize that even the best program will be inevitably wrecked if the atmosphere of power vacuum and nonimplementation of laws continues to prevail in the country and the orgy of inefficiency and indiscipline continues to hold sway.

An interesting approach! Surely the program itself is designed to create conditions for normal work? Or is it that the proposed reforms require a company of armed bodyguards?

So, all the talk about the market's democratic nature is a cover for dominance by the producer's dictatorship. And the transfer of state property (which has simply failed to become all-people's property) into the hands of private individuals or groups is far from democratic. After all, it has been created by the joint labor of the whole people and belongs to us all. Is this not a "reverse collectivization"?

Democracy is not a kingdom of group interests. It means power by the informed people. Therefore, by the soviets elected by them.

Since the state is a soviet state, it is not a collection of ministries and departments by a hierarchy of soviets. All over the world, however, it is the master vested with full powers that issues orders as to what will be produced and in what volumes. Therefore, real people's power means

vesting elected organs with the right to be the sole clients placing orders for output. It would be logical to make enterprises satisfying the needs of a given territory's population subordinate to soviets at different levels.

Soviets, with help from societies for the protection of consumers' rights, could review the range of output manufactured in the country in the interests of the majority (and not just those of the moneybags). A vast volume of articles in the West is ordered by people through catalogs compiled by consumers' associations. Society is subject to increasingly powerful monitoring by consumers. This is the way for us to get rid of unspendable money on the one hand, and of shortages of prime necessities on the other. It would be worth extending such a conversion not only to the defense industry but throughout the national economy as well!

The word conversion comes from the Latin. But what is the magic word which will enable us to actually effect this conversion? What we need are not **commodities** which could be profitably sold to the rich but **products** which the majority need. Is it not time for our economy to bring forth product-men [produktivist], in addition to commodity-men [tovarnik] and noncommodity-men [netovarnik]?

All the talk about it being impossible to plan everything down to the tiniest screw is nothing but fairy tales. The largest Japanese firms, for example, manage without any warehousing facilities because everything has been planned down to the last screw and the last minute. This happens within each firm. But the plan already interlinks 2,000 sectors.

This is the only solution—planning in physical terms. It is obvious that you need an engine, a chassis, and four wheels to make a car. We, in contrast, when planning in value terms, often manufacture five wheels, two engines, and not a single chassis.

This is why the path to prosperity leads along the path of assimilating a multitude of specific mechanisms which could be made available to us without changing forms of ownership.

Much becomes clear if Western structures and ours are examined in parallel. For example, our soviet of people's deputies is the corporation's master. This is the only difference. As for the rest, the apparatus at the owners' disposal must be similar because the functions of coordinating, managing, and supervising production are the same.

All through the course of perestroyka, people in our country have been looking at the West but have been stubbornly unwilling to perceive the specific constructive mechanisms there. It is obviously to someone's disadvantage!

Mighty jinns have now escaped from the bottle and block the path of genuinely radical reforms! Alas, they cannot be defeated in the course of parliamentary debates. In my view, the proposed mechanisms must be introduced with help from the president's "emergency" powers. In any case, the law signed by him "On Additional Measures to Stabilize the Country's Economic and Sociopolitical Life" contains, among other decisions, the right to promptly promulgate normative acts concerning questions of ownership relations, the budget and finance system, labor remuneration, and so on.

Indeed, why not turn our state sector into something akin to a Western concern, capable of competing on the world market (a proper master would never allow the breakdown of his enterprise). The solution of these tasks in conditions of presidential rule would take much less than 1,001 days. And there will be no need for tales of the 1,001 nights.

Economist Calls for Immediate Privatization

PM1610134090 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 6 Oct 90 p 2

[Interview with economist Larisa Piyasheva by I. Savvateyeva; place and date not given: "'Social Justice Does Not Exist in Economics...', Economist Larisa Piyasheva Analyzes the '500 Days' Program"]

[Text] [Savvateyeva] Larisa Ivanovna, you were perhaps the first of our economists, as early as 1987, to have the courage to declare openly that socialism and private property, the market and the plan, are incompatible: "It is impossible to be slightly pregnant...." Afterwards your opinion was contested for a long time and you were advised, among other things, not to confuse economics with gynecology. Life has put everything in its proper place. Witticisms are no longer heard, and the Russian Supreme Soviet intends to embark on the implementation ofthe "500 Days" program as early as November. What worries you most of all today?

[Piyasheva] Precisely the fact that the Russian Supreme Soviet intends to implement "500 Days" from as early as November.

[Savvateyeva] You don't like thç program?

[Piyasheva] I like the idea. Its aims are correct. In it, everything is at last called by its proper name, and there is no ideology, no socialism with "added flavorings." And from this point of view it is fine. But as a working document, it is absolutely useless.

[Savvateyeva] What?! Everything is scheduled in days—and it is useless....

[Piyasheva] Well, I do not see anything wonderful about the fact that it is scheduled in days. Scheduling the pace of reform in days, weeks, and months—it's utopia. Economic life is infinitely complex. The unpredictability of demand, the unpredictability of consumer reaction, and, finally, the unpredictability of the political situation in the country—all this guarantees that a program of the "500 Days" type will never be fulfilled.

[Savvateyeva] But if everything is unpredictable, does it make any sense to undertake any kind of transformations at all?

[Piyasheva] Why "everything"? We must make provision for two things: the operation of a normal economic mechanism in the necessary direction, and the social protection of citizens. Now, a program will not cope with the first and most important of these tasks until it answers the question of how to privatize property and solves the problem of the reform of pricing.

[Savvateyeva] But everything is clear in the program regarding prices: There are socially low prices, free prices....

[Piyasheva] That's just it! Socially low prices, commercial prices, stable prices, contract prices, state prices—virtually a five-tier pricing structure has been cobbled together. And the market prices, if they exceed the administrators' ideas of "suitability," will be penalized, and the proceeds used to maintain the socially low prices.... In short, as far as prices are concerned, everything is even crazier than in a bad dream! The only prices that should exist are market prices, and they should be released at one and the same time, right from the beginning of the reforms.

[Savvateyeva] ...And people will become paupers, and food riots will be provoked...

[Piyasheva] Nothing of the kind! We are more likely to starve with stable prices and empty shelves. Look: Today tomatoes in the stores cost 70 kopeks, but to us, the consumers, that is neither here nor there, because in practice we do not have these tomatoes. On the market they cost R4. And cooperative workers were recently selling them from their cars at R2. They did business all day long. There were both tomatoes and customers. That means that today R2 is the optimum price. And if it were permitted to sell tomatoes in every store, on every stall, and on every shelf at the price at which they will sell, they would cost R2 per kilogram. Well, is this really so terrible?

[Savvateyeva] For me, it is probably not "so" terrible, but for an old woman on a pension of R50?

[Piyasheva] An old woman on a pension of R50 has no tomatoes even when they are at 70 kopeks. And it is in order for her and people like her to be able to support themselves in the difficult conditions of transition to the market that provision for social protection measures is required: Indexation of income must be introduced and compensation provided for. Prices must also be brought down by measures aimed at the demonopolization of the economy: Giant factories must be broken down into smaller units; prices on monopoly-produced goods will initially have to be restricted; and in some cases, perhaps, free access should be opened up for foreign competitors, so that there is alternative output to exercise a restraining influence on prices.

[Savvateyeva] And do you think that all these measures are sufficient to cushion the impact of "shock therapy"?

[Piyasheva] And what is "shock therapy"? They scared us for a long time with Poland. I set off for Poland somewhat afraid of finding a collapsed market and agitated crowds in the streets. I saw nothing of this. I saw a very well-filled, organized, working market. A market without waiting lines, with all the necessary goods and services; a market in which the zloty is exchanged absolutely freely for any Western currency. Both in banks and in private exchange booths. Despite all their "shock" increases, these prices are roughly the same as exist in our country at the present time. So that all the talk of "shock therapy" and "destructive influence" was, of course, strongly exaggerated.

Yes, I did observe housewives buying not five bottles of milk, but one, half a packet of butter, one small cheese, and two small loaves. This kind of rationing on the level of the family budget undoubtedly exists; the prices pinch. But at the same time it should be said that the Poles can spend their money not only on food and clothes like us. The possibility has emerged in their country of buying the means of production, and therefore they try to spend as little as possible on food now. Scaring people with Poland suits those who do not want the transition to the market to take place. But I am perfectly happy as far as the Poles are concerned in the sense that, if their political situation allows, if there is civil consensus, they will quite soon solve their economic problems and enter the normal rhythm of the world market. The problem of prices is by no means as complex and terrifying as everyone has become accustomed to believing. What is really frightening is something quite different—and for some reason no one talks of this—the inevitable deflationary shock which the Shatalin plan guarantees us.

[Savvateyeva] In other words you are afraid of the consequences of "surplus money" being taken out of circulation?! And this at a time when all economists without exception, from hardline communists to fierce marketeers, go on and on with terror and despair about "volatile" ["goryachiye"] money, "inactive" ["nesvyazannyye"] money, and "free" ["svobodnyye"] money, about the need to stabilize the ruble, about inflation.... The stabilizing period—the first 100 days—is perhaps the most decisive in the "500 Days" program....

[Piyasheva] It is precisely in this "most stabilizing" period that we will come to grief. In the event of the program being implemented according to the timetabled scenario, the economy may enter a state of depression the like of which even we, who have endured so much, have never seen.

[Savvateyeva] Heavens, don't whip up unnecessary fears in the readers. People are absolutely terrified even as it is.

[Piyasheva] These fears are not unnecessary. Look what our reformers are proposing. In order to get rid of "surplus" money they are suddenly, at a stroke, reducing state investment by almost half. In particular, they want to reduce military expenditure by 20-30 percent over a period of three months. And what does this mean? Take the Urals, for example. A large military plant. In October it still receives its subsidies, but from November, if we start fulfilling "500 Days," funding is decreased by 20 percent. Production begins to falter and finally stops altogether. The plant is shut down. What does a closed-down factory mean? People do not get paid. Well, let's say, they continue to be paid in the first month. Maybe in the second month also: The administration makes itself busy, sells something somewhere, and makes some money. But in the third month they will be forced to fire their workers. A military factory is not a small store. There will be crowds of unemployed, and consequently, penniless, people on the streets. But that is not all. If an enterprise of this kind ceases to operate, that means that it will no longer require the output of dozens of subcontractors and suppliers. And then all these plants will stockpile their output for a day or for two or three days, but by the 10th day or the 100th day they will shut down all the same. The enterprises which received the output of our military plant for their own production will also end up the same way. This is complete destabilization and economic collapse.

[Savvateyeva] But what is to be done? After all, we have to somehow reduce military expenditure, stop subsidies to loss-making enterprises, end over-long construction projects...

[Piyasheva] All that is necessary. But not like this—wham, bam in 100 days. Loss-making enterprises, incidentally, often produce the most essential output. Suddenly ceasing to fund them means leaving us all without many vitally important goods.

There is the same problem with our over-long construction projects. Should we mothball the majority of half-finished facilities? But this means abandoning to the mercy of the wind, rain, and snow projects in which labor and resources have already been invested. Again: There are people on all these building projects who will suddenly find themselves without work. And what should we do with the unfinished facilities themselves? Sell them? That could have been done easily enough two or three years ago, as soon as the cooperative system was started up.

In general, the entire idea of stabilizing finances within 100 days is a flawed idea. Surplus money should be withdrawn very carefully and gradually, otherwise we are guaranteed an inflationary shock. It would be possible to eliminate forms of parasitical consumption as of now, for instance. There are masses of all kinds of social foundations and structures which are dependent on the budget and which can be eliminated relatively painlessly.

[Savvateyeva] But all this is just kopeks.

[Piyasheva] Nevertheless it can be done. And of course, it is necessary to stop printing money in short order, and to switch the budget to a regime of strict savings. At the same time it is necessary to release prices, and—the main thing—to begin privatization. It is useless to try to stabilize finances first, and only later settle the question of ownership. Only privatization, and as quickly as possible, can improve the situation.

[Savvateyeva] But regarding privatization, there are questions, and questions, and questions...

[Piyasheva] Eleven years ago the Chinese, starving as they were, seized the land of their own accord and presented their communist fathers with a fait accompli. The latter thought a long time about what they should do: Jail the disobedient people and deal with them, or, in view of the situation, carry on sharing out the land? They decided to share out the land. They didn't even go as far as to bring in private ownership, but leased the land for 10 years and permitted free trade. Today China's food market is overflowing from abundance.

[Savvateyeva] But it is easy to say: People need ownership. Today, I think, the biggest question is how to carry out privatization while avoiding its negative consequences.

[Piyasheva] Unfortunately not one of the programs that have been proposed as of today, even the most progressive one—the Shatalin program—explains what the mechanism of privatization should be.

[Savvateyeva] I am not even talking about the mechanism. Look at what is happening today. Destatization has, strictly speaking, begun already. Joint enterprises are being set up and joint-stock companies are emerging. But beneath the ultramodern banner—you only have to dig a little deeper—the same old administrative-bureaucratic apparatus is establishing itself in the new conditions. Who owns the Kama Truck Plant's shares? The enterprise and the ministry. The Kama Truck Plant is a huge firm, and yet not even the ordinary inhabitants of Naberezhnyye Chelny itself have received a kopek's worth of the production capital. The situation is roughly the same in joint enterprises. The departments begin by including state property in these enterprises as part of the incorporation capital, then the state delegates ownership rights to these departments, and at the end of the day the enterprise becomes in effect the private property of the same bureaucrat. In both cases the same people who recently were receiving colossal bonuses for sitting in a comfortable chair will be receiving huge incomes. This is what I think: In the present situation, when the administrative-bureaucratic system is still very strong, would not the end result of hasty privatization be that the most immoral and parasitical part of society—today's nomenklatura and the associated mafia operators—is strengthened many times over?

[Piyasheva] It depends how privatization is carried out. Once again everything depends on the mechanism. Various models are currently being proposed. In the "500

Days" program they have simply written "sell" and "hand over" either side of a comma. But if you sell and also hand over, who will buy?! Everyone will wait for free distribution to begin.

[Savvateyeva] Many "marketeers" counsel selling off state property all the same. And the most important advantage they see in this is that "volatile" money will finally be withdrawn from the population.

[Piyasheva] In my opinion this idea does not stand up to criticism. Well, first, the idea that the population has a lot of money is an illusion. Our people are poor, not to say destitute. Take yourself, an ordinary resident of Moscow, whose income is probably not among the lowest, what would you be able to buy if sales were to begin now?

[Savvateyeva] Well, nothing, of course.

[Piyasheva] There you are. And the majority of families are the same. We have a very narrow band of people who have large savings: two to three, at most five percent—this is minute compared with the population as a whole. The rest of the people live from one pay packet to the next and have savings, as Shmelev once said, "for granny's funeral." About R800 or R1000 per average investor, what kind of savings are these? Ordinary people—engineers, technicians, craftsmen, workers—how are they to buy shares in their enterprises on these zilch savings, excuse the expression?

[Savvateyeva] I talked recently with Mikhail Bocharov on roughly the same subject. He advises getting bank loans.

[Piyasheva] Loans? You know, it is in conditions of a developed market and a normal economic situation that people can get bank loans. People trust these banks when they have observed their work over the decades. The main thing is that they know what they are doing. The market, demand, costs, possibilities of selling goods—all this they are more or less familiar with. But what about us? Imagine again: You want to take out a bank loan right now of, say, R100,000? Are you sure that in three to five years the transaction you have made will make any sense? What if the state adopts yet more confiscation legislation? Or if it hikes the interest rates on this loan?

Apart from this, selling off state property in our, I emphasize our, conditions is, in my view, profoundly immoral. For decades the state has mercilessly exploited the people, draining it of its last juices, and now it goes and offers to sell them what, basically, it shamelessly robbed from them. What kind of rule-of-law state can we have on this economic foundation!

[Savvateyeva] But will privatization "come off" at all in our country? The "marketeers" keep demanding: Give the people private property, give them private property! But will the people take it? Recently the "Vremya" program showed material about Poland: About 10 percent of state stores, it appears, have been sold off, but people will not buy the rest, and that is that. What is more, the storekeepers are going on demonstrations, demanding to keep the working conditions that they are used to.

[Piyasheva] So then, do you also believe what some people here are promising: that it is possible to switch to the market without mass unemployment and a worsening of social problems? It used to be that when some small event happened in your life—the boss shouted at you—you were upset for the whole day. Now everything is changing, virtually an entire system of values, a whole set of principles, is being turned upside down. But as far as the example of Poland is concerned, this is apparently the crux of the problem over there. The Poles have embarked on privatization by selling off property from the state; their people are not much richer than ours. So it turns out: Roughly 10 percent of the population have money, and they have bought up what they could. But the rest simply have no money. Of course, they feel deceived, cheated, and they go on strike. This all comes back to the same thing: In our conditions, the idea of selling state property into private hands is a mistaken idea.

[Savvateyeva] In the endless disputes on this subject there is also the following argument: The value of state property is estimated at several trillion rubles, and the people "only" have in their hands R250 billion of "free" money. Simple arithmetic shows that the sums do not add up. Does this mean that property should be handed out after all?

[Piyasheva] I think it should only be handed out.

[Savvateyeva] But how are we to share out honorably, that is to say in accordance with social justice, let us say, the Bryatsk Hydroelectric Power Station, from which each employee would receive a "slice" worth more than a million, and a hairdressing salon, where the private owner would have to make do with a pair of scissors and one Soviet "Mechta" hair drier between three?

[Piyasheva] As a pure "marketeer," I believe that the idea of social justice does not and cannot exist in economics.

[Savvateyeva] It seems that this was already known to Adam Smith in the 18th century: Economics should not be just, they should be efficient—and this is itself the prerequisite of social justice. But the situation in which we find ourselves is unique. Won't we be damaging the very business of privatization if we are guided exclusively by economic laws?

[Piyasheva] This is what I want to say more about. Yes, in our situation, where people are destitute and embittered, when the idea of universal leveling is still firmly lodged in the minds of the majority of people—in such a situation, to ignore the principle of social justice from the outset is to provoke great social tension, to provoke an explosion that will quite possibly bury all our reforms.

[Savvateyeva] So what must be done nonetheless? Maybe the enemies of the market are right, claiming as they do that to share everything equally is impossible, no method of doing so exists in nature?

[Piyasheva] A method does exist, we only have to reject the "production principle" of sharing. I propose that the value of all state property subject to privatization be assessed, and divided equally between all citizens of the country, including babes in arms. The result will be something like R10,000-15,000 per person. This will be fair. I believe that our state is guilty before every one of us, whether we have been in prison or not, whether we have worked hard or not, whether we have been repressed— irrespective of anything—each of us as a citizen of our country has the right to a certain share.

[Savvateyeva] That is attractive and tempting. But, excuse me, doesn't all this smack of the utopia of the first socialists with their ideas of universal equality? How will you share out these portions from a practical point of view?

[Piyasheva] I understand: Piyasheva "the marketeer" suddenly puts forward a purely communist idea, an idea that is geriatric and stupid. Yes, I agree absolutely: This idea really requires no great economic intelligence. But it seems to me that this is the one opportunity to achieve some kind of consensus among the citizens of the country and to avoid entering into a phase of war of all against all.

As for the method of distribution, this is very simple: Each person will receive an investment check, his entitlement to property. And he can exercise this entitlement any way he likes.

[Savvateyeva] What happens if, for instance, my KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA colleagues, and staffers on the PRAVDA newspaper, and the CPSU Central Committee apparatus, all want to buy the printing press, and so do the printing press workers, who understand as well as we do, I think, that a printing press is a profitable business? Won't all the would-be buyers squabble over profitable enterprises? And anyway, Larisa Ivanovna, don't you think that we have seen it all before: Take everything away and redistribute it anew, this time according to a new, "true" justice?

[Piyasheva] But why should we take everything away! The workers and employees of industrial enterprises will receive a privileged right to acquire their own plants and factories. Peasants and people who have recently left the countryside, but have not yet established themselves in the city, will have a priority opportunity of acquiring land. Essentially, in the way of property people will secure ownership of the production capital in which they are now involved professionally.

[Savvateyeva] And how do the experts in market affairs—foreign economists and entrepreneurs—advise us to carry out economic reforms?

[Piyasheva] Oh, well, they all say the same thing: Release prices and privatize, privatize property as quickly as possible, keeping strict financial control.

Article Cites Experts on Conversion Issues

PM1210144190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Oct 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Article by S. Leskov: "Conversion: Diktat or Market"]

[Text] The latest session of the USSR Presidential Council was devoted to problems of conversion. A fact which attests to a great deal. You would think that every day is worth its weight in gold and the country is on the eve of the transition to a market economy, but here they are discussing problems of the most nonmarket sector of our economy.

The explanation is as follows: Conversion is the magic wand which our wretched economy can wave to rectify its condition. But how is this wand to be brought into play? At the first stage of conversion we committed quite a few follies, setting powerful science-and-production associations bulk plans for the production of primitive consumer goods. Obviously, the problem lies not in the potential of the defense sector but in the creation of economic mechanisms which will make the reorientation of the powerful defense complex economically advantageous.

Can we expect much from the defense complex? V.D. Protasov, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, told me that figures on the capacities of the military-industrial complex, about which there used to be legends, were first "summed up" in time for the session of the USSR Presidential Council. It turned out that the military-industrial complex provides 6.4 percent of the country's GNP. To tell the truth, this is less than common sense suggested. Experience teaches, however, that the first published figure is not always incontestable. The "declassified" military budget, for example, gives rise to very contradictory assessments. But, even when given this underestimation of the real scale of the military-industrial complex, it is clear that the defense sector in itself will not swamp our consumer market with long-awaited goods. It can help, above all, with science-intensive high technology, which can take antediluvian civilian production to a qualitatively new level. Specialists are unanimous that the path of conversion is not the production of primitive frying pans and irons but the expansion of so-called dual-purpose technologies which can be used for both military and civilian purposes. The range is extensive: television equipment and communications systems, aircraft, transport, medical instruments, shipbuilding, computerization...

Taking conversion into account, it is proposed to increase consumer goods production during 1991-1995 to 270 billion rubles, i.e. almost double the amount in the current five-year period. But here is the fundamental question: Will the defense complex, with its closed structures and hush-hush production, fulfill these tasks?

Is there not a profound, insoluble contradiction between the market for civilian output and the defense sector, which it is planned to entrust with producing this output? Are the large-scale plans to enrich us by means of conversion not doomed to failure for this reason?

Conversion could take two paths. The first is a kind of "quitrent" from military enterprises in the form of civilian goods. The advantage of this is that the technology of the basic production does not change. But there are more drawbacks—defense enterprises are not adapted for the mass production of civilian output, once again additional investments will go to the military-industrial complex, and the civilian sector of the economy will continue to vegetate. Academician V.S. Avduyevskiy, chairman of the Soviet National Commission to Promote Conversion, proposes transferring some enterprises in the military-industrial complex to the civilian sphere and admitting them to a free market. Despite the economic prospects of this proposal for the national economy as a whole, the military-industrial complex itself views such a turn of events without enthusiasm. I asked G.Ye. Lozino-Lozinskiy and S.P. Nepobedimyy, leaders of major defense enterprises, whether they would consent to the transfer to anyone of the conversion targets entrusted to them. Despite the fact that the civilian output which they produce is secondary to the basic production, both general designers responded with a categorical refusal. And this can be explained psychologically. Whatever arguments economists might advance, the first conversion option is closer and dearer to the military-industrial complex, for it preserves the possibility of the reverse process, reconversion. What department would voluntarily reduce its sphere of influence?

But, for the time being, administrative logic triumphs. In 1991 not a single enterprise in the defense sector will be taken from under the roof of the military-industrial complex, above all because the basic questions of reorganizing the economy have not been resolved. The question of the strategy of conversion, which K.V. Frolov, vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, believes is becoming increasingly urgent, is hanging in mid-air.

With a large-scale switch to producing civilian output, the defense sector cannot do without competition, without using market laws. Take the following illustration, for example. Yu.P. Semenov, general designer of the "Energiya" Science-and-Production Association, frequently speaks of the prospects which the vast platform put into orbit with the help of the Energiya rocket opens up for expanding the country's telephone network. To be frank, this alluring project has very authoritative critics, who propose moving toward this goal by other means. Who is right, which option is to be preferred? It could very well happen that, within the framework of the administrative command system, as has happened repeatedly before, what will be chosen is not the most economically and technically advantageous option. I believe that the market and free competition would reduce the risk of multibillion-ruble mistakes in distributing the funds allocated to conversion.

I well understand that at this moment in history talk of the fresh wind of change promised by conversion could cause annoyance. In Kaliningrad, Moscow Oblast, where the largest group of space enterprises is based, a few days ago I saw people punching each other in a really angry line for electrical goods. The majority of those standing in line seemed to be employees of space science-and-production associations, the superintendents, so to speak, of conversion...

A sad picture. It suggests this thought: Will the fate of many other of our grandiose projects not befall conversion if it is carried out within the framework of the administrative command system?

Agricultural

Goskomstat Releases 15 Oct Harvest Figures

PM1910100990 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 19 Oct 90 First Edition p 1

[N. Osychkin report under the rubric "USSR Goskomstat Reports": "Concluding Stage of the Harvesting"]

[Text] USSR Goskomstat [State Committee for Statistics] figures received at the editorial office indicate that by 15 October the harvesting of cereal crops had been practically completed in all union republics except the Russian Federation. The latter still had to thresh grain on an area of 2.4 million hectares. The sunny weather that has set in will clearly enable it to do this over the next week.

On average the country has gathered 22.1 quintals of grain per hectare. The gross grain harvest (including corn) is 228 million tonnes. State resources have received 63.6 million tonnes of grain (74 percent of the state order), and marketability is at the level of 29 percent. Moreover, in exchange for mixed feed kolkhozes and sovkhozes have delivered 10.8 million tonnes, mostly food grain.

Corn has been harvested from 1.1 million hectares and 4 million tonnes of it have been threshed. Some 1.5 million hectares of it remain to be harvested on farms in the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], Central Chernozem Oblast, the Volga region, and the North Caucasus. Sunflowers have been threshed on 2.6 million hectares—57 percent of the sown area. The yield is 17 quintals as against 16 last year. Some 4.4 million tonnes of oilseeds have been harvested. Some 1.9 million hectares remain to be harvested, mostly in areas of the Volga region and West Siberia. Mass soybean harvesting is under way on farms in the Far East.

Raw cotton purchases stand at 7,235,000 tonnes—92 percent of the plan; this is 1,167,000 tons more than by the same date last year. The Kirghiz SSR has fulfilled the plan for its sale. Long-stemmed flax has been pulled on

542,000 hectares [region not specified] and, taking into account the loss of the crop on some of the sown area, 79,000 hectares remain to be harvested. The pace of this work remains low on RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] farms, where it has been pulled on only 231,000 hectares—a little over half the sown area. Farms that are lagging behind particularly badly are those of Yaroslavl Oblast, where 53 percent of the area has not been harvested, Kaluga Oblast, where 50 percent has not been harvested, Smolensk Oblast, where the figure is 34 percent, and Pskov Oblast, where it is 29 percent. Purchases of flax fiber stand at 154,000 tonnes, or 37 percent of the state order, which is only a little over half the figure for the same date last year.

Sugar beets have been lifted on 2,067,000 hectares—63 percent of the sown area. Some 54.9 million tonnes of the root crops have been lifted. The yield per hectare is 266 quintals, as against 278 last year. Purchases stand at 48.6 million tonnes (63 percent of the state order) as against 53 million last year. There are 316 sugar refineries in operation. Some 24.4 million tonnes of beets have been refined, yielding 2,456,000 tonnes of sugar, which is at the level of last year.

Vegetables have been harvested from 725,000 hectares—70 percent of the sown area. The yield per hectare is 156 quintals. Potatoes have been lifted on 1.9 million hectares—84 percent of the sown area. Some 368,000 hectares of potatoes remain to be harvested, 256,000 of them in the RSFSR. The potato yield is 106 quintals per hectare, including 92 quintals in the RSFSR. It is important to mobilize every effort in the current favorable weather to lift and dry all the tubers and to put them on sale or lay them in for winter storage.

Work to lay the foundation for next year's harvest is continuing. Winter crops have been sown on 31.7 million hectares, which is 4.3 million fewer than by the same date last year. Fall plowing has been carried out on 57.6 million hectares—24 million fewer than in 1989.

The late "Indian summer" is summoning farmers into the fields. Every fall hour must be devoted to this year's and next year's harvest.

Sugar Shortages Blamed on Inefficient Processing

PM1910103390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Oct 90 Morning Edition p 1

[M. Petrov "Topic of the Day" article: "But It's Not Sugar..."]

[Text] No matter how hard the compilers of the optimistic "In the Country's Fields" reports try to convince us that harvests are big, we are perfectly well aware that it means absolutely nothing. A bumper grain crop is no guarantee at all that everyone will be able to buy every day as much as he wants of any type of bread. In the same way, a harvest of one-half of a tonne of potatoes per hectare does not at all mean that there will be plenty of potatoes in the stores all winter. We can still grow things. But making it into something we can eat—this, as ever, is causing a sea of problems.

Turning sugar beet into sugar is particularly fraught with problems. The sugar beet harvest began a little later than usual this year. So far 1,603,500 hectares of root crops have been harvested —one-half of the sown area. Compare this with last year, when more than 2 million hectares had been harvested by the same date. In the country as a whole, the average sugar beet yield is lower too—261 quintals per hectare compared with 268 last year. All in all, the future looks bleak, although the harvest is expected to be higher than planned in Russia's beet-growing areas.

The current sugar supply problems in some oblasts and republics of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR], according to Rospishcheprom [RSFSR Food Industry Administration] Chairman V. Shcherbak, are due to the fact that there was little left over from last year. To put it simply, there was barely enough sugar from last year to last until the new harvest. But of course, this is certainly not the cause of the disastrous situation Muscovites and residents of other cities find themselves in, unable to buy sugar even with coupons. This is just the consequence. But of what?

To say that the equipment at sugar refineries is obsolete gets us nowhere. Today's processing capacities are packed into buildings constructed 120-160 years ago. The plants, of course, have been revamped several times during that period, but not to increase productivity, rather to somehow keep them in working condition. Even what is by our standards the newest equipment (30 years old) is hopelessly inferior to the technology used elsewhere. Some types of it are not produced at all in the country. The former CEMA, which has now started talking in the new language of dollars, has difficulty understanding what we want of it.

Because of the shortage of capacities, the sugar beet processing season has increased here to 150 days. The last 50 are an extension. It is then that about 12 percent of the sugar content of beet is lost. At Russian plants alone, 350,000 tonnes of sugar are lost because of the extension of the normative period.

There is yet another reason for the introduction of coupons: The wanton and irresponsible way in which the anti-alcohol campaign was conducted. According to expert estimates, in the Ukraine alone one-third of the sugar that was meant to go on sale has quietly migrated to domestic distilleries. The problem was partly exacerbated by Cuba's refusal (as a retaliatory measure, really) to fulfill contracts to supply us with 450,000 tonnes of sugar.

The most interesting thing is that the past three years, during which we have managed to get used to coupons again, have been the most fruitful and richest in terms of the sugar production volume. The USSR, incidentally, is the clear world leader in terms of per capita sugar consumption. Might we not moderate our appetite for

desserts somewhat? Certainly we might. But it appears that the government has decided to relinquish its top place, a wretched one from the health viewpoint (one in 10 people in the country has sugar diabetes), not by the best possible means.

Strange as it may seem, the way to reduce sugar consumption is to increase production. Indeed, on the basis of the new, more effective technologies the world has long possessed. Plenty is the only basis in which a campaign can be launched for a healthy way of life. Mankind has already invented dozens of new sugar substitutes. There are the various syrups that are essential to the food industry. There are the glucose and sucrose syrups for diabetes patients. And these products do not require the sugar refinement to which we are accustomed.

All we are thinking about at the moment is new technologies. According to V. Shcherbak, it will be the end of the next five-year plan period before joint ventures are set up with the West. That is a very distant prospect. At the bulk of refineries (there are 95 in Russia and 192 in the Ukraine) nothing is going to change in the foreseeable future.

We grow enough beet to be self-sufficient in sugar. More than enough, in fact. We just have to learn to process it quickly and expertly. Against the background of this clear but extremely difficult task, today's problems with the shortage of freight cars for transportation purposes, the lack of laboratories at farms to determine the sugar content in order to avoid financial chicanery and so on and so forth seem utterly trivial.

Evidently, sugar rationing is going to remain for the moment. That is nothing to rejoice about.

Military

Baltic Fleet Commander Notes Navy Pullback

PM1910090990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Oct 90 First Edition p 2

["Mini-Interview" with Admiral V. Ivanov, commander of the Baltic Fleet; date and place not specified: "Three Questions for the Commander";]

[Text] [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] 1. As a result of the military reform what changes have there been in the life and activity of the forces in your charge?

[Ivanov] In the course of the reform we are resolving questions of improving the organizational-staff structure of the fleet, its quantitative and qualitative composition, and the balance in terms of categories of troops and combat and support forces and systems. Proceeding on the principles of defensive military doctrine and the Soviet Government's initiatives to reduce the level of confrontation at sea, we have removed from the fleet cruisers and submarines carrying ballistic missiles. We have withdrawn from active service in a number of sea areas and have reduced its scale. The rehearsal of defensive tasks has become a priority in operational and combat training.

We are preparing to switch to a two-year period of service for seamen and petty officers. A tremendous amount of work has been done in response to the increase in anti-Army sentiments and the intensification of interethnic strife within the country.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] 2. What, in your view, should be the ultimate aim of the Armed Forces reform?

[Ivanov] The ultimate aim should be to secure a status and composition for the Armed Forces and a level of combat readiness that conform with the effective level of the military threat and its future potential and takes account of the real correlation of our forces and other countries' military potential. In my view, the sociopolitical and economic aspects of the Soviet Union's current development and the contradictory nature of the military-political processes taking place in the world and in Europe must be taken into consideration without fail.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] 3. In your opinion, what are the main obstacles in the way of the profound transformations in the Army and Navy required by the times?

[Ivanov] There are many such obstacles. Above all the general destabilization of the situation and economic difficulties in the country, which constantly distract us from resolving questions of perestroyka in the Army and Navy.

Moral—and in some regions physical—pressure on the Armed Forces and deliberate efforts and attacks from all sides to discredit and destroy the Army, which is, incidentally, still the most important consolidating principle in our state system, present a major obstacle.

Increasing desertion, evasion of military service, and the disruption of the draft of young reinforcements with the blessing of the supreme soviets in a number of union republics also present an obstacle to reform.

There is an acute need for perestroyka processes in the Army to be enshrined in state legislative acts and for the social and domestic position of servicemen and their families to be improved in order to speed up reform.

I must say that servicemen are most interested in profound transformations within the framework of the military reform. But we want them to occur without hasty, ill-conceived actions prompted by transient interests and factors (as was the case with the discharge of the students) on the basis of an integrated, well thought-out, well-calculated, well-founded program that takes into consideration the main point—the maintenance of the requisite combat readiness—along with with efficient state mechanisms for social protection for servicemen, both those on active service and those discharged into the reserve.

Frolov Attends Military Air Academy Meeting

PM1910081990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 Oct 90 Second Edition p 2

[Report by N. Sautin: "Are Castles in the Air Needed?"]

[Text] At the request of the professorial and teaching staff and students of the Prof. N.Ye. Zhukovskiy Military Air Engineering Academy they had a meeting with I.T. Frolov, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and PRAVDA chief editor.

Meetings between the state and party leadership and the military are always complex: Many painful problems have accumulated in the Armed Forces and are waiting to be solved. How do things stand in this connection at the Zhukovskiy Academy?

"Over the past two years," Aviation Colonel General V. Kremlev, chief of the academy, said, "we have restructured training and scientific work so that we now train specialists to a high world standard and give them a basic engineering education. The academy has begun taking secondary school graduates again. There are five applicants for every place on a course here. Recruitment of young mathematicians has been announced for the first time—graduates of such renowned higher educational institutions as Moscow State University, Moscow Engineering Physics Institute... We are continuing to train aviation engineers for the troops on the basis of the full computerization of the training process."

The concern of the academy's scientists could be heard in the questions put to I.T. Frolov in connection with the funding of science and the crisis state of public education.

The progress of the PRAVDA subscription campaign gave rise to a debate. The increase in the newspaper's price has created difficulties for front-line soldiers and veterans of the Armed Forces. The academy's officers believe that the party's Central Committee must find means to support its own press organ.

"The development of democracy and the multiparty system," Col. B. Fomkin said, "does not mean for us a belittling of the Communist Party's role. For there is no other social force at present to take its place. The party, the overwhelming part of it, has defined its socialist choice."

"We expect," Aviation Lieutenant Gen. A. Borisov expressed his opinion, "PRAVDA to more clearly espouse and defend the positions won by the October Revolution. Only the CPSU—not in the sense of an entry in the Constitution but in real life—is the leading force today. To think otherwise is to build castles in the air. I believe that the newspaper of Soviet Communists can do a great deal to stabilize the situation in the country, to consolidate the really revolutionary forces advancing perestroyka..."

Paper on Conscripts' Mothers Opposed To Violence

PM1710110790 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 15 Oct 90 p 5

[Report by Anders Ohman: "Soviet Soldiers Die in Mysterious Suicides"]

[Text] In the last four years 15,000 conscripts have died in the Soviet Army. Suicide is given as the official cause of death in 20 percent of these cases. Bullying, ill-treatment, and ethnic divisions are suspected of being behind several of the suicides.

The mothers of the dead soldiers have organized themselves into a group to unmask and fight against the increasing violence in the Red Army.

An upsetting document about the unsatisfactory situation in the Army is published in the latest number of FORSVARSTJANSTEMANNEN, which is a Swedish professional journal for civil servants working in the field of defense.

The article is by Russian journalist Olga Maslennikova. She has interviewed mothers who have lost their sons in the Soviet Army.

"The air was full of concern and sorrow. 'How are we to go on living,' was the question in their eyes when they told of their deeply tragic fates," the reporter writes about her meeting with the grieving mothers.

Natalya Sheludyakova, chairman of the organization, reports that 15,000 boys have lost their lives over the four years—at a time when there has been relative peace. The figure for those who have died is greater than the losses during the Afghanistan war.

There are several distressing cases. A son was delivered in a coffin to one mother with the message from the authorities that he had hanged himself. When she opened the coffin she saw that he had been badly abused.

One mother, Inna Blinnova, spoke about her son, Aleksandr, drafted for military service in December 1989. In May he was stationed near the border with Finland. One day before he died he wrote a cheerful letter to his mother.

June 4 was the official day of his death—"death by hanging" according to the death certificate.

"My son was very upset that soldiers and people of his own age were being killed in Azerbaijan. He did not want to be sent to such a place to repress democratic movements in the country," Inna Blinnova said. Her son described his views in his letter home.

The mothers succeeded in halting a troop transport to Azerbaijan by persuading the soldiers to get off the train at the railroad station. Later army generals promised not to send Muscovites to the conflict zone in Azerbaijan.

Two other mothers, Elvira Bushinskaya and Tamara Kotova, sought out their conscript sons who, it is alleged, had been subjected to mental and physical abuse.

It emerged that in just over a month 7 out of 15 boys had been forced to break off their training and were now at hospitals and clinics for the mentally ill.

The Soviet Army has around four million soldiers, and the majority of able-bodied young men are drafted. A new element is violence between ethnic groups within Soviet society which is reflected in the Army.

The parents of soldiers who have died are now appealing to the Soviet Defense Ministry and the General Staff to put a stop to the violence and punish the guilty.

Weimar Military Tribunal Sentences Deserter

PM1710100490 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 13 Oct 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Deserter Sentenced"]

[Text] Berlin, 12 Oct—The three-day trial of the Soviet deserter soldier O. Luchak ended today in Weimar. He received a one-year suspended sentence from a military tribunal for being absent without leave from his military unit and for theft. In the event of further violations of the law he risks two years' imprisonment.

In the opinion of Soviet civil attorney O. Lyamin, who defended the accused, the court returned such a lenient verdict only under the pressure of public opinion. Pickets from the local population kept up a constant vigil in front of the building where the hearings were held.

Baltic Republics

Nordic Council Desires Relations With Baltics

LD1810215790 Moscow TASS in English 2140 GMT 18 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondent Valeriy Zaytsev]

[Text] Riga October 19 TASS—"The Nordic Council wishes to establish parliamentary, cultural and economic relations with the Baltic republics," Pal Petersson, head of this international organisation, told a news conference here on Thursday.

The delegation of this inter-parliamentary body of all Nordic countries is visiting the USSR at the invitation of the Soviet parliament.

Legislators had a meeting with president of the Latvian parliament Anatolijs Gorbunovs. Describing the situation in the Baltic republics, he noted that "the legal problem of the Baltic states is an international issue. "This issue can be successfully resolved if conditions connected, above all, with Moscow are fulfilled," he added.

On Thursday evening the delegation departed for Talinn where it plans to hold a joint meeting of the Baltic Council which includes representatives of the three Baltic states and the Nordic Council.

Savisaar Holds News Conference on U.S. Visit

LD1810134590 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 1800 GMT 17 Oct 90

[Excerpts] [Announcer] Republican government leader Edgar Savisaar met correspondents on his return in Estonia from the United States. Ain Saarna has brought fresh material from this meeting to the Paevakaja [program name].

[Saarna] At seven in the evening the meeting of Edgar Savisaar and [Estonian Foreign Minister] Lennart Meri with journalists began on Toompea [in Tallinn] with the subject—as one would guess—being the week-long stay of the prime minister and the three-weeks-long stay of the foreign minister in the United States. At the moment, with the meeting still in progress I can say the following.

Edgar Savisaar emphasized again that the meeting with President Bush was not at all an audience but a serious working meeting in the course of which the President also took notes. The whole U.S. top political team was participating. If time was found for 50 minutes during a domestic budget crisis and the Kuwait crisis, this demonstrates vividly that Washington's interest in the Baltics has increased considerably.

Edgar Savisaar thought that the meeting next in importance after the meeting with the President was the meeting at the World Bank. Problems of our recent price rise and compensations were examined. [passage omitted]

Foreign Minister Lennart Meri said that he recently met Secretary of State James Baker three times, and that the meetings were each time [word indistinct]. He thought that he had managed to explain [to Baker] what constituted our transition period, and that an understanding of the process provides ground for further cooperation.

Now briefly some answers to questions:

[Correspondent] First, at whose invitation was government leader Edgar Savisaar in the United States?

[Savisaar] At the invitation of the Estonian-American Chamber of Commerce.

[Correspondent] Why was Arnold Ruutel, chairman ofthe Supreme Soviet not in the U.S.?

[Savisaar] I do not consider it right that under the present domestic political situation both the chairman of the Supreme Soviet and the government leader should be away from the republic simultaneously. Greetings of Arnold Ruutel, however, were passed on to President Bush, and the greetings were also accepted. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] Can one say that at the meeting the conversation went along general lines, without our side making any specific proposals?

[Savisaar] At meetings at this kind of level one should indeed talk about more general issues because agreements of a more detailed nature will be left to other levels. [passage omitted]

TASS Not Invited

LD1810133690 Moscow TASS in English 1146 GMT 18 Oct 90

[Report by TASS correspondent Albert Maloveryan]

[Text] Tallinn October 18 TASS—Estonian Prime Minister Edgar Savisaar said the main outcome of his U.S. visit and meetings with President Bush was the possibility of "greater American involvement in settling the 'Baltic Issue'."

Speaking on Estonian Television on Wednesday night, Savisaar said that representatives of the U.S. State Department are expected to arrive in Estonia in November to consider purely technical issues of relevant consultations.

Savisaar noted the favourable evaluation by international banking experts of the Estonian programme for economic reform.

He said the response held out promise of favourable credits and loans.

Unfortunately, a TASS correspondent could not attend Savisaar's news conference. Asked by the correspondent about its venue and time, government spokesman Juhan Hindov replied: "I don't advise you to try and get there because the prime minister has the right to choose who to meet."

Hindov explained this strange attitude towards a representative of the media by the fact that the premier is not dutybound to hold meetings against his wish.

Estonian Legislature Discusses Presidency

LD1810164290 Moscow TASS in English 1438 GMT 18 Oct 90

[Report by TASS correspondent Albert Maloveryan]

[Text] Tallinn October 18 TASS—An executive presidency can be set up in Estonia, parliament deputies concluded after familiarising themselves with the bill to terminate the powers of the Presidium of the Estonian Supreme Soviet and transferring its legislative functions to parliament chairman Arnold Ryuytel.

According to one bill co-author, Tiin Anton, the Presidium as a collective leadership must be replaced by a single head of state, namely the chairman of the supreme legislature.

The bill is necessary because of the unwieldy Presidium, which was formed on false assumptions, contends Chairman of Christian Democrats Illar Hallaste. The Presidium is comprised of the speaker, his deputies and chairs of all permanent commissions in the Supreme Soviet. The majority principle has enabled the largest facation in the parliament—the Popular Front—to put the maximum of "its people" into the leadership of the Supreme Soviet. This prevented the Presidium from developing its work on the basis of a constructive dialogue with representatives of other political movements and parties.

Acknowledging the need to reform the Presidium, some deputies expressed apprehensions about extending the powers of the parliament chairman, fearing a possible mini-dictatorship—especially, if current chairman Arnold Ryuytel is replaced by another, more ambitious man.

These apprehensions, some parliament members believe, are not groundless because many view the proposed reform as a bridgehead enabling a new man [word indistinct] whose identity has not been revealed, to occupy Estonia's highest state post.

Narva Rally Protests Estonian Economic Border

PM1910105190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 16 Oct 90 Union Edition p 2

[Dispatch by Leonid Levitskiy under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Rally on the Border"]

[Text] Tallinn—In Narva, a city situated where Estonia and Russia meet, a rally was held in protest against the republic government's intention to set up an economic border.

Representatives of Leningrad Oblast and Estonian cities took part in the rally. The placards which people took out into Peter's Square reflected the pain and alarm being experienced today. "Internal Borders Mean the Internal Division of the USSR"; "Instead of the Berlin Wall—the Narva Wall."

The cities of North East Kohtla-Jarve, Narva, and Sillamae have established close ties with Leningrad Oblast's Ivangorod, Kingisepp, and Slantsy, and formed a single socioeconomic region; and now people want to dissect it alive, to dissect human relations and destinies....

The border towns in both republics disagree with the establishment of borders. A joint session of the city soviets of Ivangorod, Kingisepp, Slantsy, Kohtla-Jarve, and Sillamae was held a few days ago in Narva. The declaration that was adopted—only four persons voted against it—declares that a single economic region has been set up that guarantees the interests of all the people living in it. Deputies also declared as impermissible the formation of borders; the introduction of territorial administrative changes; and the signing of interstate agreements between the USSR, the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], and Estonia without the participation of regional and local soviet deputies from these cities.

The rally in Narva was held in support of this declaration.

The republic government and Supreme Soviet are in an uncompromising mood—there will be an economic border. In a statement given on radio, Prime Minister E. Savisaar stressed yet again that only an economic border would defend Estonia's internal market. In his words, at the present time almost 200 million rubles worth of goods are exported uncontrolled. The head of government declared that those who oppose the border are opposed to Estonia too. Their main aim is to have the republic blockaded.

Military Official Says Latvia Parade To Be Held

PM1910100690 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Oct 90 First Edition p 1

[Dispatch from Riga by Colonel M. Ziyeminsh: "Military Parade Will Take Place"]

[Text] Twice in recent days there have been heated debates in the Latvian legislature on the question of the 7 November military parade in Riga. The outcome was a statement expressing the attitude of the majority of deputies toward the upcoming military parade.

Earlier as you know, a law was adopted whereby 7 November is deleted from the list of holidays. It is now

deemed to be an ordinary working day, and failure to report for work on that day is regarded as a violation of labor legislation with all the ensuing material consequences.

Now deputies deemed it necessary to "clarify" their position with regard to the military parade scheduled by decree of the USSR president. A parade of USSR troops, the statement says, is contrary to Latvia's sovereignty, destabilizes the sociopolitical situation in the republic, and "provides confirmation for the peoples of the whole world that Latvia is still annexed."

I called Lieutenant General F. Melnichuk, first deputy commander of the Baltic Military District, and inquired how he views the statement adopted by the republic Supreme Soviet.

"The military parade will take place in Riga. Systematic training is now in progress. The USSR president's decree will be fulfilled"—that was his reply.

Latvian Party Central Committee Plenum Reported

PM1910075790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Oct 90 Second Edition p 2

[Dispatch by O. Meshkov under the "Official" rubric: "Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Plenum"]

[Text] Riga—Participants in the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee plenum examined the question "On the Latvian Communist Party's Tasks in Connection With the Decisions of the CPSU Central Committee October (1990) Plenum." A. Rubiks, leader of the republic party organization and member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, gave a report. He noted among other things that the resolution adopted by the CPSU Central Committee plenum clearly says that, during the transition to market relations, the party will aim to give priority to collective forms of ownership and will oppose the sale of land for private ownership.

The majority of speakers spoke about their dissatisfaction with the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee October plenum and of the center's indecisiveness and inconsistency in resolving problems of interethnic relations and in opposing attacks on the party.

Prunskiene Views Meetings With Swedish Officials

LD1810165390 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1000 GMT 18 Oct 90

[Text] [Announcer] The following are some remarks made by Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene concerning her meetings [in Sweden], in an interview with Radio Free Europe.

[Begin Prunskiene recording] In a most general sense, these constitute yet another step in strengthening Lithuania's relations with other countries. The Scandanavian states have special interest for us because they are our neighbors to the north, and of course Sweden, which previously held a not totally defined position, is expressing its goodwill more and more clearly, and this invitation constitutes the first official invitation by the prime minister of another state—a Western state.

To give concrete expression to the question, an information or interests bureau should be established in the same way as is being done in Czechoslovakia, France, and other states. In addition to [words indistinct] yes, we on our part would like to discuss the sale of certain construction materials; we are interested in [word indistinct] with agricultural development with [word indistinct] supply questions. In general, the proposal [word indistinct] zone is very wide, as to what we could sell or in what area we could invite Swedish cooperation, even including oil exploitation within Lithuanian territory—discussion of which has also been started—and ending with an entire series of lesser subjects. [end recording]

[Announcer] In that same interview, when asked about the preparations for negotiations with the Soviet Union the prime minister said the negotiations should start around the middle of November, and they should begin with major matters—the clarification of ownership relations.

The second consultative delegation meeting for which the prime minister will set out directly from Stockholm will take place on 20 October.

Talks With Carlsson Assessed

LD1810212290 Vilnius Domestic Service in Russian 2020 GMT 18 Oct 90

[Text] Kazimiera Prunskiene, the prime minister of the Republic of Lithuania, concluded her visit to Sweden today. At a joint news conference with Ingvar Carlsson, the head of the Swedish Government, she stated that she held in high esteem Sweden's initiative, which became the first Scandinavian country supporting the request of the Baltic republics to grant them the status of observers at the summit meeting on 13 November in Paris. However she noted that Lithuania would prefer to take part in the conference as a full member. The Lithuanian prime minister today met representatives of business circles and her compatriots.

Ozolas Outlines Procedure for Talks With USSR

PM1910102490 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Oct 90 Union Edition p 3

[Report by correspondent Nikolay Lashkevich under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Lithuania: Talks Stance"]

[Text] Vilnius—The second consultative meeting between Lithuanian and USSR state delegations on talks is to take place 20 October.

This was announced by republican vice premier R. Ozolas, leader of the Lithuanian and USSR joint working group.

The procedure for conducting the talks and the basic set of questions for discussion were determined. R. Ozolas said that the sides had agreed to set up 10 joint experts' groups on questions of ownership; economic and trade links; financial system and banks; transport links and energy; civil rights and freedoms; social security guarantees; humanitarian sciences and culture; army and defense (provisional name); state and border protection arrangements; political, legal, and organizational relationships; and also on preparation of draft documents on the relationship between Lithuania and the USSR.

The experts' groups are to prepare proposals which will be discussed by the official delegations. R. Ozolas expressed the hope that all current problems will be resolved this year, while next year it will be possible to "discuss and sign a document on recognition of Lithuanian independence." The primary themes at the upcoming consultative meeting on Saturday will be the army and borders.

According to the Lithuanian vice premier, Lithuania will insist that the USSR "release" it not as a republic that was not bound to sign the Union Treaty, but as a state that has suffered occupation. The Lithuanian state delegation's goal at the talks is "recognition of freedom."

Lithuania, USSR Lay Groundwork for Talks

LD1810163790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1530 GMT 18 Oct 90

[Text] Moscow, 18 Oct (TASS)—Today in the Soviet capital sesions started of groups of experts for drafting the proposals that will be discussed at the forthcoming routine consultative meeting of the official delegations of Lithuania and the USSR.

As has already been reported, during the previous consultative meeting of the two delegations on 2 October, a working group was set up to do the ground work for the negotiations between Vilnius and Moscow. It was headed by Vitaliy Doguzhiyev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and Romualdas Ozolas, deputy prime minister of Lithuania. The sides agreed last week on the formation of 10 joint groups of experts.

As Romualdas Ozolas reported to a TASS correspondent, today the experts were discussing issues relating to the Army, the visa and customs procedures, and economic ties. The meetings will continue tomorrow.

Having pointed out that it was too early to talk of results achieved at the sessions, Ozolas noted that the "groups had done useful work today".

The next meeting of the official delegations of Lithuania and the Soviet Union is planned for 20 October.

Lithuanian Crime Wave Due to Political Instability

PM1910111390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Oct 90 Second Edition p 1

[Interview with Militia Colonel Pavel Sergeyevich Berezutskiy, deputy chief of the Lithuanian MVD Criminal Investigation Directorate, by PRAVDA correspondent Yu. Stroganov; date of interview not given: "Are There Weapons Dumps in Lithuania?"—first three paragraphs are introduction]

[Text] Vilnius—"The reason for the rapid increase in crime in Lithuania is the unstable political situation and the failure to resolve socioeconomic questions," believes Militia Colonel P. Berezutskiy, deputy chief of the republic's MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Criminal Investigation Directorate. In his "specialism" alone the number of crimes has risen by a third in comparison with the same period last year.

Violence today is a sword of Damocles over society. Many people in Lithuania are also frightened by the rumors that secret arms caches have been set up here for "savanoriai" detachments—volunteers guarding certain facilities and subordinate to the republic's parliament alone—along with subunits of the revived "League of Riflemen."

It may be that fear is making mountains out of molehills. But the rumors persist; so what is the truth?

[Berezutskiy] We have no information about secret weapons caches. However, as regards the fight against crime, all internal affairs departments have been ordered to check out weapons security at dumps, bases, and shooting ranges. Steps are to be taken in those places with inadequate security.

[Stroganov] Have there been cases of weapon thefts in the republic?

[Berezutskiy] Not very many. In Kaunasskiy Rayon, for instance, a few air rifles were stolen from a shooting range. A search is under way. In Vilnius a railcar was discovered at the railroad station with hunting rifles on board, and ten had been stolen.

[Stroganov] How often do offenders use weapons?

[Berezutskiy] Crimes of that kind are very rare. On the whole crimes are being committed as before, only more impudently: Masked bandits go into buildings and massacre people. Although it must of course be noted that criminal's equipment is evolving, "modernizing." There has been a marked increase in the number of serious crimes, homicides, and assaults over the last few months of this year in comparison with the same period last year. The number of thefts in particular has soared.

[Stroganov] Is the increase in crime not like a snowball, and will it be possible to stop it?

[Berezutskiy] We are doing everything we can to combat it effectively. Our staffers are constantly on cases. We

have as yet failed to clear up the number of homicides as we did in the same period last year. But the number of homicides has increased appreciably today. We are working with the same forces....

VLIKAS Wants Baltic Issue on Paris CSCE Agenda

LD1810110190 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0900 GMT 18 Oct 90

[Text] Prior to the commencement of the 19-21 Nov CSCE conference in Paris, VLIKAS [Supreme Committee For the Liberation of Lithuania] chairman Kazys Bobelis has made an appeal on behalf of its administration to the President Bush and also to Secretary of State Baker.

The statement emphasizes that, following the unification of Germany, the occupation of the Baltic States and their illegal annexation currently remain among the last consequences of World War II and of the universally-condemned Stalin-Hitler plot.

Leaders of the emigre organization ask the United States administration to officially include the Baltic States' question into the Paris Conference agenda so as to bring about participation, as full delegates, of the representatives of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

Attention is called to the fact that according to international law, an equal parallel exists between the annexation of Kuwait and that of the Baltic Republics, and therefore their nations must be defended equally.

RSFSR

Yavlinskiy Announces Resignation 17 October

LD1810125790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1935 GMT 17 Oct 90

[Remarks by Grigoriy Alekseyevich Yavlinskiy, Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] deputy prime minister, at the RSFSR Supreme Soviet session in Moscow on 17 October—recorded]

[Text] The first thing that needs to be said is something which you evidently already know: that the program for a transition to market, as an interlinked set of measures to get out of the crisis within one and a half years, or 500 days, and which had your support, cannot be implemented. In my view this happened not because the program does not work, not because it contains mistakes, but because to date the conditions for implementing the program are lacking. I should like to dwell briefly on and explain the professional points of view on what is the matter here.

The program was approved as a Union program. The need for just such a concept was dictated by a desire to take into account historical traditions, centuries of experience, objective economic laws, and to avoid the extraordinarily severe social consequences of any isolation. The expectation of agreement between the republics on a united economic policy for emerging from the crisis exceeded all reasonable timetables. Confidence in the center's ability to adopt and implement such a decision is being lost. Worst of all, frictions have arisen between the republics and threaten to grow into conflicts. The mutual understanding which really was achieved in August is disappearing. The conclusion of an economic union which should and could have taken place not later than 1 October was for various political considerations put on the back burner and is not being adopted. This decision was dictated not only and not even so much by political considerations as primarily by objective economic reasons. The inertia of disintegrating processes corrupting the economy is very high. They are accumulating and multiplying and are leading to a qualitative deterioration of the situation. The program contained special mechanisms which would have made it possible to cut short these destructive spirals of a deteriorating situation. But in 50 days—and this is half of the first stage of the reform—nothing was done.

Political conditions: An economic reform of such depth and scale could be implemented only given the conditions of sufficiently strong rule and support from the people. This could have been secured by a close political alliance of Gorbachev and Yeltsin. In my view only this, plus mutual understanding with the first leaders of other republics, would have made it possible to rapidly implement the major measures for financial stability which in principle not a single republic could carry out on its own.

This step has already been taken in practice. It was supported by the public and understood by the republics. The overwhelming majority of leaders in the republics supported the program. Certain republics even adopted the program in their Supreme Soviets. Of late this absolutely indispensable construct has started to vacillate and is no longer a reliable basis upon which one can confidently rely in such serious work.

Organizational conditions: radical changes in the organizational structure of running the economy and setting up an inter-republican economic committee enjoying the confidence of all republics making up the economic union should have been an absolute condition for the implementation of such a program. Redistributing economic authority and powers from the center to the republics, allocating real possibilities for reorganizing industry in the broad sense, and for the republics to take charge of their own economies, would undoubtedly make the national economy as a whole more manageable. The interrepublican economic committee should concentrate the basis of its activities on dealing with actual interrepublican economic tasks, mainly stabilizing the financial situation.

Finally there was an absolute need for cadres in the renewal of the highest economic echelon of power in the country on the basis of competence, professionalism, and personal probity. To get the program started, seven

to ten people were sufficient for the key economic posts. None of this was done. A new think-tank was necessary for carrying through the reforms. But as before, we were left with just the center. In these conditions it would be naive to put into practice an economic policy enjoying the confidence of the republics and at the same time to hope that some kind of logic other than that already enshrined in the government program would come into being.

Now what may be the most important thing: economic conditions. The program was based on the fact that we are on the brink of inflation and a crisis in our financial systems. The main feature of it was using all possible means, both state means and those of specialized economic machinery tried and tested throughout the world, to stabilize the financial situation and thus to prevent hyper-inflation, the further severance of economic ties, a drop in the standard of living, and production grinding to a halt.

In principle, this highly dangerous line was inherent in the raising of grain prices in July this year and in the fact that the subsequent administrative increase in wholesale, procurement, and retail compensation prices was announced for seven months. Ideologically this is the concept formulated by the program put forward by the USSR government. This was one of the most important subjects for discussion between our working party and representatives of the Union government. I think I am convinced that the inflation spiral could have been broken. Under no conditions should we have administrative price hikes—we should steadily make the ruble stronger, limit the money supply and gradually free prices, but not for everything. We should leave at their current levels prices for the goods which are most important to the people. A considerable proportion of the program is dedicated to how to do this. However, a most sensitive blow was struck in precisely this area. The Russian government without warning raised procurement prices for meat by a very great deal. This led to a knee-jerk reaction by the USSR Coucil Ministers which adopted the corresponding decision on a countrywide scale. Just how deep this process has gone is shown by... I know that in workers' canteens in the Urals if there were no subsidies a meal would cost R2.52.

Another most important element in the program of the USSR government has been implemented in practice in the decree of 4 October on wholesale prices. In other words, the program which was proposed by the government of the USSR is virtually being implemented. Only the administrative raising of prices remains, but this is now inevitable in one form or another. Consequently one can no longer promise people stable prices at today's level, one cannot promise that the standard of living that has come into being will be maintained, and one cannot hope for a strengthening of the ruble in the immediate future.

In this situation the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR has approved the pensions law in its first reading, having promised our old folk something which in my view cannot be fulfilled: while from 1 October, despite all the arguments, the Union law on pensions began to be implemented. All of this has created an economic situation which objectively was bound to arise out of the logic of the government program.

What should now be done? I will dwell only upon the most general issues in so far as time needs to be set aside and special work needs to be done in order to set out what needs to be done item by item.

The first thing I would like to say about this is to formulate a thesis in categoric terms. During a period of economic crisis and when there is the danger of a depression starting, politicians must not disturb the exclusively professional running of things by exerting their own pressure and especially by interfering. When there is an upsurge, when the resources are there, when there is a cake, then the politicians can and evidently must take part in sharing it out. But when there is none of this in existence and when there is nothing to divide up, then they must only help the professionals to do their work.

Second, the need to correlate real economic power in the republic to the tasks that we set ourselves must be recognized honestly and frankly. Today the possibilities of the government of the RSFSR are not only no greater then they used to be before the adoption of sovereignty, but they are smaller—smaller because in accordance with our abominable tradition a large number of issues were resolved through friendship, by a telephone call, by God knows what other methods. Now, happily, these links have collpased, but now one cannot do as much. This is a reality. And it also has to be said that far from everything is as it should be as regards our own competence: the possibilities are extremely limited until—as was envisaged in our program—the most important economic powers are redistributed and placed under the direct jurisdiction of the republican government politically and in real terms, and not just on paper, and adopted moreover unilaterally. This has to be the starting point in our work in implementing the declaration on sovereignty. All possibilities must be used for resolving this issue. In my view the most important of them is the cadres policy of Russia in the central economic bodies. I would like to stress particularly that one should also include among the priorities work to develop mutual understanding with the republics and to establish serious, fundamental, and certainly advantageous political, economic, and cultural links with them.

Third, it is worth looking into this very honestly and worth saying openly that there is an economic slump and it is possible that it will worsen.

Social tension could reach a high level. It is necessary to take this into account and to create a system, a special system for the social protection of the population from high inflation. The elements of this are well-known. First and foremost there is the assessment of the movement of

retail prices, a system of indexing incomes and a form of allocation in terms of goods. In my view it is clear that it is already necessary to think about preparing for serious financial reforms. They could be very painful for many sections of the population and not equally fair for everyone, but it seems that events will develop in such a way that this, for professional reasons, will be unavoidable. If this is the case then it is vital to make preparations because reforms of this kind are not made quickly. On the whole, these are the global issues.

It is no less vital to quickly and competently get on with routine business; the balance of fuel, metal, and transport; the minimal amounts needed of foodstuffs and medicines and the state of trade, crime, and many other things. Preparing reforms should not occupy everyone all of the time. All of these specific matters, to a large extent, fall within the competence of the RSFSR government. People can tolerate a lot, but when it comes to their everyday lives what depends on the new Russian authorities must be done well or people will not forgive that.

Why did I come to talk to you about this? I came to the Russian Council of Ministers three months ago with the 400 days outline for economic reform which had been drawn up by myself and some of my closest comrades. A program was created in a month and a half on the basis of this. Many scientists, representatives of a number of workers' movements, leaders of enterprises here at a conference, foreign experts, the chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, the president, and finally the RSFSR Supreme Soviet [no verb as heard]. However there then followed endless discussions of the USSR supreme Soviet. Various mergers and separations of programs took place. Over this month and a half, to all intents and purposes the implementation of the draft program of the USSR government without prior arrangement has all but occurred. I do not agree with it. But fulfilment of the program for transition to the market is in actual fact impossible in the form it was drawn up for economic considerations. As a course, as a main route to the transition to a market economy the program will work. But entry into the market in this case will not be through stabilization but through mounting inflation. Everything that this program and I personally promised you in terms of living standards in the near future cannot be fulfilled now, even though the program has not yet started.

It is important to say what follows. These circumstances, the undermining of the program and the difficulties in store for us should in no way provide grounds for panic. Many countries, as is very well known, have endured such situations more than once in their history and they all found a dignified, calm way out of this situation—the necessary one. This can just as well be applied to our country too, one of the wealthiest countries in the world. We must demonstrate calmness, determination, and professionalism to get out of what really is a crisis situation.

As I regard myself as one of the program's main authors, which even though it was adopted cannot be implemented, including as a result of decisions taken by the government of which I am a member, I request the RSFSR Supreme Soviet to accept my resignation. Thank you for your attention.

Yavlinskiy Interviewed

PM1910075590 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 18 Oct 90 p 1

[Interview with Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, deputy chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, by D. Sabov and S. Sokolov on 17 October; place of interview not given; first paragraph is introduction: "'It Is Not the End of the World!'"]

[Text] In the Russian legislature yesterday Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, deputy chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers, tendered his resignation.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Like it or not, your resignation [otstavka] request is being interpreted as the withdrawal [otstavka] of the 500 days program. Why did you take this step?

[Yavlinskiy] Because the conditions for the realization of our program no longer exist. It is impossible to devise a program which will be correct for any given moment and which can be started from any given Monday. The countdown of the 500 days could have begun from 1 September or 1 October. Today it is already too late; today the Union government's program is being implemented without ratification. I cannot keep my promises—not to raise retail prices on basic necessities, not to lower living standards, to stabilize the ruble and increase its purchasing power. Alas, in the first 50 days measures that are too destabilizing have been adopted by both parliaments—by both the Union and the Russian legislatures....

But this is not the end of the world. It is simply that, as a professional I realize that from now on other programs are needed. New programs.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Academician Shatalin is co-author with you on the 500 days program. Does he support your decision?

[Yavlinskiy] He understands it.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Two days ago Boris Yeltsin formulated three possible options for the development of the situation in Russia if your program were to be thrown out at the Union level. Which of them is the most realistic?

[Yavlinskiy] From my point of view, the first option—in which Russia declares that it will not participate in the implementation of the president's program, introduces its own currency and its own customs service, and shares out property—is impossible. And generally speaking, I

would advise no one to take this path. The 500 days is a Union program; it cannot be implemented in one republic only, in Russia or the Ukraine for example. But the two other options—a Gorbachev-Yeltsin coalition government, and the operation of Union laws only after they have been ratified by the RSFSR parliament—are not mutually exclusive. The best that can be hoped for is the formation of a coalition. But if this does not happen, Russia will have plenty to do in a period of rapid alternation of economic projects: defending the population from inflation, implementing housing and land reform, and taking the economy out of the hands of the state.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] A vote on your resignation has been deferred. But judging by the first reaction, they do not want to let you go....

[Yavlinskiy] I will ask to resign all the same. I think that the deputies will understand that it will be better if in about six months my colleagues and I can propose a new plan to stabilize the economy on the basis of the new realities.

Silayev, Kozyrev Meet With Poland's Skubiszewski

PM1810135990 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 13 Oct 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Visit Continues"]

[Text] News about Russian sovereignty has aroused great interest in Poland, Foreign Minister K. Skubiszewski said in the course of a conversation at the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers 12 October. He met with I.S. Silayev, the head of the Russian Government, and also had a conversation with his deputy, N.G. Malyshev. The transformations taking place in Russia open up broad prospects in Poland's relations with the largest Soviet republic, the guest added.

The head of the Polish state's foreign policy department stressed that it is necessary to enrich this budding cooperation through practice, developing relations in all spheres. Russia, he noted, is a Baltic state, and with the RSFSR's emergence onto the broad international arena opportunities for developing cooperation in the Baltic region will grow. The minister expressed confidence that contacts between Poland and the RSFSR will develop especially actively in the economic, trade, and cultural spheres. In particular, Russia can open its own cultural center in Warsaw at any time, he said.

The representatives of the RSFSR Government expressed their conviction that Russia and Poland must continue to live in harmony and friendship.

At a news conference held in the evening at the Republic of Poland Embassy, K. Skubiszewski, answering questions from journalists, expressed satisfaction with the content of the conversations and talks which he had had with Soviet officials and the atmosphere in which they took place.

On the same day a conversation was held between RSFSR Foreign Minister A.V. Kozyrev and K. Skubiszewski.

The Polish minister met with teachers and students of the USSR Foreign Ministry Diplomatic Academy.

Kozyrev Holds First News Conference

LD1810160790 Moscow TASS in English 1537 GMT 18 Oct 90

[Report by TASS correspondents Lev Aksenov and Boris Zverev]

[Text] "Positive processes in the world stand to gain if Russia, like other Soviet republics, becomes truly sovereign and redefines its bilateral relations within a renewed Union," 39-year- old Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev told correspondents here today. He was speaking at his first news conference as the biggest Soviet republic's foreign minister, the post the Russian parliament confirmed him in a week ago.

Responding to a question from TASS, Kozyrev said that many aspects of Russian diplomatic activity will be dealt with after the signing of the new Union treaty that is to define which functions will be relegated to the centre and which will be controlled exclusively by republics.

He stressed that in pursuing a foreign policy, one primarily needs a clear understanding of people's needs.

The minister favoured comprehensive development of traditional ties between Russia and neighbouring states with the aim of bringing them into line with natural interests and potentials.

Setting out the Russian Foreign Ministry's stance on the Gulf crisis, Kozyrev said that the time was "not opportune for intervening in this process as complex diplomatic contacts are being carried out and the process is already following a certain vein".

"We have no intention to hamper this process," he stressed.

The minister said that there was an urgent need to study what caused the conflict and draw important political lessons as to whom we view as our friends.

"We will probably have to define with greater precision our attitude towards certain regimes," he said.

Asked about the probable line-up for talks with Japan on the Kuril islands, Kozyrev said that no decision on the issue could be taken without the Russian Federation having its say on the matter." [quotation marks as received]

RSFSR Agriculture Ministry Discusses 'Problems'

LD1810223290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 18 Oct 90

[Report by commentator Semen Astakhov]

[Text] Issues of vital importance were discussed today at a meeting held at the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Ministry of Agriculture and Foodstuffs. Commentator Semen Astakhov is in the studio:

[Astakhov] Officially today's agenda was as follows: Results of the ministry's work for the first nine months; forming a plan for the development of the agro-industrial complex for 1991; and the transition of the agricultural-industrial complex to market relations. So there are a lot of problems, but I will stop only on some of them: it was said that frost would be expected everywhere in the next few days, and that the Urals and the Tyumen Oblast are already under snow. Therefore the harvest on the remaining fields should be finished before the cold sets in. This includes grain crops and oil-producing crops, groats, and feedstuffs.

A good deal of time was devoted to the wintering of cattle, especially to the work of farm feed stuffs shops, because the productivity of farm branches and poultry farms to a great degree depend on the work of such shops.

The whole complex of peasant's problems includes also the preparations for next year's harvest. It is already clear that next spring will be a busy one because winter crops have not all been sown, not much of the fall plowland has been plowed, and the situation concerning seed is bad. The peasant is looking far into the future, whereas we urban dwellers have today's problems to solve: Mostly how to cope with shortages.

These issues were questioned at the Ministry of Agriculture, including even the issues of tobacco, vodka, and soap. According to Yuliya Nikolayevna Besedina, deputy chairman of the Belgorod Agriculture Industry Union, it appears that shortages are often created artificially.

[Besedina] Sugar refineries are working well today. More than 110,000 tons of sugar has been produced already. Compared with the same period of the previous year, this means a rise of 15 percent. Many of our sugar refineries are now forced to store sacks of sugar in the open because there is no railroad transport available.

[Astakhov] What if it starts raining?

[Besedina] If it starts raining then you know what will happen with the sugar. If freight cars are available there will be no problem with loading them with sugar. We have got sugar. What we need are freight cars. The canning industry also suffers from the lack of transportation. Three million standard cans for preserved food—to be precise, glass jars—are stored in the open. If there is just a spell of frost, say minus five, you can imagine what will happen.

[Astakhov] The glass will break.

[Besedina] Yes, because of the lack of freight cars. There is no discipline of supply. This is what you may call artifically created shortage. As for the situation with sugar, it is scandalous. This is, one may say, a product of basic necessity. The person not delivering freight cars should be given no sugar coupons for about 18 months. Then he will understand the situation.

Russian Legislator Examines Ownership Changes

PM1810111990 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 11 Oct 90 p 1

[Interview with S.M. Shakhray, RSFSR Supreme Soviet member and Legislative Committee committee, by G. Votinova; place and date not given; under the heading "Will Foreigners Buy Up Our Land?"—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] The RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet is preparing to discuss the draft law on ownership on its second reading. We talked to S.M. Shakhray, member of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and chairman of the Legislation Committee.

[Votinova] Sergey Mikhaylovich, is this law fundamentally different from the Union law on the same subject?

[Shakhray] There are some differences—major differences. But they should not be interpreted as confrontation between Russia and the Union. First, because the Russian law builds on its Union equivalent and takes it to its logical conclusion. It provides for the implementation of ideas that have not been realized by the center because of resistance by conservative forces on "ideological grounds." Second, virtually the same group of people compiled and elaborated both laws. They are top specialists on ownership matters.

[Votinova] Which form of ownership—state, public, collective, joint-stock, private—does the draft law favor?

[Shakhray] Unlike the Union law, which simply makes a verbal declaration of these forms of ownership, our draft law is based on two of them: state and private ownership. All the remaining forms—collective, cooperative, joint-stock, and so forth—follow on from private ownership. In other words, any form of collective ownership must contain an element of private ownership.

[Votinova] But will private ownership get lost in collective ownership? Does the draft law provide a mechanism for its protection?

[Shakhray] I do not think we will see a repetition of such an absurdity as total, all-state ownership. The principle of voluntary association is a guarantee of this. For example, if I were to contribute to collective ownership I

would definitely sign a contract stipulating my terms, including legal protection for my interests.

[Votinova] We have finally started talking out loud about the individual interests of each person and "disreputable" private ownership. What do people have to do to become fully-fledged owners?

[Shakhray] There are two ways of going about this. The first is when someone has primary capital and uses it in economic operations to generate profit. However, given our universal poverty this will not be the main method. Despite the scale of the shadow economy, only five percent of state property could be bought out.

The second option is privatization: the transfer of state property to private individuals. This transfer could take the form of buying out, leasing and subsequently buying out, or acquiring free of charge.

[Votinova] What could be the subject of private ownership?

[Shakhray] Plots of land, residential buildings, apartments, garages, small enterprises in the consumer services sphere, and so forth. We must be realistic and understand that larger enterprises are still beyond the means of our potential private owners. In its turn, the state must hold onto what were known as "key positions" during the New Economic Policy era if it wishes to conduct an active social policy.

[Votinova] The draft law envisages the sale of land to foreigners. Does it take account of socioeconomic, historical, and psychological factors? Russia has believed throughout the ages that the land is God's and belongs to no one. Will we not ultimately find ourselves in the position of a hired labor force in our own home?

[Shakhray] If you are talking about foreign firms, they will only be able to acquire land on a leasehold basis. On the other hand that lease must be long-term, otherwise there will be no economic interest. We are looking at a period of 50 to 70 years.

But as far as land ownership for foreign citizens is concerned—with the same restrictions that apply to all citizens—I do not think you need worry about it. Neither our sovereignty nor state power will suffer as a result of this. It is important in this respect to make a clear distinction between two different concepts: land as an aggregate of plots of land; and territory as the spatial basis for statehood and sovereignty.

The Union law proclaims, for example, that all land is within the jurisdiction of the republics and local soviets. But will that soviet plow the land, sow the seed, and gather in the harvest? Of course not. Ownership must be given to whoever works this land. Moreover, in order to avoid speculation in land, it must be sold with the mediation and under the control of local authorities.

[Votinova] That covers the question of land. But what about enterprises? Surely we cannot rule out the possibility that shady money will be invested in them and new "exploiters of the working people" will appear?

[Shakhray] I do not think our people have any great illusions as far as exploitation is concerned. Everyone knows that the state as an exploiter is more terrible than any private owner. No boss would allow himself to pay his workers 7 to 16 kopeks in the ruble as is done in our country. Otherwise his entire workforce would take to its heels. But we must make it a legal requirement that the owner of an enterprise pays the same taxes as state enterprises and cooperatives and the same insurance contributions, and moreover that he guarantees his workers the right to contribute part of their wages to production—i.e. become owners themselves.

[Votinova] Are you yourself ready to become an owner, Sergey Mikhaylovich?

[Shakhray] I would like to set up some kind of joint-stock venture in data processing in the legal sphere. Brains and information are also a commodity, particularly now. I have no doubt that this commercial activity would be successful.

Russian Communist Party Draft Guidelines Released

LD1810193890 Moscow TASS in English 1914 GMT 18 Oct 90

[Text] Moscow October 18 TASS—The draft guidelines of the Russian Communist Party have been worked out in compliance with a decision of the founding congress of the party.

The draft was today circulated for publication in the Soviet press and discussion by all party organisations in the republic.

After taking account of proposals and amendments, the draft will be examined at a regular meeting of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the Russian Communist Party.

"The Communist Party of the Russian Federation, as a component part of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU), is guided by the decisions of the 28th CPSU Congress, the rules and the policy-making statement 'towards humane and democratic socialism,'" stresses the document circulated today.

"At the same time it is independent in determining its position and tactics."

According to the draft, republican Communists regard as their top priority task work to bring closer all progressive and patriotic forces to pull society out of the crisis and efforts to preserve the USSR's integrity as a multinational state.

It also proposes that "all political parties and movements should jointly look for a way to achieve civil accord and to stabilise the situation in the republic and in the country."

The document supports decisions by the 28th CPSU Congress on switching to market relations in accordance with the country's socialist choice.

The draft notes the need "to observe equality and competitiveness of all forms of property and economic management, which exclude the exploitation of man by man."

"The Russian Communist Party supports the course towards a multistructural economy and various forms of privatisation, giving preference to collective forms," the draft says.

"The issue of the ownership of land and other means of production should be resolved only by a nationwide referendum."

The Russian Communist Party will oppose the sale and the transfer of land to private ownership, the document emphasises.

RSFSR Signs Accords With Belorussia, Ukraine

LD1810224490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 18 Oct 90

[Report by correspondent N. Kvashenkina from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] Russia and Belorussia, as well as Russia and the Ukraine signed agreements today in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Council of Ministers. A report from our correspondent.

[Kvashenkina] Bilateral agreement on economic cooperation and the future development of cultural links for 1991 was signed for the Russian side by Comrade Silayev, RSFSR Council of Ministers chairman, and on the Belorussian side by Comrade Kebich, republic Council of Ministers chairman. Comrade Silayev stressed that the accord reached is a real implementation of the sovereignties proclaimed by the republics. But the fact that an agreement was signed in itself is not everything. Much work lies ahead in which all the republican structures will be involved.

Russia and the Ukraine also signed an intergovernmental agreement today. Comrade Masol, the republic Council of Ministers chairman, signed the agreement for the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic government.

[Begin Silayev recording] We have for many years associated via the center and decided important issues for the republics and for our peoples via the center. Now, making use of our sovereignty—both political and economic—we are resolving issues directly. [end recording]

Democratic Russia Congress Tasks Defined

LD1810185990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 18 Oct 90

[Text] [Announcer] The congress of the Democratic Russia movement will take place in Moscow on Saturday and Sunday [20 and 21 October]. Here is how Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic People's Deputy Anatoliy Medvedev, a member of the organizational committee, defines its tasks:

[Begin recording] We do not want to create a party because, well to put it simply, the broad masses, non-party mankind it may be said, dislike the word party.

Therefore the question of the organization of a movement only may be on the agenda today. But nevertheless, one must unite with parties if they are to have some kind of second wind. Therefore we will also integrate into our movement those [parties] which today enjoy the most democratic repute.

We are to decide the question of elections, of holding referendums so that the republic will no longer put forward to parliament generals or even, well, staff of the KGB and such like. Do you understand? We must prepare ourselves for that process. [end recording]

Founding Congress Planned

LD1910083490 Moscow TASS in English 0808 GMT 19 Oct 90

[Report by TASS correspondent Lev Aksenov]

[Text] Moscow October 19 TASS—The Democratic Russia Movement, which rejects communist ideology and may become the second largest political force in the country after the Communist Party, will open its founding congress in Moscow on Saturday.

The movement emerged as a bloc of ideologically close groups on the eve of elections to the Russian Parliament and local bodies of power last year. It achieved landslide victories in several regions, including Moscow and Leningrad.

The two-day founding congress will be attended by about 2,000 delegates, including parliamentary deputies and representatives of the newly-founded Russian parties—the Democratic Party, the Social Democratic Party, the Free Democratic Party, the Christian Democratic Party and the Party of Constitutional Democrats.

Representatives of other movements, such as the Memorial and the Shield, and people's fronts are also expected to participate.

Russian parliamentary deputy Lev Ponomarev, deputy chairman of the congress organising committee, told TASS that a two-party system actually developed in the republic after last year's elections.

"On the one side is the conservative wing of the Communist Party, on the other are democratic alliances," he said.

"The conservative forces are united because they belong to one political structure, whereas the democratic forces are rather isolated."

Democratic leaders want to form a "soft" structure for their movement. "We are not planning to found a party, but a movement," Ponomarev said.

Russian Legislators Found New Political Journal

LD1810220490 Moscow TASS in English 2126 GMT 18 Oct 90

[Report by TASS parliamentary correspondents Yuriy Kozmin and Pavel Ostrov]

[Text] Moscow October 19 TASS—The Committee for International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations under the Russian Parliament became one of the co-founders of the EUROPE PLUS AMERIKA journal. Its publication will begin in December this year. This decision was taken at a session of the Russian parliament on Thursday.

Professor Yuriy Korolyov, editor-in-chief of the new journal, told TASS that it would publish materials by Russian deputies, enabling them to express their ideas, and primarily on the republic's foreign policy.

"We shall publish materials expressing a wide range of ideas and stands on various political issues. Our first issue will carry interviews with members of the Presidential Council Veniamin Yarin and Academician Stanislav Shatalin, as well as other politicians from the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation.

The journal will not publish fiction and cover cultural problems. It will be published in English, French, Spanish and German. The Russian version of the journal will be published in 100,000 copies.

Aside from the committee, the founders of the journal include the Soviet Academy of Sciences, which financed the undertaking, and RIAM-Progress—The Russian-Iberian-American Chamber for Promoting Progress.

Leningrad City Soviet Session Work Assessed

LD1810175190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 18 Oct 90

[Text] Ten days that shook Leningrad. This is how long the Leningrad City Soviet session lasted. Today, pickets at the Marinskiy Palace have disappeared. That is a sign that the session has finished work.

Many very important documents have been adopted, such as the provision on a free economic zone. The leadership of the executive committee has been formed. Construction of the dam has been suspended. Measures have been outlined for improving Leningrad's supply of foodstuffs. Powers have been demarcated between the city and rayon soviets of people's deputies. The decision on holding a festive parade and rally on 7 November on Dvortsovaya Ploshchad has been ratified. The proposal by the presidium on the creation of a Leningrad city soviet Committee of Orphan Affairs has been approved. A declaration in support of the 500 days program has been adopted.

In comparison with the first session, the Leningrad City Soviet has taken a huge step forward. However, the desired level of work is still far away. This was how Sobchak, chairman of the Leningrad City Soviet, assessed the results. The next session will take place in November.

Leningrad Communists Criticized for Indecision

PM1910092790 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 17 Oct 90 Second Edition p 2

[Report by nonstaff correspondent V. Ivanov: "Program Without Position"]

[Text] Leningrad—The combined conference of Leningrad Communists completed its work last Saturday. Despite the duration of the forum—the first stage began back in April—the region's Communists clearly failed to secure an abundance of final documents or clear, effective answers to their questions.

The general opinion is that the report by CPSU Obkom [oblast party committee] Secretary Yu. Belov "On Leningrad CPSU Obkom's Political Position and Action Program" was the highlight of the conference. Some people would certainly describe this speech as thorough, some even harsh. It did indeed contain critical notes. But in my view, the speaker's firm phraseology; his energetic, rousing voice; and his pauses for effect could not hide the theoretical weakness of the document offered for discussion.

Judge for yourselves. The following seemed a clear question: "How are Communists to work in society today?" "Left-wingers" and those on the other side have concrete answers to this question. It is only those people who are trying to sit on the fence who lack answers. In that uncomfortable position, it only remains to say in response to the above question: "It is necessary to be realists," "be the party of constructive opposition," and other statements of that ilk. However, such "clarity" was hardly helpful to the delegates from primary party organizations.

The reason for the political uncertainty is still the same—a desire to occupy a cosy place in the midst of controversy. This position ensures the greatest freedom of movement, although practice indicates that it eliminates the possibility of influencing events.

Verbosity was also at the bottom of the conference's final document—the "Political Position of the Combined Conference of the Leningrad CPSU Organization and

the Leningrad CPSU Obkom Action Program." Although the preamble to the resolution acknowledges the need for a clear stance on fundamental questions of party life, the bulk of the document presents the same range of conservative party terminology—in its worst form!—regarding the need "to overcome the crisis in party consciousness" and create a "program of stark realism."

Incidentally, it was proposed at the conference that a Leningrad version of the CPSU Program be drawn up. However, in view of the results of the conference you cannot help wondering if is it worth wasting effort on an attempt to suit everyone again...?

Potential Nuclear Hazard to Lake Ladoga Reported

PM1910074990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2107 GMT 16 Oct 90

[Report by V. Batalov from the "Television News Service" newscast]

[Text] [Batalov] Near one of the islands in Lake Ladoga, an abandoned ship with nuclear decay products in its hold is rusting, LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA reports today. Our correspondent has gone to the scene. The mysterious island near which the sunken ship is located has been a prohibited area for many years and remains so to this day. Special regulations apply there. The hull of the ship which serves as a receptacle for the dangerous cargo is made from high-grade steel which guarantees safety at present, but it is a question of a potential threat to the lake. To eliminate this threat, work involving the country's scientists and military subunits has begun. [Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1230 GMT 16 October, in a "Television News Service" announcer-read report citing LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA, adds that the abandoned ship "is a former German destroyer received by the Soviet Union in reparation in the fifties"]

Siberian Oil Workers Threaten To Strike 20 Oct

LD1810125490 Moscow World Service in Russian 1030 GMT 18 Oct 90

[Text] The oil workers of Tyumen Oblast, which is in Siberia, have threatened to shut all emergency pipelines on 20 October unless their demands are met, including release from criminal liabilities of those guilty of polluting the environment and immediate wage increases for 700,000 oil workers to the level of those of cooperators. These demands were made public at a meeting in Nizhnevartovsk and were addressed to the USSR president and the Union and Russian Governments. At the meeting in Nizhnevartovsk, the participants themselves did not bother to find a way out of the situation, the press notes.

Urals Lease-Holders Union Meets in Chelyabinsk

LD1810225890 Moscow TASS in English 2203 GMT 18 Oct 90

[Report by TASS correspondent Yevgeniy Tkachenko]

[Text] Chelyabinsk October 19 TASS—The formation of the market is a complicated task, and the attempts to implement it within the narrow framework of far-away regions are doomed to failure. This was stressed by delegates to the First Congress of the Union of Lease-holders and Businessmen from the Urals region, which opened here on Friday. It is being attended by representatives of all regions and republics of this important region of Russia.

During about half a year, that elapsed after the constituent congress of Urals lease-holders, the union created by them has been engaged in the practical implementation of their tasks. The commercial bank began to function and is now gaining strength. Its turnover exceeded four million roubles and continues to grow. An information centre has been created, which helps members of the union establish direct production relations in conditions of the transition to a market-oriented economy. The membership of the union is now 8,000. These include lease-holding and small enterprises, teams, farmers and, partially, cooperatives.

Delegates to the congress are discussing problems dealing with the formation of the domestic market of goods and services, free from speculation, on the basis of mutual advantage. The union of lease-holders will be consolidated not by the administrative might of the state, but by the economic power of the market, which should eliminate economic boundaries between regions and destroy artificially created restrictions on mutually advantageous exchanges. A special programme of the establishment of new economic relations in the agricultural sector features prominently in the discussion.

Demonstrators Picket Kabardino-Balkar Paper

PM1910104090 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 16 Oct 90 Union Edition p 2

[Dispatch by Ali Kazikhanov under "Direct Line" rubric: "Pickets at the Editorial Offices"]

[Text] Nalchik—Members of the sociopolitical organization "Adyge-Khase" have begun picketing the editorial offices of the republican newspaper KABARDINO-BALKARSKAYA PRAVDA.

The cause of this, "Adyge-Khase" says in an appeal, is the publication in this newspaper of articles which seriously strain interethnic relations, and in the organizations's opinion offend the honor and dignity of the Kabard people and of the Adyge people in general. "Adyge-Khase" calls on "all the inhabitants of the republic—Kabards, Balkars, Russian, and other citizens—the Kabardino-Balkar ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet; the CPSU obkom

[oblast committee]; and the mass media to refrain from unbalanced, mendacious, chauvinistic, and nationalist statements and publications," and demands that Ye.S. Zaytsev resign from the post of editor and be deprived of his mandate as people's deputy of the Kabardino-Balkar ASSR.

Yamalo-Nenetsk Okrug Proclaims Itself Republic

PM1910090190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Oct 90 Union Edition p 2

[Report by correspondent Yuriy Perepletkin under the "Direct Link" rubric: "One More Republic"]

[Text] Tyumen—It has been decided at a session of the Yamalo-Nenetsk Okrug Soviet of People's Deputies to transform the autonomous okrug into the Yamalo-Nenetsk Republic.

This issue had long been debated, and very diverse opinions were expressed, ranging from unconditional support for the republic to categorical rejection. The topical issue was also discussed by oblast soviet deputies. Many of them believe that the breakup of Tyumen Oblast, which incorporates two autonomous okrugs, will entail disruption of the normal activity of the country's major fuel and energy complex which has taken shape here.

Documents were sent to the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium with a request to grant a special status to the most extensive oblast in the Union, while preserving the autonomy of national formations. However, the northern deputies have decided the issue in their own way without waiting for a reply from above.

Kalmyk ASSR Adopts Sovereignty Declaration

LD1810193290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 18 Oct 90

[Text] An extraordinary session of Kalmyk Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic [ASSR] Supreme Soviet today adopted a declaration on Kalmykia's state sovereignty. Kalmyk ASSR has now been officially given a new name: Kalmyk Soviet socialist Republic, as part of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. Kalmyk Soviet Socialist Republic's laws and constitution take precedence on its territory.

Yamal-Nenets Deputies Adopt Republic Resolution

LD1810121490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1000 GMT 18 Oct 90

[Text] Our Tyumen correspondent reports that a session of the Yamal-Nenets Okrug Soviet of People's Deputies adopted a decision on the formation of a Yamal-Nenets republic.

The session of the Tyumen oblast soviet and the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet now have the final word.

Legislature Postpones Gorkiy City Renaming

LD1810163690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1230 GMT 18 Oct 90

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] The Russian legislature has postponed the renaming of Gorkiy city to Nizhniy Novgorod because a referendum on this issue has not been held among the city residents.

Western Republics

Ukrainian Students To Change Protest Methods

AU1810215090 Paris AFP in English 2003 GMT 18 Oct 90

[Text] Moscow, Oct 17 (AFP) — Students who had been on strike against the Ukraine Communist government have said they will keep up their action under other forms, the INTERFAX news agency said Thursday [18 October].

It said that they planned to prevent the holding of a military parade in the capital Kiev on November 7 commemorating the Russian revolution.

The students called off their strike after Prime Minister Vitali Masol agreed Wednesday to step down.

Mr. Masol late Thursday however signed an agreement for economic cooperation with his Russian counterpart Ivan Silayev, Soviet television reported.

His resignation must still be approved by the Supreme Soviet, or parliament, to be effective.

The hunger-striking students have begun dismantling the tent camp they had set up in Kiev's Lenin Square.

Ukraine's Grinev Interviewed on Various Topics

On Moscow Talks

PM1910081690 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 18 Oct 90 p 1

[Interview with V. Grinev, deputy chairman of Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, by V. Mamontov in Moscow 17 October: "V. Grinev: Extreme Measures for Extreme Cases"]

[Text] [Mamontov] As I understand it, Vladimir Borisovich, we have met in order to talk about big politics: the Union Treaty, relations with the center and with Russia. But life has introduced more urgent subject matter—in Kiev there are real student disturbances, demands for

the government's resignation are becoming louder and louder, people are on hunger strike in the central square....

[Grinev] All these are extreme manifestations of the problems already mentioned. They are hunger-striking under the slogan "No to the Union Treaty!" and they are demanding the fulfillment of the Supreme Soviet resolution on army service on the republic's territory.... I would like to note that young people always react more sharply, that is true all over the world. But the dangerous thing is this: If we treat every minor ailment with strong drugs, habituation will soon set in. Extreme measures must be saved for extreme cases, with greater reliance on reason....

[Mamontov] So you think the political situation in the Ukraine has not yet peaked?

[Grinev] Of course it has not! In a couple of weeks, when parliament begins to discuss questions of the transition to the market, when the terrible danger hangs directly over the authoritarian system—that is when the crucial moment will come! Alas, not everyone perceives the hidden significance of such questions....

Moreover, the political heat and confusion sometimes leave no room for thinking about the patent contradictions in the present situation. For instance, the "Communist faction" in our parliament is coming out increasingly blatantly against the Union treaty—and is thus aligning itself with the most radical supporters of state autonomy! What is going on here? The point is that this faction is on the whole a partocracy, and hopes, by playing the national card, to hold on to power and preserve the old system.

[Mamontov] To "cordon themselves off" from the Union—but with all the "birthmarks of socialism"?

[Grinev] Yes. But we should go all the way along the path of destroying the old administrative edict system: whether it entrenches itself in the Kharkov region or in Chukotka.

[Mamontov] That sounds far from reassuring, I must admit: More destruction!

[Grinev] Ah! That is just the point! I do not think we should blow up the system, I think we should make it burn more slowly before it burns itself out entirely....

[Mamontov] The idea is clear. But in practice it is seldom possible to avoid confrontation. As I understand it, your talks at the Defense Ministry are having variable success?

[Grinev] I think our delegation there, which was formed on 10 October, has made some progress—and incidentally this is news that many people are waiting for in the Ukraine. Parliament is coming under heavy fire—both within its walls and from outside—for failing to implement its own resolution on service on the republic's territory. But... It must be admitted that we do not always adopt resolutions after thinking deeply and taking into account the realities of present-day life. Suppose we order the sun not to set over the Ukraine, and are then surprised when evening comes! I think our new decision on the same subject is far more constructive. We propose that the Union Armed Forces—professional in the future and which include seamen, missile men, the paratroops, and so forth—be chosen on a quota basis. While in the republic there would be drafted, territorial troops plus a well-organized alternative form of service.

In brief, those are the terms we are putting to the Defense Ministry. Otherwise the fate of the draft could be difficult....

[Mamontov] Is that an ultimatum?

[Grinev] No. It is the realities of life again, realities which are pushing the iceberg on Arbat Square [Defense Ministry building] toward a "Gulf Stream" where it could easily melt.... You must understand that nowadays sticking to dogma is pointless. A political dualism exists: Union and republics, strong presidential power and sovereignty.... And the same is true in the military sphere. What should be preferred? Here it is not ambitions that should prevail. It is important to realize this: Where will the hope of a decent, ordinary human life for all Soviet people come from? From the old structures? I do not believe it, such things do not happen.

The center sometimes regards our declarations as games for grown-ups. It keeps creeping in, believe me. Yet it is from these games that a new social structure is arising—I would call it an association of free states. And Union law can become such only after ratification by the republics: That is the way to eradicate the present conflicts and disputes whose echoes can be also heard today from Kiev.

To try in any way to suppress such a movement is to go against the times, against the logic of history! That is my profound conviction, and I am prepared to persuade the defense minister and the president of it.... And that is why we are today engaged in active talks with Russia, why we came to Moscow.

On Army Draft

PM1910121390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian Oct 16 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Dispatch by Sergey Tsikora under "Direct Line" rubric: "Peaceful Talks About Military Matters"]

[Text] Kiev—Young men from the Ukraine who are drafted into the Army this fall will not travel outside the republic to serve until a special agreement is reached between the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] and the higher Union organs. This is the decision adopted by the Ukrainian parliament.

A delegation headed by V. Grinev, deputy chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, has gone to Moscow to hold talks on this, let us say directly ticklish question.

"The difficulty of our mission lies not only in the fact that neither the center nor the republic has any experience in solving the problems of Army manpower acquisition in conditions of the operation of the republic's Declaration of State Sovereignty," Grinev said. "Developing the premises of this declaration, our parliament has adopted a number of resolutions which do not entirely 'fit' with certain Union laws. We are trying to eliminate these contradictions, but not at the cost of not fulfilling the juridical acts of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet—a fact I would like to stress.

"The delegation is empowered to conduct a highly serious and wide-ranging discussion in the country's Supreme Soviet, the Union Council of Ministers, and the Ministry of Defense on the questions of quotas," V. Grinev noted. "The issue is the number of conscripts which the republic should send outside its territory in order to ensure the state's strategic defense. Under the Ukraine's new laws, the republic government establishes the quota which is ratified by the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet. Preliminary consultations with the Center are essential here since in the past the majority of conscripts from the Ukraine have served outside the republic. Now that the Ukrainian Declaration of State Sovereignty and a number of resolutions have been adopted, this position can no longer exist. The majority of deputies believe—and this principle was enshrined in the corresponding Ukrainian Supreme Soviet resolution—that next year we should be talking about voluntary service in units located outside the territory of the republic, and later—with the switch to a professional army and professional strategic troops—only about voluntary service, service by contract.

"We have been given directives to defend the Ukrainian parliament's position at Union level," the deputy chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet continued. "But even with such purposefulness on our part we hope that the talks will not be rigid or confrontational. Recent meetings with representatives of the command authorities of military districts and troops deployed on Ukrainian territory convince us of this. At first it was far from straightforward to talk with the military, but in the end we found a common language. Both sides understood that there is no returning to the past and that new solutions must be sought in the new conditions."

There are seven people in the delegation. They include Communists, adherents of Democratic Platform, and representatives of the "People's Council." The chairwoman of the republic Committee of Soldiers' Mothers is also a member of the delegation. The delegation hopes to present a report to the Ukrainian parliament on the results of the talks this week.

Ukraine Nationalist Demonstrations Examined

PM1710152590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Oct 90 First Edition p 4

[Article by correspondent Colonel A. Polyakov: "Tactics of Strong-Arm Suppression"]

[Text] The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet session began to work 1 October. For that day representatives of RUKH [Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroyka], URP (Ukrainian Republican Party), and SNUM [Independent Ukrainian Youth League] threatened to organize a national strike, to bring 1 million people into Kiev, and to prove that the Ukrainian people stand behind them.

Indeed, several thousand demonstrators, mainly from the West Ukraine, passed along Kirov street next to the Supreme Soviet building. But the peaceful march obviously did not suit the organizers of the demonstration. At an order (this is recorded on video tape) several hundred demonstrators rushed at the militiamen and broke through their chain but came up against a special militia detachment. Without thinking several demonstrators used flagstaffs, metal tridents, and even a small ax. Immediately in parliament, without investigating the essence of what had happened, deputy Larisa Skorik said angrily: "Why did they attack people?" Naturally, those she was calling people were not the boys in militia uniform, who were fulfilling the decision of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet to ensure the session's normal work, but those who had themselves attacked the guardians of order, who did not even have batons and who essentially saved the elderly people who might have died under the mob's feet. The result of the act of provocation was that 15 officers, sergeants, and privates were hospitalized with concussion and puncture and laceration wounds. That was not all.

A new gambit followed. A tank truck from Ivano-Frankovsk broke through to the building where the session was under way. You can imagine the situation—a gasoline tank in the middle of a sea of people. Something irreparable might happen at the slightest provocation. At the demand issued by militia Major General V. Nedrigaylo, chief of the Kiev Internal Affairs Administration, that he leave immediately, a man who had clambered up onto the tank truck produced matches and began to shout:

"General, I shall blow up you and everyone else here!"

The actions on the street were coordinated with speeches in parliament, where the opposition demanded the resignation of the government, the prohibition of the very idea of a Union treaty, and the dissolution of the Supreme Soviet. These ultimatums met with no support either at the session or among the Ukrainian people. It was decided by a majority of votes to permit the government which has been acting for three months to work. The so-called national strike was supported by only 10,000 people out of the 25 million working in the

Ukraine, and that was mainly in the west of the republic, while in Kiev only 48 people supported it.

In the first two weeks of October I visited several enterprises. People are understanding increasingly clearly that the political "games" of the extreme leftists are pursuing far-reaching aims—fuelling nationalist sentiments, playing on the feelings of citizens, whom they promise to make well fed and rich if they support the idea of a separate Ukraine, and kindling distrust in the Army, the KGB, and the militia. The interest of the peoples of the whole country and of the other nationalities living in the Ukraine is of secondary importance to them. You don't have to be a prophet to see and realize that behind the loud slogans and appeals there lies one desire—to seize political power, overthrow socialist ideals, and recarve the republic's history and future to their own design. All means are good for that. Primarily the tactic of ultimatums and strong-arm pressure.

If they did not succeed at the session, if they did not manage a national strike—then they must confuse the students. Now representatives of the students, again mainly from the West Ukraine, are pitching tents on October Revolution Square in Kiev, next to the Kreshchatik, where parades and festive demonstrations pass. They are announcing a hunger strike with political demands: The government must resign, they must serve only in the Ukraine (I shall note, incidentally, that, as is well known, students are not drafted into the Army now), "no" to the Union treaty, and disband the Supreme Soviet.

Need one explain who stands behind these demands, who helped the newly emerged politicians to "mature?" The participants in the hunger strike in numerous interviews are already, without false modesty, calling themselves "the future of the Ukraine," people who "are making history." It is not surprising when some deputies are shaking their hands, urging them to keep up their courage, and calling them "the flower of the nation." The newspaper VECHERNIY KIYEV writes: "The students are prepared to die to achieve their demands." You feel how cunningly pressure is being organized both on the republic's leadership, which must give in, and on the students who, conversely, must "outpressure" the Supreme Soviet. One wants to say: Forgive me, but why must the demands of tens, or even hundreds, of young people resorting to extreme measures be met? Perhaps they are proposing a miraculous program for taking the economy out of the crisis—a program which has been rejected? Highly dubious. It is hard not to agree with L. Kravchuk, chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, who said that the dissolution of parliament is demanded by thousands but it was elected by millions, and it will fulfill their will.

Seized by a feeling that everything is permitted them, those taking part in the meetings often act counter to the demands of law and the norms of public order. On Friday 12 October someone urged the students to go to the "Bolshevik" plant, where L. Kravchuk was meeting with workers so that they could present their demands to him. You think a fully empowered delegation went there? Not a bit of it. Thousands of young people closed off Victory Avenue, the city's main thoroughfare. Public transport was paralyzed and repeatedly came to a halt on the Kreshchatik. As soon as Kravchuk agreed to meet with the students, O. Daniy, chairman of the Kiev branch of the Ukrainian Students' Union, turned the students back to the Kreshchatik.

Forcible pressure from extreme leftists is experienced by all those who stand on sober, considered positions. Here in their methods of agitation and propaganda and their calls for action the "leftists" do not bother with any particular intellectuality and shun no means. The Army is a force which kills the human element in soldiers, militiamen are fascists and janissaries, and journalists are traitors to national interests.

Saturday 13 October. Noon. The Kreshchatik is again closed by a crowd of people. Next to the hunger strikers' camp is a placard reading "Gang of 239, get out of parliament." The "gang" is the parliamentary majority. That is the "parliamentary" language of our extremists. Try to call them that.

What is the origin of this unruliness? A sense of permissiveness and lawlessness. In addition the laws are quite often violated by some deputies if they have a selfish interest in doing so.

Alongside the students' tents was a rally and musical show. Hoarse bards with some skill in anti-Soviet songs and couplets. A bold little lady levels a provocative question at a cadet of the Kiev higher naval political school:

"Will you shoot the people?

"Why shoot them, the people are working," he replies calmly.

"If the scum order you to shoot?" a disheveled man shouts from behind the little lady.

By scum he means the commanders. What then is the man who at that minute shouts into the microphone:

"The occupiers and red lackeys under the red ensign! Hurrah for the Bandera supporters, hurrah for the members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists!.."

He is obviously a real "democrat."

Perhaps the time is coming when things should be called by their names. This shamelessness in no case expresses the people's interests.

Reactions to Rukh Call for Press Boycott Reported

PM1810134590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Oct 90 Second Edition p 3

[Report by correspondent M. Odinets under the rubric "From the Latest Mail": "Boycott Again"]

[Text] Kiev—Our newspaper has already described in a letter from Kiev the Rukh [Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroyka] action against the communist press—the call to boycott subscription to party publications. An issue of RADYANSKA UKRAINA has published its own commentary in connection with the Rukh letter "To Compatriots."

This letter claims that the newspapers PRAVDA, PRAVDA UKRAINY, and RADYANSKA UKRAINA "are full of nothing but undisguised lies, slander, and calumny against the progressive forces which are gaining increasing prestige in the Ukraine and which the Communist Party sees as appreciable opponents." And since this is the case "we will not allow them any longer to be parasites feeding on our beggarly kopeks, which turn into billions of rubles (?!)."

Apparently, the newspaper comments, you are taking your cue from certain figures in the "appreciable" opposition. There is their usual denunciatory tone and usual collection of low-grade methods—without facts, arguments, and proof in the hope that some people will go for an unbaited hook. But it seems to us that in this case the letter reveals the unself-critical and arrogant approach that has long been observed among the Rukh leading circles, which would like to protect their activists from the "pernicious" influence of other, non-Rukh publications. The subtext of the document is clear: To protect them at all costs from heresy and from different views of the problems that we must resolve and of the capricious developments of politics and to portray their own views as the only correct ones. Do not look elsewhere, they say. Blindly follow us and you will win happiness.

The letter, RADYANSKA UKRAINA continues, shows that Rukh publications have nothing with which to counter us, the Communist press, and cannot compete on equal terms. They are afraid of entering upon honest creative competition in the arena of pluralism. So they are using bans and boycotts which we hope will only help us, being good publicity.

"So we want to say a sincere thank you to the Rukh Secretariat over this," the newspaper concludes. "Thank you, dear 'appreciable opponents,' for your attention and support. Your manifesto entitled 'Boycott the Communist Press' will long serve as a 'model' of glasnost and pluralism for us. We thank you both on our behalf and on behalf of the subscribers whom you so insistently warn against imprudence. We trust that our friends the readers will make the right choice."

Yalta Soviet Discusses Crimean Tatar Problems

PM1910105090 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Oct 90 First Edition p 3

[Report by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Captain Second Rank V. Pasyakin under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Situation Worsening Once Again"]

[Text] Yalta—A lull seemed to have set in after the excesses in the Crimea, and in particular in the region of Greater Yalta, in connection with the Crimean Tatars' seizure of land, their ultimatums demanding residence permits, their resettlement in Yalta, and the local population's retaliation to this. But not for long, it transpired.

The Yalta City Soviet of People's Deputies session whose decisions were awaited by the city's residents and the Crimean Tatars took place over two days, 11 and 12 October. Its materials were relayed onto Yalta's Soviet Square in order to reassure people, promptly affect their mood, quell the seething disputes, and resolve the complex issues without offense to either side.

V. Braylovskiy, Yalta Gorispolkom [city soviet executive committee] chairman, cited the following figures in his report: by the beginning of the session 1,892 petitions had been received from Crimean Tatars. Some 81 people have already received permission to obtain a Yalta resident's permit, and 19 of them have been registered. Despite the fact that there are more than 16,000 people waiting in the undiminishing line for housing in the resort town.

The situation is complicated by the fact that Crimean Tatars often lay claim to the undeveloped, best land and do not always like the areas they are allocated. They resort to the impermissible, illegal method of seizing land. Hence the well-known conflicts. What is more, the distribution of plots of land is dragging on, causing legitimate discontent.

In short there are many questions—very difficult ones at that. Tolerance, a considered approach, and mutual understanding are particularly necessary here. This is unfortunately precisely what the Crimean Tatars' representatives often lack. After the Yalta City Soviet session tobacco growers, turning up for work in the morning, discovered 22 Crimean Tatar shacks on the sovkhoz's land. The best varieties of tobacco are grown in this seven-hectare field. The team's losses as a result of the trampled produce—during a period of tobacco famine, what is more—totalled, according to preliminary calculations, approximately 70,000 rubles. Tobacco growers have decided to go on strike in protest.

The Yalta City Soviet session continued its work 16 October. Will it succeed in resolving the painful problems and securing consensus between the local population and the Crimean Tatars?

Ukrainian Green Party Elects First Leader

PM1910113390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 16 Oct 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Report by correspondent S. Tsikora: "Green—the Colour of Hope"]

[Text] The constituent congress broke off its work, and all the delegates went to the park for a rally. Here before a fairly large assembly of people, the burial took place of

meeting's participants offer concrete proposals that would offer a peaceful and constructive solution to the deadlock.

M. Moroshany, chairman of the Association of Victims of Stalinist Repression, stated in his speech that the concepts of "the dictatorship of the proletariat" and "merging of nations" have been transformed into a bitter campaign to destroy ethnic distinctiveness, and subsequently into true genocide all over the Union. In his opinion, the Moldova Communist Party Central Committee should express its opinion more concisely and clearly with regard to anticonstitutional attempts to create other republics in Moldova.

G. Pologov, leader of the Associated Council of Labor Collectives, explained the position of that formation, which is presently guided by the social context of the republic.

The speaker's proposal that the president of the republic lead negotiations "including negotiations with the participation of an official delegation of Russia which would be a mediator" was rejected by Mircha Snegur. He noted that the idea of negotiations was not entirely clear. "With whom? With our own people, the population of our own republic?" asked the president.

V. Reyder, chairman of the Kishinev Humanitarian Club, appealed for common sense and a repudiation of harsh measures, and he proposed the organization of a "roundtable" in Tiraspol "with the participation of representatives of the various organizations of the republic and the local formations, labor collectives, and parties that are proclaiming themselves. He also emphasized the need to create a republic-level forum under the Supreme Soviet to take part in the development of laws for subsequent discussion in the parliament. And he emphasized that the non-Moldavian population is not objectively informed of the processes taking place in the republic. He insisted on the development of a public education effort among them.

A. Grezhdiyeru, chairman of the Democratic Platform within the Communist Party of Moldova and USSR people's deputy from Moldova, spoke about the meeting of a group of USSR people's deputies from Moldova with M.S. Gorbachev in Moscow, disinformation disseminated by TASS, and the activities of forces from the center that are manipulating the accumulated information surrounding the activities of the organizers of the new state formations on the territory of the Republic of Moldova. According to the speaker, these forces are pursuing the goal of preserving a unitary, centralized state at any price and wish only to make unsubstantial changes to the empire, leaving its essence untouched. And the leaders of the enterprises under Union jurisdiction, who constitute a "fifth column" in the republic, as well as the majority of the members of the labor collectives of these enterprises who are guided by the deputy's group "Soyuz," are essentially their hostages and are being used against the national rebirth of Moldova. And all of this is taking place on the eve of the conclusion of a Union treaty with the goal of preserving the empire.

S. Chertan, one of the leaders of the Union of Peasants, emphasized the idea of organizing a "roundtable." At the same time he proposed that M.S. Gorbachev be asked to express his position clearly with regard to events in Moldova and that the leadership of the republic be asked to design a package of specific measures that will take into account the interests of the entire population.

"Today we are experiencing the consequences of an occupational regime," stressed Leonida Lari, chairwoman of the Christian Democratic League of Women. "Our movement for national liberations is undergoing all kinds of attacks by the Russian-speaking population of all the Union republics. This population is the right hand of the bureaucracy at all levels, and Moscow stands behind them." The speaker believed that the only way out of the situation is in decisive, efficient application of the law. In order to correctly evaluate the situation and objectively inform the public of the republic and of the whole world, she proposed that an international symposium of linguists, sociologists, historians, and lawyers be organized in Kishinev.

V. Solonar, a representative of the board of the international movement to defend perestroyka "Unitatea-Yedinstvo," having supported G. Pologov, spoke in favor of negotiations to find a way out of the impasse and stressed that today's separatist phenomena are consequences of mistakes tolerated by the parliament which supposedly did not provide the government or the local and central organs of administration proportional ethnic representation.

Speaking in the name of the Union of Lawyers, V. Volchinskiy evaluated the meeting being conducted at the initiative of the president of the republic as an attempt to overcome the crisis by the most humane methods. In the effort to limit the functions of the soviets and the party, he considered the absence of coordination and subordination all levels of the soviets administrative activities to be a mistake.

O. Nantaoy, an official of the Social Democratic Party of Moldova, suggested in his speech that the mistakes of the new parliament be analyzed patiently, especially the fact that some deputies often forget which territory they represent. He spoke in favor of accord and equilibrium in the activities of the parliament and against hasty assertions that may infringe severely on ethnic sentiment. He was in favor of the new status of the deputy and of activating a commission on deputies' ethics that would concern itself with raising their political culture. He proposed that negotiations not be started but that the existing situation be used to distance the separatist leaders from the people, to work on the public education campaign, to publish and circulate the law on the functioning of languages within the territory of the republic so that all who wish may become acquainted with it, and

to put clear limits on the Gagauz issue and the issues raised by the Russian-speaking population in the Dnestr regions.

Concerning the need for a genuine resolution of the Jewish question in the republic within the bounds of the dialogue with all political and social forces that the leadership desires, A. Brodskiy, member of the board of the society of Jewish culture in the SSR of Moldova and the editor of the newspaper NASH GOLOS, rejected the idea of the use of force in defusing the situation. He noted a genuine need to educate the whole population about the laws and to refrain at meetings of representatives of political formations from discussing petty issues and from pressure on anyone. Objecting to V. Solonar, he stressed that for the most part a fair, ethnic representation at the level of the Union government and the central soviet organs has been ignored.

Expressing the position of the Society of Ukrainian Culture, A. Tkachenko raised a series of questions affecting not only Ukrainian representation in a number of organs and institutes, but also the creation of conditions contributing to the development of the culture of Ukrainians in the republic where they were born and that they consider their own—the development of schools, publication of textbooks, etc.

I. Zabunov, leader of the Bulgarian public cultural society "Vozrozhdeniye," rejected the idea of using severe measures against the Gagauz because no bitter precedents should arise in a history of the indigenous population's peaceful coexistence of with them. In his speech he also enumerated a series of questions that are in need of discussion, and as much as is possible solutions: Recognition and resolution of the issue of southern Bessarabia through negotiations with the Ukraine, the need to analyze the historical role of Russians in Bessarabia, and satisfaction of the educational and cultural demands of the Bulgarians of Moldova. He proposed that the question of reunification with Romania, which has not officially been raised by the leadership of the republic, should not henceforth be a subject of discussion in the press and at mass meetings. However, he stressed that the situation can change quickly, and relations between Bessarabia and Romania may become closer than for instance those between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Petru Luchinskiy, first secretary of the Moldova Communist Party Central Committee, addressed the situation in the entire Union where an absence of central authority is observed. He stressed the need to determine the most urgent issues that must be resolved in the republic and to use all methods, not just presidential methods, to overcome the crisis, to make an immediate transition to a market economy, and to introduce progressive forms of organization of economic activity. He emphasized the inadmissibility of methods that would lead to clashes between people. It is necessary to demonstrate more mutual trust and to unite all democratic and progressive forces in this activity.

Mikhay Gimpu, leader of the People's Front of Moldova, noted that from its very beginning the Front had struggled for the national renewal of the indigenous population and of representatives of other peoples residing in the republic. But this was not to the taste of some forces, and they began to function in the name of the working class, creating the United Council of Labor Collectives. The Front remained unchanged in its goals and clearly understands the goal of the separatists who, although they see that they have no chance for success, try by any means to oppose the movement for national renewal. He stressed that separatist aspirations are only the aspirations of individual leaders and that the people do not have anything in common with them. And the means that will help us overcome the existing situation is to guarantee legal principles: Observation of the law is the duty of each citizen; the duty of each state is to convince citizens to observe the law. After five days have passed, it is necessary to apply the laws to those who are trying to implement rulings that the parliament has declared unconstitutional.

At the conclusion of the meeting, President Mircha Snegur noted that many important thoughts had been expressed. Declaring that he was satisfied with the meetings, the president affirmed the need to apply political methods and to observe and bring those who violate them to justice. The president rejected the idea of negotiations and spoke in favor of conducting a series of meetings, assemblies, symposiums, etc. at which the most important questions of the political, economic, social, national, and cultural life of Moldavia would be discussed. He also expressed a wish to develop an economic program in the republic on the basis of the concepts of Academician Shatalin. President Mircha Snegur affirmed decisively that there can be no question of any sort of surrender. He stated that he is president of all the residents of the republic and that he will rigorously defend the integrity of a sovereign Moldova.

Moldavian Communist Party Plenum Reported

PM1810140390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 Oct 90 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report under the rubric "Official": "Moldovan Communist Party Central Committee Plenum"]

[Text] Kishinev, 16 Oct—A Moldovan [Moldavia] Communist Party Central Committee plenum was held here today. P.K. Luchinskiy, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the Moldovan Communist Party Central Committee, delivered information on the results of the work of the CPSU Central Committee October (1990) Plenum.

The Moldovan Communist Party Central Committee plenum defined the place and tasks of party organizations in practical work on stabilizing the republic's economy and making the transition to a market.

While supporting diverse forms of reducing state control in the agro-industrial complex, the plenum participants opposed the transfer of land to private ownership.

The plenum supported the appeal of M.S. Gorbachev, USSR president and general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to the people of Moldova and urged all interested sides to begin a dialogue in order to achieve civil and national concord in the republic.

Belorussian Supreme Soviet Passes Leasing Law

LD1910051990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1454 GMT 18 Oct 90

[Text] Minsk, 18 Oct (Belta-TASS)—The extraordinary session of the Belorussian Supreme Soviet continues to debate the package of legislative acts governing the Republic's transition to a market economy. One distinguishing feature of this debate is that alternative drafts have been submitted to practically every law. The competition to the main author—the Republic's Council of Ministers—has come from the deputies in the opposition Belorussian People's Front.

Today the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] law "On Leasing" was adopted in its first reading, as were two other important documents yesterdaythe Republic's law on ownership and its land code.

Particularly sharp controversy broke out between the proponents of the government and opposition versions over whether land should be recognized as an object of private property. Most deputies agreed with the view of the Republic's Council of Ministers, which envisages the transfer of land to citizens of the Belorussian SSR for life with the right of inheritance, but prohibits its use as a commodity.

Belorussian Decree on Law and Order Published

91UN0056A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 21 Sep 90 p 1

[Decree of Presidium of Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet: "On Tasks for Implementing the Appeal of USSR President M.S. Gorbachev 'On Strengthening Legality and Law and Order'"]

[Text] The Presidium of the Belorussian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet notes serious shortcomings in the observance of legality and law and order, the protection of the rights and legitimate interests of citizens, and the growth of legal nihilism in the society. The dissemination of knowledge of the law among the population is at a low level.

The republic's national economy is not developing in a stable manner; the economy is in a state of crisis; processes destroying intrarepublic and interrepublic ties are accelerating; and the measures taken by the government, the republic ministries and departments, and the local soviets of people's deputies to improve the situation in the consumer market are turning out to be ineffective. The monitoring role of the organs of power and administration in providing for contractual discipline and fighting against mismanagement in the local areas is becoming weaker.

Attention is drawn to the inadequate work of law enforcement organs in preventing crime. Many leaders and other officials are not actively imposing order in production and public places. No positive results have been achieved in eradicating organized crime.

The Presidium of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet decrees:

1. Local soviets of people's deputies, in conjunction with law enforcement organs:

to systematically analyze the condition of legality and law and order in the oblast, rayon, city, microrayon, village, rural soviet, and in each labor collective;

according to the results of the analysis, to take decisive measures to eliminate shortcomings that are revealed and hold management personnel and other officials strictly responsible for omissions in educational and law enforcement work;

in each population point and labor collective to create a situation of respect for the law and intolerance of any manifestations of it; to be especially intolerant of violations of legislation by economic leaders and individuals holding elective positions, and workers of law enforcement organs, and to step up monitoring of their activity from below;

to step up activity for monitoring the observance of legislation and fighting legal violations; to increase the responsibility for the organization of this work in labor collectives and electoral districts;

to extensively inform the workers of the course of the fulfillment of plans for housing, social-domestic, and cultural construction and the fulfillment of the mandates of the voters.

2. To draw the attention of the leaders of ministries; state committees; departments; and state, cooperative, and social enterprises and organizations to their personal responsibility for the state of affairs with respect to the observance of the requirements of legislation. To hold guilty parties strictly liable for each violation of the law.

3. To demand of leaders of enterprises and organizations unconditional fulfillment of contractual commitments, observance of delivery discipline, and prevention of waste.

Republic state arbitration organs, banking institutions, and other monitoring organs are to provide for unwavering application of economic sanctions against violators of economic legislation.

4. The Belorussian SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs (Comrade V.D. Yegorov) and the Belorussian SSR Committee for State Security (Comrade V.G. Baluyev) in conjunction with the Belorussian SSR Procuracy (Comrade G.S. Tranavskiy) are to wage a resolute, uncompromising, and coordinated battle against organized and professional crime, disturbance of public order, encroachment on the rights, and legitimate interests of the citizens, and other illegal actions.

5. The Belorussian SSR State Committee for Television and Radio (Comrade A.G. Stolyarov) and the Belorussian SSR State Committee for the Press (Comrade A.I. Butevich) are to organize in the republic, local press, and on radio and television regular statements of leaders and other workers of soviet and law enforcement organs as well as legal experts clarifying legislation and the practice of its application, and to inform the population quickly of work done in the republic for strengthening socialist legality and law and order, providing for protection of the rights of citizens, and observing the principle of social justice.

6. The commission of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet for legality and questions of law and order and the fight against crime is to provide for coordination and interaction of law enforcement organs of the republic in preventing and stopping legal violations.

[Signed] N. Dementey, chairman of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet
[Dated] 11 September 1990, Minsk.

Caucasus

Ter-Petrosyan Interviewed About Civil Strife

PM1910152190 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 19 Oct 90 p 1

[Interview in Yerevan with Armenian Supreme Soviet Chairman Levon Ter-Petrosyan by correspondents V. Aloyan and V. Larin; date not given: "We Avoided Civil War"—first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] He was not elected a USSR people's deputy because he was in prison. He has now achieved popularity even outside Armenia. The T-shirt [in the accompanying photograph] says: "We Love Levon." So who is this figure in the political arena whom the Center finds enigmatic?

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Obviously one of the most complex questions in the republic parliament today is that of relations with Azerbaijan. Can a way out of the prevailing situation be seen?

[Ter-Petrosyan] When we came to power we said right out that the way of confrontation has been exhausted. Our way is the development of political dialogue, and the republics need to find compromises of some kind in order to get out of the impasse. The Karabakh problem is a heavy burden not just for Armenia but also for Azerbaijan. Our method is being met with understanding among all strata of the population and, judging by their statements, the Azerbaijani leaders are not against dialogue either. The ice has begun to break and in principle contacts with the Azerbaijani leadership already exist.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] You have repeatedly said that you will establish mutual relations with all the adjacent republics and independent states. At the same time your statements about mutual economic relations with Turkey are provoking an ambiguous reaction both in Armenia and among Armenian emigres abroad....

[Ter-Petrosyan] The proposal has met with support among realists and is the object of speculation among people of traditional thinking and those who want to obtain political dividends. But I must say that both in Armenia and abroad the initiative has met with understanding. Such questions must be approached with realism, not on the basis of emotions but on the basis of the people's true interests.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Even not so long ago, armed groupings were trying to dictate their policy. Regardless of the fact that the deadline for handing in weapons passed, by no means all weapons have been handed in. This must mean that measures taken by the local authorities have been exhausted.

[Ter-Petrosyan] Before the elections and in particular before the beginning of the new Supreme Soviet's work, Armenia was on the brink of civil war. Foreseeing their certain defeat, the power structures and certain forces in the center did everything they could, in my opinion, to exacerbate the situation as far as possible and cause dissatisfaction with the democratic changes among the people. At the cost of great efforts we managed to avoid mass bloodshed. I state with all my authority that, if the old power structures had continued to operate another month or two, Armenia would not have avoided civil war. Even if we were to suddenly leave the political arena, all the same we would believe that we had achieved our main task—a tragedy did not occur.

It is also important that the republic is implementing the disarmament operation and the state of emergency measures through its own efforts. The demand that neither the Army nor the Internal Troops interfere in these questions was observed. This helped us to avoid many excesses. Armed detachments employed both by destructive forces and by the mafia have mainly been disbanded.

As far as the confiscation of weapons from individuals is concerned... I believe that all the weapons will only be returned when everyone is convinced of the guarantees of personal security provided by the state. We cannot get by without strengthening state structures, the KGB, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Today the parliament is adopting—practically unanimously—both your political proposals and the prime minister's cadre proposals. Has the opposition given in or has it thought out its tactics well?

[Ter-Petrosyan] There are two explanations here. First, our legislature is not an isolated power structure, and it is closely linked with the people whose trust is the basis for the unanimity. The government proposals are based on reality and are close to reality to such an extent that at the moment there are no serious arguments against its recommendations. Second, the opposition is not yet a united force which could dictate its conditions, and moreover it does not enjoy the support of the masses.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] What principles will determine mutual relations between Armenia and the republics and the center?

[Ter-Petrosyan] Judge for yourselves. Political, economic, and cultural ties have linked the Russian and Armenian peoples for over 200 years. Is it possible for all that to pass by without a trace? No, cooperation will be strengthened and developed—but without diktat from the center. Vertical ties will be replaced by horizontal ones based on equal rights and mutual agreements. When everyone understands that such ties are mutually advantageous, then this could to lead to some kind of new form of integration.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] The market economy is gaining positions step by step. And it is not just its opponents who are having to give up their principles. It is said in Armenia that the new government has decided to re-open the "Nairit" rubber production unit, closed earlier for environmental reasons....

[Ter-Petrosyan] Any state is interested in strengthening the economy and expanding income. But the main thing is the observance of world standards and environmental norms. If there are guarantees that they will be observed, then we will have the courage to persuade the people of the advantage of operating "Nairit." After an objective examination by an international commission, "Nairit" can start working.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] A presidential election was once part of the Armenian Pannational Movement's program. Now there is no mention of this point in the Armenian Pannational Movement. Has reality introduced corrections?

[Ter-Petrosyan] Indeed, we submitted proposals for general, direct election of the president of the republic. But I think that this question cannot be resolved without the people's participation. A referendum is necessary—and the people should decide for themselves whether a president should be elected or whether we should be satisfied with what we have for the time being.

Official Links Blockade to Armenia's Policy

NC1810134190 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1215 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Report by ARMENPRES correspondent Ch. Balagozyan; "Closing One And A Half Months Ago of Main Gas Pipeline Through Azerbaijan Adds Fuel Blockade to Armenian Transportation Blockade; Authorities Remain Inactive"—ARMENPRES headline]

[Excerpts] Yerevan, 15 Oct (ARMENPRES)—It is no secret that our neighbors try "to strangle" an entire republic whenever something is not to their liking. They want us to never forget that our well-being is in their hands. From time to time they blockade the railroads and highways and close down the main gas pipeline. In Armenia people believe that the continued imposition of the blockades is the result of the impunity enjoyed by those responsible for the losses worth billions our republic has suffered. It is not only our republic which suffers these losses, but the whole country as our economies are closely integrated. This is happening at a time when the state is in the throes of an economic crisis. Many people now ask what is the position of the center and of the country's leadership on this issue. Drawing from an opinion poll ARMENPRES prepared three questions for Yuriy Vladimirovich Golik, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Law and Order and Fight Against Crimes. [passage omitted]

We easily contacted Y.V. Golik by phone. After hearing our first question, he requested that we phone back the next day, excusing himself by saying: "I have just returned from a trip and am not up to date on the latest news."

The next day Golik reported that the government is looking into the fuel blockade and that "it is trying to find an acceptable solution, but that so far nothing concrete has been achieved."

[Balaqozyan] Why is the president of the country not personally tackling the issue?

[Golik] I was unable to meet with the president yesterday as he was very busy. He is also busy today.

[Balagozyan] We would like to hear your personal views as to why the country's leadership is procrastinating. Is the 50-day blockade not long enough for them to realize the economic and political implications of the move? I direct this question to you personally because two weeks ago at the USSR Supreme Soviet you argued that in view of the complexity of the socio-political situation and of the need to implement extraordinary measures to extricate society from the crisis, it was necessary to bestow additional powers on the president of the USSR.

[Golik] And why? So that he can carry out economic reforms. (Yuriy Vladimirovich corrected me and added unexpectedly, making what he saw as an apparently logical connection—Balagozyan) At the same time the

Armenian Supreme Soviet has declared full independence and has decreed the creation of its own armed forces. It has declared that any foreign country may have military bases on its territory.

[Balagozyan] You have been given incorrect information. The Armenian Republic's Supreme Soviet has not made a decision on the establishment of foreign military bases on the Armenian territory.

[Golik] What are you saying? Here is the decision, it is right in front of me.

I am reporting this telephone conversation exactly as it happened. Instead of replying to my questions, the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet committee leveled accusations about the disobedient Armenian Supreme Soviet. After the victory of the popular forces, the republic's Supreme Soviet started to pursue an independent policy, and because of that the central authorities have suddenly found themselves "unable" to prevent the blockade. In an earlier similar case, one of the Baltic republics faced a blockade due to disobedience. However, toward the end of the conversation Yuriy Vladimirovich tried to placate me by saying that, according to his information, a presidential decree is now being drawn up on lifting Azerbaijan's blockade of Armenia which we can expect to be published in the coming days.

Oil Supplies to Armenia Resumed

PM1810154590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Oct 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by correspondent Sergey Bablumyan under the rubric "Direct Link": "Gas Has Gone to Armenia"]

[Text] Yerevan—At the 17 October morning sitting of the Armenian Supreme Soviet session Vazgen Manukyan, head of the republic's government, reported that the supply of gas to Armenia has been resumed.

As IZVESTIYA has already reported, ever since 20 August the republic's population and industry have been deprived of the fuel supplied from Saratov along the main pipeline which crosses Azerbaijani territory. The damage done to the republic's economy by this prolonged gas blockade exceeds 100 million rubles.

NKAO Philanthropic Union Official Released

NC1910082290 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1630 GMT 17 Oct 90

[Text] Artur Aleksanyan, acting chairman of Artsakh's [Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast—NKAO] Armenian philanthropic union, was recently released from Shushi prison. He had been detained for 30 days for allegedly resisting a search by soldiers.

However, Artur Aleksanyan explained the true reason behind his arrest as follows: The military authorities are well aware of the role played by Amaras Philanthropic Union in the consolidation of the [word indistinct] and cultural relations between Artsakh and the Armenian Republic. This union is one of the official [word indistinct] organizations in Artsakh, and it enjoys its worthy place in the Karabakhian Movement. I am sure that my arrest was engineered in order to create a pretext to obstruct the union's activities.

Mutalibov Defends Azerbaijan Position on NKAO

91US0021A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 38, Sep 90 p 11

[Report on interview with Ayaz Mutalibov, president of the Azerbaijan SSR and first secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee, conducted by SOYUZ special correspondent Dmitriy Khrapovitskiy by telephone; date not given: "Ayaz Mutalibov: The Other Side Will Be Given a Hearing"]

[Text] Baku—This is no longer news: The hurly-burly, fast-moving situation of today does not, alas, provide us with answers to all acute questions. How many invigorating kernels on the ears of this sociopolitical teaching or the other can be found! Under the incipient privatization, will we succeed in avoiding the characteristic ailments of "their" society? The following also may today be boldly put among such questions: Was there really a root cause to the Karabakh conflict? Neither the shooting nor the deaths at the border make this any clearer. We will venture to maintain that it is sometimes far more important to find a way out of a situation that has taken shape in the course of an argument than to answer a question. Will tranquillity come to the land of Azerbaijan—this is the subject of our interview....

[Khrapovitskiy] Ayaz Niyazovich, an obvious question....

[Mutalibov] Of course, our main problem currently is the confrontation of peoples which had been age-old neighbors, and which has come about not on our initiative. It is today hindering not only the rhythmic labor of the two republics but also the implementation of many democratic transformations of which we are in need. It seemed to some people that it was possible in the course of the policy of perestroyka to return once more to the question of the NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast], thus ensuring in many people's eyes the glasnost and democratization which had just been proclaimed....

The initiators of the latest Karabakh campaign availed themselves very adroitly at first of the socioeconomic problems of the NKAO, which are typical of the whole country incidentally. This was the start of 1988. A country which had already exceeded its meager possibilities many times over nonetheless allocated 500 million rubles for the solution of these problems. Although by that time the public was already informed about the fact that in terms of the level of basic social indicators the autonomous oblast was ahead of Azerbaijan and Armenia. The true aim of what was intended soon came

to be manifested. There should be no doubt that the resources allocated by the state are not necessary to this day. What then was the reason for this embitterment? Neither then nor now have we been in any doubt—territory.

You know, for all that I must still note here that the matter of expanding the limits of Armenian territory is not an idle question; it has existed as long as the Armenian Church. The best representatives of Armenian culture speak constantly about this. Silva Kaputikyan said in one of her speeches that Armenians are simply being strangled: on the one side by Iran, on the other by Turkey, on a third by Azerbaijan. They are thinking about future generations which "will have nowhere to live." But even if one needs something very much, it is not the done thing in a civilized society to lay hold of this by force. It was such attempts that we encountered. Translated from Azeri, Karabakh means "dark garden," and there is nothing Armenian here. Attempts were made to move away from this name, and people began to say Artsakh. But this is not an Armenian name either, it is Albanian. Caucasian Albania, as you know, was situated on the land of present-day Azerbaijan. But it is not even a question of these toponymic "victories" of ours. The argument of "historians" could go on forever. And life should not come to a halt because of it.

After all, the CPSU Central Committee Interethnic Relations Department is well aware (I have always encountered understanding there) of the history of the disputed land. There was sufficient time in 1988 to have investigated and adopted the appropriate measures. But no. There was intimidation at that time, with reproaches connected with democracy and glasnost, reproaches concerning the diktat of the center. And it was not only with this that a desire to demonstrate "democratic" actions was connected....

[Khrapovitskiy] What do you mean? Is this an allusion, very prevalent in your republic what is more, to some all-Union "Armenia lobby"?

[Mutalibov] A lobby or not, there are many inescapable facts. Why in 1988, when the situation had only just begun to intensify, did the center need to observe some "perestroyka etiquette"? We are still not yet accustomed to democracy and understand it as the right to an improvement in our own life, and fail to see that in all countries with a developed democracy it is organically combined with strong authority. So the time gained has led to the supporters of the separation of the NKAO from Azerbaijan, not having heard the categorical disagreement of the central authorities, having accumulated forces and resources. Just look, the NKAO has done no work for two years, but people are not living at all badly.

If the NKAO may gradually be detached, why can others not be detached? What then, are we now to start everything all over again? But after all, even if we all detach ourselves from one another, traditional economic relations cannot be replaced by new ones in a trice, and much of the former interaction would have to be restored. So would it not be better not to be in a hurry?

Do you think that we have no claims against our neighbors? At one time Azeris constituted almost half the population of Armenia, but there has come to be practically none of them left in the years of Soviet power. There was, after all, the so-called Mikoyan deportation when approximately 100,000 Azeris were evicted from Armenia, and thousands of them perished in the new locations—many from cholera. Some 165,000 Azeris were expelled from Armenia in 1988. They left a territory equal to one-fifth of Armenia—6,600 square kilometers. One is struck here by the fact that without any pricking of the conscience some "patriots" in Armenia are shouting about genocide against Armenians in Azerbaijan. Yet for 70 years Azeris in Armenia went unprotected by the Soviet authorities. They were deprived of the rights to life, labor, and abode, and owing to the lack of scruple of its former leaders never did the Azeri side complain about the real genocide being perpetrated against a whole people.

[Khrapovitskiy] Very many people in Armenia currently are prepared to give thought to a sensible way out of the grim situation....

[Mutalibov] We know this and are prepared to assist in every possible way. There are after all autonomous formations throughout the world. They have their prerogatives, like the republics. Just one condition—the NKAO as an autonomous formation is a part of the political and economic system of Azerbaijan, and is naturally guided by its laws.

[Khrapovitskiy] No nation can be brought to its knees—we are little by little assimilating this piece of wisdom. The more so in that even the most dreadful earthquake was for many people merely a passing fact against the background of the problem of the NKAO's affiliation to Armenia. The two peoples are appallingly stirred up. Convincing them that the cause of the other is the "right" cause is impossible. What should be done right now, today, to ease the tension?

[Mutalibov] This situation was born of the inaction of the central authorities and our recent leadership. The numerous informal associations and parties point to this fact today. Many of them have availed themselves of the Karabakh problem with great benefit to themselves. Skillfully playing on the delicate national feelings of the two peoples the Armenian National Movement, the basis of which is the not-unknown Karabakh movement, has now come to power in Armenia. Nationalist, extremist trends which brought us to Black January also grew on this yeast, and given the inaction of the central authorities all this will pulsate constantly. You see how a few days ago, for the first time since January, there was once again an attempt to occupy the square in front of Government House. And the center has to think that all

this is being connived at there by certain forces. Otherwise the Union NKAO Control Commission in particular, for which it is high time to bring clarity to bear on the situation and call things by their name, would not have been inactive all the while. After all, the situation on the border is practically unchanged, and this is giving the extremists hope that they can restore their pre-January rating on the scale of political affection. I am sure that this will not happen, our people do not need blood. But such attempts are being made.

So I have one answer: We are not posing the question of secession from the Union, and I am sure that in principle the Union may be renewed in such a way that the Union republics benefit. But within the Union, be so kind as to ensure the security of our citizens and borders.

[Khrapovitskiy] Following the "Death to the Center" chants are now appeals for assistance. I have to wonder: Perhaps it will be possible for the two republics to come to an agreement after all? Have you been in contact with the new Armenian leadership?

[Mutalibov] The Armenian side periodically puts forward the following proposition: Let the NKAO problem be solved in the autonomous oblast itself—neither by Armenia nor Azerbaijan. There is in the statement itself, you will agree, evidence of a disregard for the rights of our republic. Would any other republic agree to such a formulation of the issue were this situation to exist anywhere else? I am sure it would not. So why give us such ultimatums? And speak about political methods of solving the problem here?

I recently had a telephone conversation with Ter-Petrosyan. I told him the same as I have told you: We understand Armenia's current problems, but they are not an excuse for pursuing an expansionist policy. I said that now that you are leader of the republic, you might want if only for a moment to put yourself in my shoes.... But I very much fear that the opposition will squeeze Ter-Petrosyan primarily on the Nagornyy Karabakh problem. So even if he sincerely wishes to eliminate the conflict, his efforts alone it would seem will not be enough.

Azerbaijan's Aliyev Describes Election Campaign

PM!910102190 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 13 Oct 90 p 1

[Interview with Geydar Aliyev by V. Larin and A. Mursaliyev in Nakhichevan; date not given; first paragraph is introduction: "'I Knew That the Majority Wanted Me'"]

[Text] With his steady gaze and look of authority, this man, a former comrade of Yuriy Andropov, seems to have no intention of losing his latest battle. The telephone in his apartment is constantly ringing, he receives a steady stream of telegrams, and there are always cars parked outside the entrance, some of which bear government number plates.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] You won an election. Does this mean that Geydar Aliyev is making a comeback in big politics?

[Aliyev] Taking part in the election for the republic's Supreme Soviet is a form a political activity. I have been elected a people's deputy in Azerbaijan and in the Nakhichevan ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic]. In this capacity, I will actively and persistently defend the interests of the Azerbaijani people.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] You met with a protest demonstration in Baku but have had some marvelous meetings in Nakhichevan. Here you managed to secure 95 percent of the vote. Did this unanimity come as a surprise to you?

[Aliyev] I would like to divide that question into two parts and answer each of them separately.

There have been no protest demonstrations against me. Meeting me at the aircraft steps, my relatives told me that a group of around 30-50 people carrying placards had gathered outside the deputies' lounge. I wanted to go up to them and ask what they wanted. It is my custom not to avoid contact with people, whatever their attitudes may be. But I was told that they were specially hired people—mainly from nearby villages—and that there was no point in talking to them.

I was later visited by a Baku journalist who had been in the deputies' lounge at the airport at the time. He had been able to talk to many of the "protesters." He felt sure that these people—very far removed from the world of politics—did not know why they had been brought there. They had been assembled, put on buses, and told that they must go to the airport.

I would like to relate another incident as well. On my arrival in the city, I went to stay with my brother. At the end of the day I decided to visit the graves of the victims of the January events. I tried to time my visit to the burial ground for when there would be very few people about, and I went there with my relatives. I was bending down to pay my respects at the last grave when I turned round and saw that a lot of people had gathered behind me: There were probably more than 300 of them. Everyone greeted me very warmly, as one human being to another. They started to ask me questions, a conversation ensued, and I realized that these people had come from various regions of the republic. But when I began to feel that a virtual rally was forming around me, I decided to say goodbye and leave so that there would be no grounds for talk. After all, there is still a state of emergency in Baku. So those two events both happened on the same day....

As far as the second part of your question is concerned, the unanimity shown by the people of Nakhichevan came as no surprise to me. I knew that most voters would vote for me. When I flew into Nakhichevan no one knew about it. But my sister's small yard was soon filled with an endless stream of people. A very great many people—

around 80,000—gathered in the central square to wait for me. It was hard to make our way through the crowd, it took us around 40 minutes so great was people's desire to speak to me. I made a short speech and they welcomed my arrival, expressing their warm attitude to me. It was then that I finally realized I was bound to be elected.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] What will be the first steps you take as a people's deputy?

[Aliyev] In short, I think the first thing that needs to be done is to stabilize the situation in the republic and create normal living and working conditions for my compatriots. The republic cannot be left in a state where part of it is essentially cut off and refusing to obey. The main destabilizing factors are the situation surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh and the question of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Nagorno-Karabakh is part of Azerbaijan and cannot remain for long in its present state of limbo. The legislature must decide how to resolve this.

It goes without saying that we must also work for democracy and real people's power in the republic and for the removal of all diktat and suppression.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] With which political forces do you link the future of Azerbaijan?

[Aliyev] There are now a great many political formations and trends in the republic, and I do not know them all as well as I should. I am more or less familiar with the People's Front: I read its newspaper, AZADLYG. It is an influential political force. It is hard for me to say how much influence the others have. But I do believe that the time has come to allow all political forces to be active. None of them must dictate its terms to the rest. This is the only way that democracy can develop in Azerbaijan.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] What is your opinion of the situation in the country?

[Aliyev] I think it is deplorable. There is no other word for it. What is more, the situation becomes worse and worse with every passing month and year. No one can tell us why we should have to suffer all the bad things before we can start a new life.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] What can you say about ideas like "Aliyevism" or "the Aliyev clan"?

[Aliyev] It is all lies and slander. Publications on this subject are a dishonest move, and I cannot rule out the possibility that this sordid action against me was sanctioned by the country's political leadership.

Let me explain. Troops were sent into Baku on 20 January. People were killed. I felt pain and outrage at that. I could not remain indifferent to the fate of my people and my republic. I regarded this action as unlawful, illegal, undemocratic, and inhuman. I condemned this military action at a press conference on 21 January at the Azerbaijan permanent mission in Moscow. I said that it was a gross political error by the country's leadership. This statement of mine was immediately circulated by the world media, with the exception of the Soviet press. I learned that it had caused irritation among the Central Committee leadership. This is my relatives' apartment—you can see it for yourselves. If I had some kind of clan, all my relatives would be living in luxury, but they live a simple lifestyle. So what kind of clan can they be talking about?

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Did you resign solely on health grounds?

[Aliyev] No, I did not. There were also other reasons unconnected with my health and work. I had always worked hard, honestly, and conscientiously and everyone was well aware of that.

Baku Commandant Cancels 7 Nov Victory Parade

LD1910095190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0832 GMT 19 Oct 90

[Text] Baku, 19 Oct (AZERINFORM-TASS)—Colonel Veriy Buniyatov, military commandant of the capital of Azerbaijan, has canceled the 7 November demonstration and parade in Baku devoted to the 73rd anniversary of the October Socialist Revolution. He informed the people of Baku of this today in an announcement by the military commandant's office, published in the republican newspapers.

It appears from the announcement that the demonstration and parade have been canceled in accordance with Point 6, Article 4 of the USSR law "On the Legal Regime of the State of Emergency", according to which the holding of rallies, street processions, and demonstrations is banned.

Foreign Businessmen, Azerbaijanis Meet in Baku

PM1810142990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 Oct 90 Second Edition p 1

[Untitled report from PRAVDA-TASS-INTERFAX roundup under the general heading: "Telephone. Teletype. Telefax"]

[Text] Baku—The first international congress of representatives of foreign business circles interested in economic ties with the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic has opened here. More than 500 representatives of over 100 foreign firms from Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, Egypt, Cyprus, the United Arab Emirates, Pakistan, the United States, Turkey, South Korea—from 40 countries in all—are participating in the forum's work.

Georgia Protests Holding 7 Nov Military Parade

LD1910142690 Moscow World Service in Russian 1040 GMT 19 Oct 90

[From the "Soviet Chronicle" feature of the "Soviet Union Day by Day" program]

[Text] Georgiy Chanturiya, chairman of the National Democratic Party of Georgia, has sent a telegram to President Gorbachev protesting against the decision to hold military parades on 7 November throughout the Soviet Union. The telegram states that the so-called October Revolution was the defeat of the February revolution, liquidated democracy, and by its bayonets halted the aspirations of the people for freedom. In the view of Chanturiya, 25 February, the day of the annexation of Georgia, is the [word indistinct] of 7 November. He warns that any attempt to hold a military parade in Tbilisi on 7 November may cause completely unpredictable consequences in its wake.

Central Asia

Coverage of Kazakhstan Supreme Soviet Proceedings

Sovereignty Declaration Debated

PM1810150390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Oct 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by correspondent V. Ardayev: "Declaration Born of Debate"]

[Text] Alma-Ata—The first stage of the discussion of drafts of the republic's declaration of state sovereignty has been completed at the Kazakh SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet session.

The leaders of the working group of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, who created the official draft declaration, could hardly have assumed just a few days ago that the discussion would be so complex. Nor incidentally that, in addition to their draft, another alternative draft drawn up by the "Democratic Kazakhstan" deputies' group would be the subject of a parliamentary debate.

One serious objection against the alternative draft's being discussed at this session: It had not been through all the preceding stages of discussion—discussion in commissions and committees and by the whole people (it was published only on the eve of the session). However, in the end the strength of a number of points in the alternative draft and the activeness of the group's deputies in explaining their concept and insisting that the document be examined, resulted in a decision to duplicate the text of the draft and distribute it among deputies. As a result, almost every participant in the debate touched on it in one way or another. There was also much criticism of the alternative—the chief target was the idea of abandoning national statehood in favor of building a civic society in the republic. Defending the group's position, Deputy Yu. Sukhov, a member of "Democratic Kazakhstan," described its aim as follows: "It would be terrible if, having destroyed the totalitarian regime in the country, we were to build a totalitarian republic." It was this fear above all that prompted the deputies' group to draw up an alternative draft.

There was a lot of argument over questions of the republic's state language, alternative military service, the creation of republican militarized formations—internal troops and public security services—and other points. Although the original official draft was nonetheless taken as the basis by a majority of votes, the deputies decided, taking the abundance of proposed amendments and amplifications into account, to form a conciliation commission to carry out additional work on it. It includes representatives of "Democratic Kazakhstan," and now it is quite likely that the final version will incorporate certain points from the alternative document. It was decided that the session would return in one week's time to the adoption of the Kazakh SSR Declaration of State Sovereignty.

The determination with which the "Democratic Kazakhstan" deputies' group, whose very existence was simply disputed by certain leaders even on the eve of the session, made its presence felt and cannot escape notice. Thus the question of the structure of power in the republic was included on the agenda at the suggestion of this group's members. It is assumed that the proposal to reform the Council of Ministers as a cabinet of ministers directly subordinate to the president of Kazakhstan will be discussed.

In addition, when discussing the agenda the deputies decided to examine at top priority the question of the draft republic law on making changes and additions to Kazakh SSR legislative acts in connection with the adoption of the USSR Laws "On Increasing Liability for Encroachments on Citizens' National Equality and the Violent Violation of the Unity of USSR Territory" and "On the Legal Regime of the State of Emergency." The need for this is dictated by the sociopolitical situation prevailing in the republic.

So far, in two days of work the deputies have adopted just one law—the law proclaiming Republic Day. Henceforth 6 October will be celebrated annually as the state holiday of Kazakhstan's entire people.

The session discussed the republic version of the draft Union treaty. Kazakh SSR President N. Nazarbayev addressed the deputies on this question. He voiced the hope in particular that the version prepared by the republic will prove acceptable to other sovereign republics too.

A speech was heard from V. Vodolazov, deputy from Uralsk, who spoke about the activities of the "Rebirth" society of Uralsk Cossacks. His report did not satisfy the deputies who decided to set up a special parliamentary group for a more detailed and objective study of the situation in Uralsk Oblast.

Republics Agreements Approved

LD1810190690 Alma-Ata Democratic Service in Kazakh 1500 GMT 18 Oct 90

[Excerpts] An information report on sessions of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic [KaSSR] Supreme

Soviet. Today's morning session of the KaSSR Supreme Soviet, which was chaired by Abdildin, deputy chairman of KaSSR Supreme Soviet, examined the issues proposed by the KaSSR Council of Ministers on the agreement of economic, scientific, technical, and cultural cooperation between the Uzbek SSR, Kazak SSR Kirghiz SSR, Tajik SSR, and Turkmen SSR on 23 June 1990, and the agreement betwen KaSSR and Belorussian SSR on 5 October 1990. A report was delivered by Gukasov, first deputy chairman of the KaSSR Council of Ministers. [passage omitted]

After the thorough discussion by the deputies, the agreements were aproved. Deputies then moved on the discussion of the questions on amendments and additions to a few of the legislative acts of the KaSSR, in connection with the adoption of the law of the USSR on the strengthening of the responsibility for the encroachment of national equality of the citizens and violation of the unity of the territory of the USSR, and in according to legal regime of the state of emergency. [passage omitted]

The committee for the question on legislation, legality, law and order has been instructed to complete and to put forward a corresponding draft law. The draft law on status of the people's deputies of the KaSSR was examined at the evening session. A report on this draft law was delivered by Klachkov, chairman of the Committee for Question on the Work of the Council of the People's Deputies in the Development of Governing and Self-governing of KaSSR.

Subscriptions to Kazakhstan Press Decline

PM1810152590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Oct 90 Second Edition p 6

[Report by correspondent T. Yesilbayev under the general heading "Subscription Campaign Under Way": "In Conditions of Competition"]

[Text] Alma-Ata—In Kazakhstan the regular readership of many central and local newspapers and journals is down on last year. Kazyken Vazylov, the republic's deputy minister of communications, describes the features of the current subscription campaign:

[Vazylov] The subscription campaign is beyond the halfway point, but its results are depressing. In the last month practically all central and republican publications failed to muster even one-fourth as many subscribers as last year. The reason is well known: the sharp increase in the price of all newspapers and journals.

Competition in the information market is now keener than ever. Nevertheless, as the results of the subscription campaign for September show, the sympathies of many Kazakhstan people are with central and republican party publications. Thus subscriptions to PRAVDA in Aktyubinsk, Kokchetav, Uralsk, and Turgay Oblasts and in Alma-Ata city have been higher than in other regions of the republic. Nevertheless, subscriptions are clearly down on last year when it was the choice of 307,000 readers in Kazakhstan.

The start of the subscription campaign suffered irritating disruptions caused by the lack of full information about the new periodicals prices, and also by the shortage of newspaper and journal catalogues. The situation has now been rectified. Unlike previous years, the personnel of post offices have a material interest in the propaganda and circulation of periodicals. "Soyuzpechat" is now giving them eight percent of the proceeds of newspaper and journal subscriptions and is giving four percent to mailmen.

The increase in the price of newspapers and journals has been a particularly painful blow to low-income strata of the population. No advertising is any help here, so to speak. So the initiative of a number of collectives of industrial enterprises, institutions and organizations, and state and collective farms in the republic which have taken on the cost of subscribing to PRAVDA and other party publications for pensioners and labor veterans, deserves every possible support. Many communications enterprises and also our ministry's central apparatus are following a similar course of action.

The Friends of PRAVDA Clubs are not remaining on the sidelines either. For instance in Alma-Ata the Friends of PRAVDA Club, in conjunction with the "Atameken" small enterprise, the corporation of aeronauts, and the Leninskiy Rayon "Soyuzpechat" Department, has published in local newspapers the conditions of a lottery whose winners—PRAVDA subscribers of course—will receive money prizes of between 100 and 500 rubles.

We have one more reserve for maintaining PRAVDA's print run—retail sales. In the republic the paper is circulated via 2,181 "Soyuzpechat" kiosks and 54 stores, and all rural post offices and freelance vendors on aviation and railroad transport, in hotels, and in rest homes and sanatoriums have been brought into play.

'Unity' Movement Registered in Alma-Ata

PM1910115390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Oct 90 Union Edition p 1

[Report by correspondent V. Ardayev: "'Unity' Registered"]

[Text] Alma-Ata—The interethnic movement "Unity," which came into being around a month ago in the capital of Kazakhstan, has acquired official status.

The international movement [interdvizheniye] which has declared peace and concord among all the peoples in Kazakhstan its main aim, now has 25 collective members—collectives of industrial enterprises, scientific research and planning institutes—and institutions are joining, one after another. They include people of various nationalities and with a variety of political views.

Only recently the Chechen-Ingush "Vaynakh" ethnic cultural center became a member of "Unity."

One thing unites them: a desire to live and work without interethnic upheavals. The members of "Unity" are prepared to rebuff any manifestations of nationalism and chauvinism, irrespective of what nation or ethnic group the people propagandizing them belong to.

Now "Unity" has been officially registered at an Alma-Ata Rayon Soviet Executive Committee. The movement will be holding a conference in the next few days.

Russian Migration From Uzbekistan Examined

91US0027A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian
No 40, Oct 90 p 6

[Article by Olga Vladimirova: "170,000 'Internal' Emigres"]

[Text] Tashkent—The law on the official language of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] clearly says that all nationalities residing on the territory of the republic freely enjoy the right to form their own national-cultural societies and center. Many people have availed themselves of this right. In any event, 13 such centers have registered as of this time in Tashkent—Korean, Armenian, Jewish, Kazakh and others—and have successfully embarked on the implementation of their scheduled programs. And no one as is known has put any obstacles in anyone's way. So why is there suddenly a question mark concerning a Russian center? This affair is reminiscent, to the point of unseemliness, of the well-known children's game of telephone, but it is not on this occasion children that are playing it.

This is what I was told by A. Travkov, deputy of the Tashkent City Soviet and cochairman of the Uzbek "Intersoyuz," which unites representatives of the republic's Russian-speaking population:

"A constituent conference of the Russian Cultural Center was held this March in Tashkent. It was attended by approximately 40 delegated representatives of the artistic and engineering intelligentsia. They formed the center and immediately began work on the propaganda of Russian culture. The 'Mozaika' Studio Theater, which incidentally is registered by the appropriate authorities and has legal entity status, affiliated itself with the center. The founders of the center prepared and transmitted to the Tashkent City Soviet Executive Committee [Gorispolkom] documents by which the center itself was to have been registered. But suddenly a surprise—the gorispolkom [city soviet executive committee] refused to register the Russian Cultural Center. The refusal was upheld by the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers. The reasons? All the conditions for the development of culture have already been created for Russians in Uzbekistan, and their need for spiritual and cultural contacts with one another has been satisfied in full. No one called to mind the fact that it was primarily the law that had been violated. We appealed to the city prosecutor's office—once again a refusal. It was politely explained to us: Even if the law is on your side, it is currently the wrong atmosphere in the republic."

As Central Television recently reported, more than 170,000 persons have left Uzbekistan under duress since the start of the Fergana events. Containers on the railroad have been allotted for six months ahead. The newspaper TASHKENTSKAYA NEDELYA abounds in announcements of "Exchange an apartment in Uzbekistan for one in any Russian city." In the past seven months some 319 persons have been released from the Tashkent Tractor Plant alone in connection with departure from the republic, and these have been mainly engineering-technical personnel and highly skilled workers. Given the constantly growing unemployment among the republic's indigenous population, the shortage of manpower at the industrial enterprises is being felt with ever increasing seriousness. The government has now been forced to urgently solve a complex question: Owing to the departure of personnel, the danger of a stoppage at major power stations has arisen right on the eve of winter. There is practically no one to service two power units at the Syr-Darya State Regional Electric Power Station [GRES], and the construction and startup of the Talimardzhan GRES are being hampered. The reason is the same—the departure of personnel. Such a situation would hardly have been created had the Russian-speaking population felt at home in the republic. It does not. Groups in which the language of tuition is Russian are being closed down in the higher educational institutions, the editorial offices dealing with the publication of literature in Russian are being eliminated in the publishing houses, and streets and squares that for decades have borne the names of Russian figures of culture, literature, and politics are urgently being renamed. All Russian signboards have somehow suddenly disappeared. Initially last year all the street name plaques were replaced by bilingual plaques. A month or two later they were hurriedly replaced by Uzbek plaques. One wonders what this action of the Tashkent Gorispolkom cost. Or have all the most acute social problems of the 2 million-strong city been resolved long since, and there is no scrabbling for money?

The impending industrialization of the republic has forced some people to have second thoughts, it is true. The front page of the newspaper ANDIZHANSKAYA PRAVDA for 19 September, for example, carried an appeal to inhabitants of the oblast center adopted by the presidium of the city soviet on behalf of the people's deputies. It contains the following:

"We are losing specialists of various profiles so necessary for the economy. These are highly skilled employees of the health system, public education, industry, construction, transport, and services. These are people of mental and physical labor. Their departure is having a negative effect on the economic, social, and political life of the

city and the production indicators of enterprises' economic activity. Do not leave your c y and your comfortable homes where you spent your childhood and youth and a time of fruitful labor activity. And those who are now into their senior years, do not leave your children and comrades who shared joy and misfortunes with you. Do not leave your near ones and dear ones buried in Andizhan soil and do not forget the Uzbek people's traditionally friendly attitude toward all other peoples. Do not go, dear comrades!"

A good appeal; heartfelt, but how is it to be heeded? I hold in my hand the popular Uzbek magazine FAN VA TURMUSH ["Science and Life"] No. 8 for this year and have read an interview with organizers of the "Erk" ["Will"] Party, which calls itself democratic. This is what the writer Zokhir Aglam says:

"The Erk Democratic Party is the first party in Uzbekistan and in Central Asia that gives pride of place to the interests of the indigenous nationality. In any event I would like it to be such, and it is to this that I wish to lend my efforts.... Power should be in the hands of representatives of the local nationality. Who work at the plants, what language specialists use, in what language films are shown in the movie theaters—all this should be decided by representatives of the local nationality. Then the Aral will not go dry, children will grow up healthy and will not be poisoned by toxic chemicals, attacks will not be organized in the Army on Uzbek boys and if just one fighting man dies, the reasons for his death will be honestly ascertained and the murderers will be punished in public view. As long as the republic's natural resources and human lives are used in the interests of others, these vile phenomena will continue."

There you have it! It could not have been put more clearly. Is it any wonder after such statements that those who are not Uzbeks feel uncomfortable in Uzbekistan? Is it any wonder how guardedly they have received the draft law "Citizenship of the Uzbek SSR," which was promulgated at the start of September—a month has for some reason or other been allotted for its discussion, incidentally? Particular concern is caused by the wording of Article 46 according to which the future equal citizen of the Uzbek SSR must, aside from all else, swear on the republic's constitution "to respect the customs and traditions of the Uzbek people." The legitimate question arises: Why is it necessary in Uzbekistan to respect the traditions merely of one individual people, not of all those inhabiting the republic? Or would it be more logical perhaps to respect the General Declaration on Human Rights, not traditions? There are many questions....

And it is for this reason that appeals, letters, petitions, and entreaties, like that which lies before me, are being born in the Russian-speaking population. This latter is a letter sent to Boris Yeltsin, chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Supreme Soviet, and Islam Karimov, president of the Uzbek SSR, by a meeting of the work force of the test center of the "Foton" Production Association—the biggest works in the republic of the USSR Ministry of Electrical Equipment Industry and Instrument Making—following discussion of the said bill. It contains the following words:

"We members of the Russian-speaking population of Tashkent, subjected to repression, evacuated, and invited to assist the Uzbek people with humanitarian and technical assistance in the development of Uzbekistan's economy, request that the RSFSR Supreme Soviet preserve or renew our citizenship of Russia and demand that the Uzbekistan Government ensure on Uzbekistan territory compliance with human rights regardless of nationality, or otherwise provide at the Uzbek SSR's expense for departure with provision of equivalent work and accommodations outside of the republic."

The appeal contains the following postscript:

"As a sign of protest against the nationalist policy being pursued by the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee we, N.A. Pavlov, party member since 1962, and B.I. Ageyev, party member since 1967, announce our resignation from the CPSU."

Thus are all the conditions for realization of their cultural requirements being created for Russians in Uzbekistan today. Surviving is in fact the issue—not finding themselves in the role of a banished people, like the Meskhetian Turks who, as is known, were not saved either by their knowledge of Uzbek, respect for the traditions of the Uzbek people, or community of religion and culture.

What is happening with the Russian Cultural Center today, incidentally? Nothing. The city's fathers advised its organizers to gather once more at a constituent assembly, which was to have been held last Tuesday in a central hall of Tashkent. Many were puzzled, it is true: Why found again what has already been founded? But they need not have been. The assembly did not take place, for all that. It was banned by the Tashkent Gorispolkom.